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‘Climate Change Policy Narratives and Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa: 
New Concerns, Old Arguments?’ 
Thomas Campbell 
 
While there is a growing body of knowledge on the effects of climatic and other forms of change 
on pastoralism in Africa, less is known about how recent policy responses and development 
interventions in the name of climate change and pastoral area development are shaped by certain 
discourses and narratives and by political interests. This is important because the simplifications 
that are often a characteristic of environmental policy narratives can fail to acknowledge the 
politicised nature of many environmental problems in local contexts. The pastoral drylands are no 
exception as claims to land and other resources remain contested by different actors.  
Through content and discourse analyses of national policies, supplemented by interviews with key 
informants, this research examines the discourses and narratives around pastoralism found within 
contemporary policy in Ethiopia and Kenya, the interests of actors and actor-networks shaping 
those narratives, and their consequences for pastoralism.  
The findings reveal that while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening 
resilience of dryland communities have given a new impetus to pastoral development, old 
narratives that depict pastoral areas as unproductive and in need of modernisation remain deeply 
embedded in policy making. These open up spaces for the state, investors, and local elites to extend 
control over natural resources previously managed under customary institutions. The resultant 
climate policy solutions and dryland investments are, in turn, leading to new patterns of social 
differentiation and vulnerability among pastoralists.  While providing some level of climate-risk 
preparedness, climate adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own are insufficient 
to meet the needs of pastoralist communities. I argue that the extent and nature of dynamic change 
in the drylands of the HoA calls for political responses that address social inequities and power 







Chapter 1:  Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction  
While there is a growing body of knowledge on the effects of climatic and other forms of change 
on pastoralism in Africa, less is known about how recent policy responses and development 
interventions in the name of climate change and pastoral area development are shaped by certain 
discourses and narratives, and what the consequences of these narratives are for pastoralist 
communities. This is important because the simplifications that often characterise environmental 
policy narratives – around climate change or land degradation, for example – can be inadequate in 
acknowledging the institutionalised and politicised nature of many environmental problems in local 
contexts. The pastoral drylands are no exception – where claims to land and other resources remain 
contested by different actors and interests (Flintan, 2011; Scoones et al., 2019; Lind et al., 2020).  
Central to this understanding is the need to identify and unpack ‘policy narratives’: how particular 
discourses are ‘framed’ within policy, what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings 
and interests predominate (Roe, 1991; Hajer, 1995; Adger et al., 2001; Dryzek, 2013). In the Horn 
of Africa (HoA), pastoral dryland areas (and pastoralism) have long been equated with narratives 
of poverty, low productivity, environmental degradation and conflict, despite a growing acceptance 
of pastoralism as a legitimate land-use system. More recently, new policy narratives have emerged, 
built largely around ‘climate resilience', 'green economic growth’ and the need for ‘climate-smart 
agriculture’. These are being invoked by policymakers, as the state, donors and other development 
actors seek to respond to global and national concerns about climate-change, food-security and 
political-security imperatives (Krätli, 2013; Yirgu et al., 2013; Maina et al., 2013; Odhiambo, 
2014; Death, 2015). Combined with the availability of climate finance, these narratives allow 
greater scope for the state and other actors to generate consensus and mobilise resources for the 
development of pastoral areas in the face of climate change. In turn, the policy prescriptions and 
investments that flow from such narratives and funding streams have far-reaching implications for 
the livelihoods of mobile pastoralists.  
It has been suggested that some of the narratives driving current climate-change and green-
economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily ‘new’, but are instead rooted in the 
same historical discourses around ‘unproductive’ drylands, the poor as ‘agents and victims of 
environmental degradation’ and the need for modernisation (Odhiambo, 2014; Weissser et al. 
2014; Krätli, 2019). Yet there has been little research to date that systematically analyses the kinds 
of discourses and narratives found within Ethiopian and Kenyan national policies related to climate 





narratives are for pastoralist livelihoods and future pastoralist development pathways. This research 
aims to address that gap. It does this through examining the kinds of assumptions and arguments 
around pastoralism found within contemporary climate-change and drylands-focused policies in 
Ethiopia and Kenya, with a view to identifying what discourses and narratives are dominant and if 
discourses have evolved over time. In addition, it explores the interests of actors and actor 
networks driving those discourses and narratives and, ultimately, their consequences for 
pastoralism.  
The findings reveal that, while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening 
resilience of dryland communities have given a new impetus to pastoral development in the HoA, 
old narratives that depict pastoral systems and pastoral areas as unproductive, and in need of 
modernisation, remain deeply embedded in policymaking. Combined with climate-change 
arguments, these narratives open up spaces for the state and other actors – private investors, local 
elites, conservation organisations – to extend control over natural resources previously managed 
under customary institutions. Climate-policy ‘solutions’ and dryland investments are, in turn, 
leading to new patterns of social differentiation and vulnerability among pastoralists, as well as 
accentuating existing ones. I argue that predominantly apolitical and technocratic climate-
adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own are insufficient to meet the needs of 
pastoralist communities. The extent and nature of dynamic change in the drylands of the HoA calls 
for political responses that address social inequities and power imbalances, that safeguard 
pastoralists’ resource rights, and that allow for more inclusive forms of governance.  
In doing so, this study adds empirical evidence in support of what has been observed elsewhere, as 
well as offering new insights. Based on a systematic content and discourse analysis of Ethiopian 
and Kenyan national policy documents relevant to pastoralism over a period of time, supplemented 
by interviews with policy actors, it provides evidence to support claims that old arguments and 
assumptions are being reiterated within contemporary policymaking – allowing for some nuances 
and differences between the two cases. It also adds further evidence in support of the argument that 
narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities and contexts arise (Maina et al., 
2013, Otto-Naess et al., 2015; Death, 2016) – the process of devolution and the accelerated 
economic development of northern Kenya’s arid and semi-arid (ASAL) counties, or the promotion 
of a ‘green economy’ in Ethiopia, being cases in point. And that ‘dominant narratives’ have the 
ability to absorb the language and concepts of ‘counternarratives’ (Toulmin and Brock, 2016) – 
where a discourse of ‘modern, mobile and green pastoralism’ has now become more central to how 
policymakers, in both Ethiopia and Kenya, envision a pastoralist sector that is both ‘climate 
resilient’ and ‘modern’. What this research adds – and what is only beginning to be explored 





local pastoralist elites – and local political interests play a prominent role in driving the kinds of 
economic and social change in formerly peripheral pastoral drylands of Kenya and Ethiopia.  
This chapter sets out the main parameters of this thesis. The first section provides an introduction 
to the heterogeneous nature of drylands and pastoralism in the HoA, as well as the historical 
context for pastoralist marginalisation. The second section outlines the existing literature on policy 
narratives as they apply to climate change and pastoralism in the HoA, and where gaps in the 
research remain. The third section sets out the methodological approach taken. The final section is 
an outline of each chapter, synopsising key findings and arguments. 
1.2 Why drylands and pastoralism matter 
Drylands comprise around 43% of the African continent’s landmass, albeit with significant 
variations between countries (AU, 2010)1. Pastoralism, agro-pastoralism2 and dryland farming are 
the dominant forms of land use, although opportunities also exist for trade, tourism, extractive 
industries and environmental services (Anderson et al., 2009; McPeak et al., 2011). Pastoralism is 
a livelihood strategy and system of mobile livestock production that takes advantage of the marked 
variability and associated uncertainties in the spatial and temporal distribution of pasture and water 
resources in dryland areas (Naimer-Fuller 1999; Mortimore et al., 2009; Notenbaart et al., 2012; 
Lind et al., 2016; Krätli, 2015; Davies et al., 2016). Pastoralists move not only to meet the nutrition 
needs of their livestock, but also to access markets, avoid disease, escape conflict and enhance 
exchanges with other land users (Nassef et al., 2009; Mortimore et al., 2009; Turner and Schlecht, 
2019). While the drylands of the HoA (Map 1) are characterised by low and erratic precipitation, it 
is important to stress that they are also highly heterogeneous. Climate conditions range from hyper-
arid to sub-humid, and vary considerably in rainfall variability, even more so in ‘El Nino’ years 
(Notenbaert et al., 2012; Ericksen et al., 2013). Years of high rainfall may be followed by years 
with very little rainfall. Soil characteristics and fertility also show highly varied spatial patterns. 
Variation can also be seen in population density, the size of settlements and the composition of 
different communities who inhabit them – different ethnic groups, pastoralist and agropastoralist, 
mobile and sedentary (Catley et al., 2013; Catley 2017; Lind et al., 2016; Randall, 2015).  
 
                                                        
1 In addition to ‘drylands’, the terms 'rangelands', ‘arid and semi-arid lands’, and ‘pastoral areas’ are also used in this 
thesis, depending on the context of the discussion. Rangelands refers to an expanse of land covered in natural 
vegetation, suitable for wild herbivores and domesticated livestock to graze and not generally suitable for growing 
crops. Not all rangelands are arid. ‘Pastoral areas’ is a term used in both Ethiopia and Kenya to describe regional states, 
counties and dryland areas more generally, where the predominant livelihood is pastoralism. 
2 Agro-pastoralism refers to a system of agriculture that includes both crop production and livestock production that is 
practiced amongst settled, nomadic, and transhumant communities. Kratli observes that many pastoralist groups 
practiced more or less opportunistic crop farming at certain times in the past, not just shifting to agro-pastoralism as an 







Map 1. Dryland areas in the Horn of Africa 
 
Source: World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF). 
The HoA is a region where different countries have very different political histories, cultural and 
religious affiliations, geopolitical positioning and development pathways (Catley et al., 2013; 
World Bank, 2020d). The colonial period reconfigured traditional socio-economic and spatial units 
within new state borders. As a consequence pastoralists often found themselves displaced to the 
peripheries of these new states and in a situation where traditional movements in search of pasture 
and water, as well as markets, were disrupted or prohibited (Catley et al., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). 
Colonial policies further isolated pastoralists from development, privileging agrarian highland 
areas, with some element of livestock ranching promoted in the lowlands (Sandford, 1983; 
Odhiambo, 2014). African administrations in the post-colonial period often adopted or re-enforced 
these colonial policies, and old attitudes and misunderstandings around pastoralism remain 
remarkably persistent (Catley et al., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Krätli, 2019).  
Despite increased recognition of the economic contribution made by pastoral production (Hesse 





pastoralists in the HoA, and to varying degrees elsewhere in Africa, still remain largely 
marginalised in national politics, with little input to decision-making processes (Catley et al., 2013; 
Hesse and Pattison, 2013; Schlee, 2013), although somewhat less so in Kenya (Elmi and Birch, 
2013; Odhiambo, 2017; Manzano, 2019). The provision of government services and economic and 
social investment in the drylands has, up until recently, also lagged behind other areas, while 
pastoralists remain poorly protected from conflict and lawlessness (McPeak et al., 2011; 
Odhiambo, 2014; Catley, 2017; Mkutu, 2019). Human development indicators for pastoralist 
populations are reported to be lower than average than for their fellow citizens (McPeak et al., 
2011; Catley et al., 2013; Devereux and Tibbo, 2013). Recurring droughts would appear to leave 
pastoralists disproportionately dependent on food aid for significant periods (Eriksen and Lind, 
2009; Blackwell, 2010; Schilling et al., 2014; FEWS-NET, 2019, 2017; World Vision, 2019). For 
some, the increased incidence and frequency of these droughts, along with pressures of increased 
fragmentation of rangelands, has raised concerns over the future of pastoralism as a viable 
livelihood system (Headey et al., 2014; Oba, 2013; Morland, 2017). Others maintain that 
pastoralists are not simply ‘coping’ with climatic and other forms of change, but constantly 
innovating and embracing new forms of ‘mobility’ – such as accessing new markets, making use of 
mobile technologies, availing of mobile veterinary services, and even using trucks for transporting 
animals (Catley et al., 2013; Krätli, 2019).    
1.3 Environmental policy narratives and pastoralism 
An environmental policy narrative approach acknowledges that large-scale policymaking and 
planning – such as that favoured by donors and national governments – needs large-scale 
simplifications, or ‘crises narratives’, to generate political consensus and make action possible in 
the face of uncertainty (Roe 1991; Krätli, 2013; Weisser et al, 2014). Narratives not only convey 
storylines of cause and effect – they often have embedded the advocacy of a particular policy 
solution (Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018). Moreover, narratives establish ‘frames of reference’ that 
define and bound what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interests are 
legitimate (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2013; Whitfield 2016).  
A number of studies to date have gone some way towards identifying and deconstructing policy 
discourses and narratives about drylands development (and to lesser extent, climate change) in the 
HoA. These studies are focused on, for example: the persistence of drylands narratives in Kenya 
(Odhiambo, 2014); the influence of global climate-change narratives on agricultural policy, 
including pastoralism, in Kenya and Ethiopia (Maina et al., 2013; Yirgu et al., 2013); localised 
climate-adaptation interventions in pastoral areas in Ethiopia (Eriksen and Marin, 2015); climate 
adaptation as a form of capitalist growth in Kenya (Symons, 2014); and green-economy discourses 





(and several earlier) studies3 point to the fact that, for decades, dominant dryland narratives of 
‘tragedy of the commons’, 'desertification' and 'overgrazing' underpinned conventional pastoral-
development policies and did little to strengthen pastoralist livelihoods. At worst, they led to 
displacement and marginalisation (Swift, 1996; Fratkin, 1997; Little et al., 2008; Catley et al., 
2013; Abbink et al., 2014). In recent years, the state and their development partners have sought to 
respond to increasing regional concerns about climate change, food security and political security. 
It has been suggested that, while the language may have evolved, some of the narratives driving 
current climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily 
‘new’, but are instead rooted in historical discourses around ‘unproductive’ drylands, the poor as 
agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation (Odhiambo, 
2014; Weisser, et al., 2014; Krätli, 2019). According to Weisser et al. (2014: 114), “old ‘problems’ 
are being presented as new ones, often with an undertone of urgency.” However, there has been no 
systematic research to date that specifically analyses the kinds of discourses and narratives around 
pastoralism found within Ethiopian and Kenyan national climate-change and green-economy 
policies or, in turn, examines what the consequences of these narratives are for pastoralist 
livelihoods and future pastoralist development pathways. What research that has been conducted 
has largely been focused on influencing policy (see for example, policy briefings by: Elmi and 
Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Maina et al., 2013; Yirgu et al., 2013). These studies – discussed in 
Chapter 2 – need to be updated in light of what is a rapidly evolving policy context.  
Policies, furthermore, do not cause outcomes in a linear fashion. They interact with other factors. 
The kinds of changes underway in pastoral areas are driven as much by demographic growth, 
changes in market supply and demand, and regional security concerns, as they are by policymaking 
and political processes. Growing urban settlements, new roads, renewable energy projects, oil and 
mineral extraction – even wildlife conservancies – are increasingly linked in a modernist vision of 
economic and social transformation (Mosley and Watson, 2016; Lind, 2018; Regassa, et al., 2019). 
Combined, these factors have profound implications for pastoralism, as large expanses of grazing 
land are no longer accessible, and mobility – pastoralists’ key strategy for managing variability – is 
restricted. Yet these developments are generally perceived by policymakers as part of a wider – and 
necessary – dynamic of commercialisation and (green) growth, and even as a precursor to 
enhancing climate-resilient livelihoods “outside of pastoralism” (Krätli, 2019: 12). Important 
questions remain, nonetheless, as to who are the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from policy processes, and 
if the interests of some actors are being privileged over others.  
Thus, further research is justified to answer a number of critical questions. These form the basis for 
this study:  
                                                        
3 For a history of dominant dryland narratives in the HoA, see also: Swift, 1996; Fratkin, 1997; Little et al., 2008; Catley 





- What are the dominant discourses and narratives found in current national climate-change 
and drylands policies in Ethiopia and Kenya, and have these changed over time?  
- Who are the principal actors, actor networks and institutions shaping and driving these 
policy narratives, and what are their motivations and interests? 
- What are the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods and for the 
future of pastoralism in the two countries? 
1.4 Thesis approach 
This research employs a comparative case-study approach composed of two macro-units of 
analysis, Ethiopia and Kenya. While climate change is clearly an ‘all-Africa’ issue, there is much 
to be learned by focusing on the policy dynamics in a particular region and in just two countries. 
Ethiopia and Kenya were intentionally selected, as they have much in common but also have quite 
different contexts. Both are prominent adoptees of policies favoured as part of the new 
international consensus around ‘green development' and climate change (Death, 2015; Jones and 
Carabine, 2013; Held et al, 2013; Redda and Roland, 2016; Yirgu et al., 2013). They share similar 
dryland zones, with significant populations who identify themselves as pastoralists or 
agropastoralists. Both have been considered relatively successful in economic development terms, 
experiencing high levels of economic growth (World Bank, 2020a; World Bank, 2020b, World 
Bank, 2020c), yet are experiencing similar development and climatic challenges. In recent years, 
Ethiopia and Kenya, like other countries in the HoA, have both seen increased frequency and 
severity of drought – albeit with impacts and consequences that are site-specific, varied and 
uncertain (Funk et al., 2012; Ericksen, et al., 2013; Carabine, 2014; Herrero, et al., 2016). At the 
same time, these countries have quite different histories of state formation and have clearly 
followed quite different political and national development trajectories.  
This study makes use of – and builds on – an analytical framework devised by Keeley and Scoones 
(1999; 2003),4 designed to make sense of complex policy processes. The framework distinguishes 
between discourses and narratives, actors and institutions, and the politics and interests that 
together shape policy processes. To this I have added a fourth component: focused on the 
consequences of policy prescriptions for pastoralist livelihoods and the future of pastoralism more 
generally. This is important because it helps give insight into the complex “political economy of 
winners and losers” (Adger et al., 2001: 688) from policy processes that might otherwise be hidden 
within (simplistic) policy narratives. These overlapping elements allow a deeper understanding of 
how national environmental and development policy change has a bearing on pastoralist 
livelihoods, and on the drylands more generally, in Ethiopia and Kenya. This research also benefits 
from insights from political ecology, which seeks to understand the ways in which social relations, 
                                                        





institutions and power produce particular types of environments and patterns of resource use at the 
local level (Blakie and Brookfield, 1987; Adger, et al., 2001; Forsyth, 2003; Robbins, 2012). 
Political ecology is helpful in tracing the genealogy of narratives concerning pastoralism and 
climate change, and the power relationships that support them (de Wit, 2015; Goldman et al., 
2018).  
1.5 Thesis outline 
Chapter 2 reviews some of the recurring debates about pastoralist livelihoods and resource-
management strategies in the HoA and the narratives underlying these, as well as shedding light on 
wider governance and livelihood dilemmas posed by policies and interventions in the name of 
climate change, ‘resilience’ and the ‘green economy’. It argues that the effects of climate change 
on pastoralist livelihoods cannot be separated out from broader political, economic and social 
processes underway in the drylands. 
Chapter 3 sets out the analytical framework for this research. This framework provides a systematic 
way of understanding the dynamic interactions between narratives and discourses, actors and 
networks, and politics and interests, within environmental policy processes, as well as the 
consequences of those policies for future pastoralist development pathways. I identify how 
emerging policy narratives around climate change broadly correspond to three broad discourses on 
pastoralism and pastoral area development: ‘pure pastoralism’; ‘transforming pastoralism and 
pastoral areas’; and ‘modern, mobile and green pastoralism’.  
Chapter 4 outlines the research design and methodology used in this study. It establishes the 
epistemological perspective that informs my study and why a two-country comparative case study 
is appropriate. Secondly, I elaborate on the appropriateness of the research tools – content analyses 
(CA), discourse analysis (DA) and semi-structured interviews – used to answer the three research 
questions, and justify the sources of data chosen for analysis. These mixed methods collectively 
help to address the shortcomings of each should they have been used individually. Interviews, for 
example, provide insights - into different policy actors interests, how policy is manifesting through 
development interventions at local level, as well as other kinds of dynamic change underway in the 
drylands of the HoA - that are unlikely have emerged should the study have been confined to just 
CA and DA of written policy.  Finally, I outline my approach in analysing and interpreting the data 
collected from fieldwork, while highlighting some ethical issues and methodological limitations. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the CA and DA of Ethiopian and Kenyan policy documents 
related to climate change and drylands development, spanning the period 2007 to 2017. The 
analysis reveals that, while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening resilience 





assumptions that depict pastoral systems and pastoral areas as unproductive, and in need of 
modernisation, persist. Combined with the imperative of responding to climate change, these 
narratives amplify the perception that some kind of intervention needs to take place, opening up 
space for the state and other powerful actors to claim stewardship over land and other resources 
previously managed under customary institutions.  
Chapter 6 draws on the results of interviews with key informants. It identifies the key actors, actor 
networks and institutions driving policy discourses and narratives, and explores why they hold the 
positions they do. It argues that the transformation of pastoral production towards a more 
commercial and diversified orientation remains the primary interest of policymakers (the state and 
donors, especially) in both cases, despite some differences in their political landscapes and where 
their discursive emphasis lies. 
Chapter 7 examines the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods and 
future pastoralist development pathways. It argues that, while some differences exist between the 
two countries – notably more political space for pastoralist communities and civil society 
organisations to engage in decision-making and /or to resist undesirable forms of development in 
Kenya, in contrast to Ethiopia – actions to address climate change or build ‘climate resilience’ and 
‘green growth’ in pastoral dryland areas are leading to new social inequities and differentiated 
patterns of vulnerability, as well as accentuating existing ones. Combined with other forms of 
dyanamic change taking place in the drylands, these pose challenges for pastoral area governance 
and the future of pastoralism more generally. 
Chapter 8 sets out the overall conclusions of this thesis and their implications for future rangeland 
governance and policymaking. It also highlights the contribution of this thesis to the literature, and 


































Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews some of the recurring debates about pastoralist livelihoods and resource-
management strategies, and the commercialisation and ‘transformation’ of drylands in the HoA, as 
well as shedding light on wider governance and livelihood dilemmas posed by policies and 
interventions in the name of climate change, ‘resilience’ and the ‘green economy’. The first part 
explores how new understandings of dryland ecology and the role of pastoralism emerged in the 
1980s and 1990s to challenge deeply engrained narratives of desertification and human-induced 
land degradation. Despite this ‘new thinking’, old arguments and assumptions remain remarkably 
persistent within policymaking. Pastoralists are still perceived by some policy actors as ill adapted 
to ‘modern’ contingencies and in need of transformation. The second part sets out the current 
challenges and uncertainties facing pastoralists in the drylands of the HoA, within a context of 
climatic and other forms of dynamic change. It argues that the effects of climate change on 
pastoralist livelihoods cannot be separated out from broader political, economic and social 
processes underway in the drylands. While social inequity is growing in pastoral areas, and many 
herders are either opting to leave or are forced out of livestock keeping altogether, others are 
finding new ways to adapt and innovate, by taking advantage of new markets and technologies, or 
through livelihood diversification. This raises questions as to what the future for pastoralism and 
pastoralists in the HoA might look like. In the third part of the chapter, I trace how attitudes and 
policy responses with regard to the drylands, pastoralism and climate change have evolved in 
Ethiopia and Kenya over the last two decades. In doing so, I review a number of studies to date that 
have gone some way in examining how certain key actors – the state, donors and international 
development agencies – utilise particular discourses and narratives (notably those framed around 
‘pastoralist vulnerability’, ‘commercialisation of the livestock sector’ and ‘adaptation to climate 
change’) in order to garner support for their policies and drive development decision-making 
regarding climate change and drylands development. The chapter concludes with a synopsis of key 
themes identified from the literature and the gaps in same, several of which form the basis for my 
own research in this context.  
2.2 Changing attitudes towards drylands and pastoralism  
Before examining some of the drivers of change in dryland areas, it is useful to set out how 
attitudes and policies towards drylands and pastoralism in Africa have been informed by certain 
assumptions and narratives around dryland ecology and land degradation – narratives that go back 





2.2.1 ‘Desertification’ as a policy narrative 
While concerns over an ‘advancing Sahara desert’ and climate- and human-induced degradation of 
semi-arid and sub-humid savannah areas of Africa goes back to the early decades of colonial rule, 
they can also be traced to the influence of scientists such as Frederick Clements, whose ideas on 
vegetation succession and climate climax (the foundations of environmental ‘equilibrium 
thinking’) came to dominate ecological ideas about land use, from the 1930s on, particularly in the 
United States (Adams, 2009; Davis, 2016; Behnke and Mortimore, 2016). The fear of an 
‘advancing desert’ resurfaced in the 1970s, at a time of successive severe droughts in the Sahel 
region. The concept of ‘desertification’ – the creation of deserts by people – was high on the 
international agenda in the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in an internationally agreed United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) in 1996. Of influence were the ideas of 
Garett Hardin, whose 'tragedy of the commons’ thesis upheld that common property resources 
shared by pastoralists led to ‘overgrazing’ and environmental degradation, as individual herders 
sought to maximise their herds with little concern for long-term sustainability (Hardin, 1968). 
Hardin's thesis had significant influence on public attitudes towards pastoralist land-use systems 
and provided the rationale for sweeping privatisation and commercialisation of livestock 
production in Kenya and elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s (Fratkin, 1997; Swift, 1996). Writing 
the same year as the UNCCD, Swift (1996) argued that the ‘desertification narrative’ had become 
widely accepted because it served the interests of groups of policy actors, including national 
governments in Africa, international aid bureaucracies, especially the UN, and scientists. In the 
1970s, newly independent African governments were restructuring their bureaucracies and seeking 
to gain central control over natural resources. Droughts, and the assumptions about human-induced 
degradation linked to them, legitimised such claims and made centralised top-down planning seem 
a logical strategy (Swift 1996). For many policymakers in the post-independence period, 
pastoralists and livestock mobility was associated with a primitive past, soon to be replaced by 
economic development and progress (Catley et al., 2013; Turner and Schlecht, 2019).  
Adams (2009) makes comparisons between the human-induced desertification narrative and other 
simplified narratives of poverty–environment linkages that were a characteristic of mainstream 
sustainable development literature of the 1980s and 1990s (such as the Bruntland Report).5 For 
Adams (2009), the linked narratives of ‘overpopulation’, ‘overgrazing’ and ‘desertification’ proved 
remarkably resilient in national government and international agency policies dominating in the 
                                                        
5 Best remembered for popularising the concept of ‘sustainable development’, ‘Our Common Future’, more commonly 
known as the Bruntland Report, 1987, the outcome of the work of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development and set the agenda for the 1992 Earth Summit. Political ecologist Fiona Nunan suggests that the 
Bruntland Report’s portrayal of the relationship between poverty and the environment as a ‘vicious circle’ (WCED, 
1987: 27), or ‘downward spiral’, serves to direct efforts to reduce poverty or improve environmental management in 
ways that focus only on poverty reduction and/or environmental management in a narrow sense, “without taking 
sufficient account of a multitude of mediating factors, including governance, institutional arrangements and power 





drylands in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Such simplistic explanations were convenient to many 
parties. In Ethiopia, for example, the government and international donors found that a neo-
Malthusian6 explanation of the causes of famine (‘too many people cause a degraded environment’) 
could allow for technical interventions – such as large-scale land rehabilitation programmes – and 
provided a rationale for politically neutral food-aid programmes during the Derg regime7 (Hoben, 
1995) and later, following the fall of the Derg, ‘green revolution’-type agricultural policies (Keely 
and Scoones, 2000).  
As Adams (2009) and other scholars (see Fratkin 1997; Little et al., 2008; Catley et al., 2013; 
Behnke and Mortimore, 2016; Toulmin and Brock, 2016; Boles et al., 2019) observe, the influence 
of dominant narratives of desertification and overgrazing underpinned conventional pastoral-
development policies for decades. As a result, orthodox rangeland management has, until recently, 
largely promoted a model that seeks to ‘control’ and manage ‘fragile’ rangeland resources (Hardin 
1968; Lamprey 1983; Timberlake 1988; Grainger 1990). Strategies included enclosing land 
previously held as common property; controlling livestock numbers; providing year-round 
waterpoints to allow optimal livestock dispersal; seeking to manipulate rangeland ecology through 
controlled burning, bush clearance and reseeding; introducing livestock disease control and 
breeding; and encouraging rotational grazing (Timberlake 1988; Grainger 1990). None of these 
strategies tend to fit in with traditional pastoral livestock systems, so governments tended to 
emphasise instead ‘sedentarisation’ (the settlement of nomadic groups in one place), formal land-
tenure arrangements and greater integration into commercial markets (Adams, 2009; Galvin, 2009; 
Catley et al., 2013; Gebeye, 2016).  
A collection of scholarly essays, ‘The End of Desertification’, edited by Behnke and Mortimore 
(2016), refutes the assumption that human factors were responsible for the Sahel droughts of the 
1970s and 1980s, or that the degradation that occurred was irreversible. Instead, these droughts 
were caused by global changes in climate brought about by fluctuations in the composition of 
greenhouse gases and particulates. Many areas recovered their vegetation in the 1990s and continue 
to support sizable dryland communities and their livestock (Behnke and Mortimore, 2016; Toulmin 
and Brock, 2016). Overall, the book challenges the use of desertification narratives to justify top-
down agricultural and environmental policies, which have allocated pastoral lands to other uses, 
and left dryland communities disempowered as a result. 
2.2.2 Challenging the equilibrium model 
In contrast to the desertification and rangeland control perspectives, outlined above, the 1990s saw 
                                                        
6 Following the ideas of Thomas Malthus, the 18th century economist, who argued that population growth would 
eventually outstrip available resources and food supply. 
7 The Derg, officially the Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia, was a Communist Marxist-Leninist 





a new model of range ecology that took on board unpredictable variability as the defining feature 
of arid and semi-arid ecosystems (Ellis and Swift, 1988; Behnke et al., 1993; Scoones, 1995; 
Naimir-Fuller, 1999). This model, according to Krätli (2013: 3), “has fundamentally changed our 
understanding of pastoral production and its environment – from one characterized by scarcity to 
valuable, from fragility to resilience, from problem to asset.” Krätli (2016: 488) further observes 
that pastoralists and their livestock have contributed to the development of rangelands through 
millennia of co-evolution, which is why when pastoral systems are effected, either positively or 
negatively, there is a knock-on effect in their ecosystems as a whole. The largely dominant view 
amongst rangeland ecologists today is that herd mobility is not only an effective strategy for risk 
management (allowing pastoralists to mitigate against, for example, a drought or flood, or a 
livestock disease outbreak); it also enables pastoralists to harness environmental and rainfall 
variability and enhance livestock production (Scoones, 1995; AU, 2010; McGahey et al., 2014; 
Krätli et al., 2015). Herds are mobile precisely because they can then access the best quality of 
grazing at all times (IIED/SOS Sahel, 2010). Pastoralists, furthermore, have a close relationship 
with, and knowledge of, their environment, which enables them to both protect and exploit the 
biodiversity on which they depend, (Homewood and Rodgers, 1991; Vetter, 2005; Notenbaert et 
al., 2012; Oba, 2013; Herrera et al., 2014). Understanding these benefits has also been shown to 
make economic sense (Hesse and McGregor 2006; Davies 2007; AU, 2010; Notenbaert et al., 
2012; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019).  
Rangeland ecologists make the case that Hardin's 'tragedy of the commons' thesis fails to recognise 
the variability and 'non-equilibrium' (Behnke et al., 1993) state of dryland ecosystems. Degradation 
is not inherent to common property regimes, but rather is caused by an absence of common 
property rules (Ciriacy-Wanthrup and Bishop, 1975; Ostrom, 1990). Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the 
commons' should instead be labeled the ‘tragedy of open access’ (Bromley and Cernea 1989).8 
While land degradation does occur in pastoral areas, this is due not to overpopulation per se, but to 
uneven population distribution, made worse by concentrations of people and livestock around 
boreholes and rural towns (Fratkin, 1997; Avery, 2014). This understanding of variability and the 
limits of equilibrium thinking led to the popularity of a new set of rangeland interventions. The 
emphasis of many agencies working with pastoralists has shifted towards livestock health and 
enhancing the capacity of animals to survive in times of disease and drought, supporting mobility 
where still possible – in particular, access to dry-season grazing reserves and traditional ‘livestock 
corridors’, targeted restocking following a drought, and strengthening pastoralist organisational 
                                                        
8 Conventional common property theory posits that for effective governance of commons, there is a need for clear 
territorial and group boundaries and recognition by authorities of the rights of communities to manage the commons 
(Ostrom, 1990). More recent scholarly work on pastoral systems argues that these pastoralist systems do not necessarily 
conform to the principles of mainstream commons theories (Behnke, 2018; Moritz, 2016; Senda et al., 2020). Behnke 
(2018: 708) argues that a degree of open acess is a recurrent feature of many indigenous pastoral land tenure systems. 
Common property theory, furthermore, is also ill equipped to deal with the emergence of class interests and increased 





capacity (Catley et al., 2013; Flintan, 2014; Krätli et al., 2015).  
Despite these strong arguments, and the dominance within the literature of new narratives on 
pastoralism and their relationship to climatic and other uncertainties, several commentators argue 
that ‘old narratives’ persist. Krätli (2013:1) maintains that the drylands and pastoralism are 
frequently characterised in contemporary discourse as, in some way, “unproductive, resource 
scarce, fragile, marginal and remote.” According to McPeak et al (2011: 3), pastoralists are still 
commonly perceived as “following an outdated way of life and clinging to a production system ill 
adapted to ‘modern’ contingencies.” Ruling national elites and international agencies continue to 
use the kind of ‘problematising narratives’ (Weisser et al., 2014: 114) about environmental 
degradation, resource scarcity and low productivity, as described above, to justify policies that 
promote the conversion of rangelands to other uses (Little et al., 2013, Scoones, 2018). These uses 
are often themselves major drivers of degradation, pastoralist displacement and, ultimately, failed 
economic development (Galvin, 2009; Catley et al., 2013; Krätli, 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Krätli, 
2019). With global climate change increasing, pastoralists are frequently portrayed as amongst the 
groups most ‘at risk’. There is, however, “a new twist to this ‘doomed-by-climate-change’ 
storyline” (Krätli, 2013: 2), with pastoralists also seen as having the ability to ‘repair nature’, 
through, for example, their involvement in land-based carbon-sequestration schemes (McGahey et 
al., 2014).  
2.3 Climate change and other uncertainties 
There is broad agreement within the literature that pastoral systems in the HoA are undergoing 
significant change and face many uncertainties in terms of their future, not least the effects of a 
changing climate. It is impossible, nonetheless, to discuss the impacts of climate change on 
pastoralism – or the narratives around same – without giving due consideration to the wider context 
of political, economic and social transformation taking place in the drylands: most notably the 
‘fragmentation’ and privatisation of formerly commonly held resources, the commercialisation of 
agriculture, and the increased investment in energy and other infrastructure projects, all within the 
context of globalised markets. While this brings new opportunities for some, others are being 
displaced or are pushed into greater poverty as a result. These key drivers of change affecting the 
drylands in the HoA are discussed below. 
2.3.1 Non-climatic uncertainties  
The role of land – tenure, access and enclosure – is fundamental to any discussion of dynamic 
change in the pastoral drylands of the HoA. In Ethiopia all land is vested in the State according to 
Article 40 of the Constitution of 1995. Citizens have use-rights and inheritance of use-rights is 





administer land and other natural resources in accordance with federal laws. Since land reform in 
1998, registration and user-right ‘certification’ schemes are underway in a number of regional 
states (Senda et al., 2020).  Nonetheless, informal or ‘customary’ land-tenure systems that have 
evolved over hundreds of years have continued to operate alongside the statutory framework, 
especially in remoter pastoral and agro-pastoral areas.  While customary land-tenure system has 
been recognised under the 1994 Constitution  (see 2.4.1 below), historically legislation has failed to 
clearly define communal rights to rangelands, and the specific roles and responsibilities for both 
communities and local government to administer and manage these resources (Bekure, 2018). This 
legislative deficiency prevents pastoral communities from fully exercising their constitutional 
rights to land.  
In Kenya, in contrast, under the 2010 Constitution, all land belongs either to the people collectively 
(public land), to individuals (private land) or to communites (community land).  Community land – 
formerly known as ‘Trust Lands’ - means land aquired, possessed and transferred under 
community-based or customary regimes, although in practice this can be a hybrid of traditional and 
contemporary practices (Alden-Wily, 2018). Administration of community lands in Kenya has 
been under the adminstration of, firstly locally elected councils, then (from 1968) centralised under 
the Commissioner of Lands in Nairobi, and eventually devolved back to the Counties following 
constitutional reform in 2010. While community land may encompass up to 60% of Kenya, mostly 
in the drier Northern counties, these lands have seen sizable areas reallocated by successive 
administrations to non-local communities for private purposes, or turned into local authority 
wildlife or forest reserves (Alden-Wily, 2018).  Reconciling the conflicting, and seemingly 
incompatible, needs of secure tenure on the one hand, and mobility and flexibility on the other, is 
the “paradox of pastoral land tenure” (Fernandes-Giminez, 2002, in Senda et al., 2020: 2). The 
Community Land Act, 2016, in Kenya (see Chapters 6 and 7) is an attempt to overcome this 
challenge. The CLA is now the framework through which customary holdings are to be identified 
and registered. It is designed to not only protect the land rights of communities but also empower 
them to to make their own rules for regulation and administration of land (GoK-NLC, 2016). The 
implications of the CLA for pastoralists are discussed further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
Galaty (2013: 144) argues that pastoralists’ vulnerability to losing land can be attributed to their 
“systematic refusal to embrace a bounded, alienable and exclusionary notion of landed property, or 
to the attitudes of land seekers.” Various scholars have pointed to the fact that pastoralists use 
negotiation, reciprocity and inter-clan bonds and networks as key processes to manage common 
property resources (Behnke and Scoones, 1993; Fratkin, 1997; Moritz, 2016; Pas Schrivejer, 2019). 
Rather than assumed ‘open access’ leading to degraded pastures, rights of use and access to 





across most of the HoA, such customary institutions are being eroded.9 That pastoral lands are 
increasingly being fragmented and converted to other forms of land use by both state and non-state 
interests has been well documented in the literature (Galvin, 2009; Galaty, 2013; Behnke and 
Kerven 2013; Little, 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Kidane et al., 2014; Korf et al., 2015; Lind et al., 
2016; Catley 2017; Pas Schrivejer, 2019). Areas selected for appropriation and crop cultivation are 
invariably the more fertile and strategic lands, such as those close to rivers and other water sources, 
or areas offering potential for resource extraction and/or infrastructure development (Galaty, 2013; 
Schilling et al., 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016; Regassa, et al., 2019). When pastoralists depend 
only on livestock, there is an advantage in managing the rangeland as a contiguous commons 
system. However, when alternative strategies – for example, cultivating crops or producing 
charcoal – become equally or more important, there is an incentive to seek ownership and ‘enclose’ 
a patch of land (Galvin, 2009, Tache 2013; Korf et al., 2015). Furthermore, the widening gap 
between rich and poor and the related inequalities in power dynamics, as effected by many internal 
and external socio-economic factors, are creating unprecedented social stratification within pastoral 
dryland areas (Galvin, 2009; Flintan et al., 2011; Catley and Akilu, 2013; Tache, 2013; Catley, 
2017; FAO, 2018; Krätli, 2019). This encourages individualistic strategies over community 
interests, in turn favouring the (de facto) privatisation of common-pool resources. Korf et al. 
(2015) argue that land appropriation in the frontier region between Ethiopia and Somalia is co-
produced through political claims to territory and capital investment by wealthy indigenous 
(pastoralist, Somali) merchants and politicians, who are in effect “complicit in the (Ethiopian) 
state’s project of territoralisation and sedentarisation” (2015: 889). It is suggested that those with 
more knowledge, assets, and closer links to decision-making processes will invariably have greater 
control over resources (Catley et al., 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Scoones, 2018). Wealthier 
pastoralists are less likely to rely on traditional forms of social capital and customary institutions 
(Catley, 2017). While there is a growing ‘pastoralist elite’10 – pushed up by structural 
transformations and the ability of certain groups, as we have seen above, to take advantage of new 
investments and commercialisation of livestock production – Krätli (2019) reminds us that the vast 
majority of pastoralists in the HoA remain poor. And in times of drought, poorer pastoralists with 
smaller herds have fewer options (Catley, 2017). The emergence of large-scale social-protection 
                                                        
9 There are efforts to counter this trend. The USAID supported Land Administation to Nurture Development (LAND) 
project in Borana (Oromia, Ethiopia) is an example of where a customary land-tenure system with traditional grazing 
area units (dheedas) has been formally recognised by local government planners (see Chapter 7).  In a similar manner, 
organisations such as Farm Africa, SOS-Sahel, Care International, and others, have for the last decade been promoting a 
model of Participatory Rangeland Management (PRM) in areas of Oromia, Afar and Somali regions (Flintan et al., 
2019). 
10 The term ‘pastoralist elite’ is frequently used in discussions on pastoralism in Kenya and Ethiopia. This refers to a 
growing class of wealthy, and usually politically well connected, herd owners (often absentee) or former pastoralists, 
who have made money from enclosing land (such as the ‘Group Ranches’ in the southern Kenyan rangelands) and /or 
from investments in other businesses (by, for example, Somali pastoralist traders in Ethiopia and Kenya). Or, who have 
taken advantage of rent-seeking opportunities resulting from policy change or political appointment (Catley 2017; 





programmes in pastoral areas of both Ethiopia and Kenya is symptomatic of this trend (Catley, 
2017; Tsegay, 2017). 
Globalisation, in the form of investment flows and the reach of private capital, new technologies 
and telecommunications, and changing flows of people, resources and information, along with 
alternative income sources, is now influencing formerly remote communities. Local livelihoods are 
increasingly connected with and dependent on other actors in a larger system (Adger et al., 2009; 
Carabine, 2014; Goldsmith, 2013; Mosley and Watson, 2016). One such capital investment is the 
Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) project, set to open up large areas 
of northern Kenya –including pastoral rangelands – to infrastructure development and oil 
extraction (Goldsmith, 2013; Kirimi and Nijeru, 2016)11. For state actors, LAPSSET is “essential 
for growth and investment” (LCDA 2016:16). Various studies (Enns, 2017; Letai and Tiampati, 
2015; Loduk et al., 2016; Schilling et al., 2016; Kochore, 2016) have highlighted, nonetheless, that 
while such ‘mega-infrastructure’ projects may bring employment and business opportunities for 
some, they place restrictions on mobility of others, as well as aggravating new conflicts over land 
and other resources. Elsewhere in Kenya, domestic and foreign investors have targeted the 
ecologically sensitive Tana Delta – an important dry-season grazing reserve for pastoralists – for 
large-scale irrigation and farming projects, including biofuel production (Maina et al., 2013; 
Nunow, 2013; Neville, 2015).  
Alongside converting pastoral land to other ‘more productive’ uses, restrictions on access are 
instigated through new forms of tenure systems, which favour landholdings by individuals or 
groups rather than more flexible traditional communal tenure described earlier. Privatisation, and 
allocating ‘title’ to land users, opens up customary land to non-traditional users – such as recently 
settled agriculturalists – most of whom are not tied to customary norms and rules in the way 
pastoralists are (Mwangi and Dohrn, 2006). Some land-tenure changes are coming from 
pastoralists themselves, with the goal of gaining control of their land before crop farmers, land 
investors or conservation organisations can get hold of it (Headey et al., 2014; Korf et al., 2015; 
Elliot, 2016; Greiner, 2017). Once the most valuable pockets of land are converted to other forms 
of land use, the wider functionality of pastoral production, which depends on mobility and access 
to seasonal grazing, is undermined (Letai and Tiampati, 2015). Changing property relations are 
also influenced by the process of sedentarisation, as described earlier, which has long been part of 
the standard formula for development of pastoral sectors the world over (Abbink et al. 2014; 
Fratkin, 2014). Services provided in towns such as education and medical care, new economic 
opportunities or even humanitarian relief provide a powerful ‘pull’ factor for pastoralist settlement 
(AU, 2010; Fratkin, 2004, 2013). The sedentarisation of pastoralists in Ethiopia has been a 
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deliberate government policy, ostensibly intended to improve food security and access to basic 
services (Yimer, 2015), but more often to make way for large-scale irrigation schemes (Abbink et 
al., 2014; Fratkin 2014; Gebeye, 2016).  
In contrast to the scenario outlined above – of pastoralists facing uncertainties in the context of 
socioeconomic and political change – Catley et al., (2013) offer a different outlook on pastoralist 
dynamics. They focus on the vibrant in-country and cross-border livestock trade and commercial 
networks that have emerged from pastoral areas in recent years responding to growing domestic, 
regional and international demand for livestock products. Livestock exports to Gulf countries in 
particular play a significant role in the economies of Ethiopia, Kenya and other HoA countries 
(World Bank, 2020d). Some of the fastest-growing towns in the HoA are linked to these trading 
activities (Catley and Aklilu, 2013; Catley, 2017; Korf, et al., 2015; Lind et al., 2016; Gebremeskel 
et al., 2019). Nyariki and Amwata (2019) have calculated the Total Economic Value (TEV)12 of the 
pastoral livestock sector in Kenya alone to be worth US$1.4 billion. For these, and other scholars, 
it is a myth that pastoralists are disconnected from markets. The reality is that such trade remains 
undervalued at national level and is not captured in government statistics (Catley and Aklilu, 2013; 
Krätli 2019; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019). Pastoralists are often viewed as somehow homogeneous 
in terms of their livelihoods and assets, but many are taking advantage of new opportunities in this 
livestock trade to generate new wealth (Catley, 2017). For Catley et al. (2013), pastoralists are not 
simply ‘coping with’ or ‘adapting to’ climate and other forms of change, but constantly innovating 
– the use of mobile phones to transfer money, the occasional use of trucks to transport animals or 
fodder, shifting from keeping cattle to camels, as examples.  
The role of women in pastoralism is also changing. The dominant trend in pastoralist studies has 
long assumed that pastoralism and pastoral gender relations are inherently patriarchical - that elder 
men dominate the political sphere, and that men play the primary roles in livestock production with 
women relegated to the domestic sphere (Balehey et al., 2018).13 Yet women pastoralists are 
increasingly recognised as playing a direct role in pastoralist production and in the complex social 
institutions and networks that are necessary for pastoralist systems (Hodgson, 2000; Flintan, 2008; 
Krätli 2019).  With changing environmental, social and economic circumstances in the HoA, 
women pastoralists have an increasing and significant role in the management of diversified 
livestock, and in the marketing of high value livestock products (such as milk) (de Jode and 
Flintan, 2020). Pastoralist women are also increasingly vocal in asserting their rights through local 
civil society organisations and through participation in national and international pastoralist 
                                                        
12 ‘Total Economic Value’ includes appraisal of the non-traditional pastoral values (the goods and services provided by 
the pastoral landscape) as well as conventional values of livestock (livestock products) (Hesse and McGregor, 2006; 
Davies, 2007; Krätli, 2015).  
13 The contributors to a seminal collection entitled Rethinking Pastoralism in Africa: Gender, Culture, And Myth of 
Patriarchial Pastoralist, edited by Dorothy Hodgson (2000), challenge such assumptions. They provide evidence 
instead to show that pastoralist gender relations are dynamic, relational, historical, and producted through complex 





womens’ networks. According to Krätli (2019: 7), failure to recognise and build on women 
pastoralists’ role as producers undermines this role, and consequently, women’s status in pastoralist 
societies. Women in pastoral systems, nonetheless (just as with other rural women in the HoA14), 
face multiple disadvantages. As pastoralists, they experience economic, social and political 
marginalistion. As women, they face inequality in accessing resources, social services and 
participation in decision-making (Flintan, 2008; Krätli 2019; de Jode & Flintan, 2020). While local 
and customary resource management offered some protection to women, modern statutory tenure 
systems risk the loss of women’s control over resources (FAO, 2017).15 The process of 
sedentarisation, furthermore, has been linked with worsening conditions for women in terms of 
workload and social control (Fratkin and Smith, 1995). For de Jode and Flintan (2020: 5), “an 
important factor in how successfully women own, access and manage collective land and natural 
resources is how strong the collective governance body is, including in the protection of women’s 
rights.”  
While issues of fragmentation, commercialisation, changes in land tenure and integration into 
global markets may appear at first to be not directly relevant to my study of climate change and 
pastoralist development narratives, they are nonetheless closely connected. Commercialisation of 
agriculture, the ‘transformation’ of formerly peripheral dryland areas more generally, and the 
desire to build a ‘climate resilient green economy’ (of which more below) are at the core of 
contemporary policy discourse and narratives in both Ethiopia and Kenya – as we shall learn in 
Chapter 5. A number of scholars point to the fact that the increased fragmentation and enclosure of 
the rangelands, as well as the breakdown of customary institutions that results from decision-
making that is rooted in these policy narratives, has the affect of undermining pastoralists’ 
autonomous ‘adaptive capacity’ (Eriksen and Marin, 2011, 2015; Lind et al., 2016). Restrictions on 
access to dry-season grazing reserves means pastoralists have less and less space to move with their 
livestock (Nunow, 2011; Oba, 2013) – a claim borne out in my own findings (see Chapters 6 and 
7). In the same way, the enclosure of grasslands and dryland forests in the name of carbon 
sequestration (Fairhead et al., 2010; Bedelian and Ogutu, 2017), the damming of rivers to generate 
‘green’ hydropower (Human Rights Watch, 2012; Yimer, 2015; Mosley and Watson, 2016) or the 
development of wind- and geothermal-energy projects (Mutiga, 2015; Williams 2015) all serve to 
restrict pastoralists from prime grazing areas and traditional livestock routes. 
2.3.2 Climate change and pastoralism 
In line with the kind of ‘new thinking’ on rangeland ecology and pastoralism described above, a 
number of scholars argue the pastoralists have been managing climate variability and climate risk 
                                                        
14 While practices of female genital mutilation and child marriage are still prevalent among some pastoralist ethnic 
groups and clans in Ethiopia for example (Afar and Somali for example) (Balehey et al, 2018), they are also present in 
wider society and thus not specific to pastoralist communties (Kratli, 2019). 





in the Africa for millennia (Ericksen et al., 2013; McGahey, et al., 2014; Hill et al., 2015). 
Traditional mobile pastoralism is regarded as an effective response to cycles of drought, floods and 
‘normal’ rainfall years in areas that do not receive more than 600mm rainfall annually, and quite 
often make do with 200–300mm (Ellis and Swift, 1988). Pastoralists balance herd size, species and 
breed composition, grazing patterns, as well as other livelihood options, with an eye to managing 
climate risk, even if other risks are more immediate (Nassef et al., 2009; Ericksen et al., 2013; Hill 
et al., 2015; Bersaglio et al., 2015). These adaptation strategies and drought-response mechanisms 
are, nonetheless, considered to be increasingly under pressure from the kinds of non-climatic 
uncertainties and changes described earlier – not least restrictions on mobility (Levine et al., 2011; 
Lind et al., 2016; Herrero et al., 2016).  
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 5th Assessment Report (AR), 
temperatures in Africa are projected to rise faster than the global average increase during the 21st 
century (IPCC, 2014). Warming and increased frequency of extreme warm events has already been 
observed for countries bordering the western Indian Ocean between 1961 and 2008 (IPCC, 2014; 
Williams and Funk 2011). While inter-annual variability of rainfall in Africa can be measured, 
longer-term trends are nonetheless difficult to assess. While Nicholson (2001) reported a 5–10% 
decline in precipitation generally for much of Africa in the latter half of the 20th century, this does 
not hold for localised areas of Eastern Africa and the HoA. Analysis by Washington et al. (2011) of 
multiple datasets finds disagreement in precipitation trends in Eastern Africa from 1961 to 2000. 
One dataset shows an annual drying trend, while another indicates no trend on an annually 
averaged basis (Washington et al., 2011). For the future, projected increases in heavy precipitation 
over the region in the mid-21st century have been reported with ‘high certainty’ by the IPCC 
(2012). The IPCC Working Group (WG) II AR5 provides evidence that climate change will 
interact with non-climate-related drivers and stressors to increase the vulnerability of semi-arid 
drylands in Africa (IPCC, 2014). Risk of reaching ‘tipping points’ for crop and livestock 
production in small-scale farming and/or pastoralist livelihoods is estimated as ‘medium risk’, with 
potential to increase to ‘very high risk’ by 2100 with a 4°C warming scenario, regardless of what 
adaptation takes place (ibid.). Under long-term 2°C warming and in the near term, high-risk levels 
may reduce to medium through adaptation action (ibid.). Nevertheless, adaptation options are 
judged by the IPCC WG to be limited because of “persistent poverty, declining land productivity, 
food insecurity and limited government support due to marginalisation” (IPCC, 2014: 811).  
For Krätli (2016), it is misleading to simply aggregate pastoralism with crop farming when looking 
at the impact of climate change on the drylands, as the IPCC have done in the case above, and as 
many international agencies continue to do. By doing so, it overlooks the fundamental differences 
in the way pastoral systems make use of dryland environments – that is, by working with their 





central to environmental policy narratives, in that they try to bypass uncertainty and build a 
unifying storyline, (Roe, 1991; Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Whitfield, 2016), thus justifying some 
form of ‘governmental intervention’ by the state, or other institutions, in the name of development, 
conservation or climate-change adaptation (Weisser et al., 2013; Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018). 
Elsewhere, Semplici (2019: 67), in an examination of climate change and pastoralism in Turkana, 
Kenya, warns against “an univocal focus on climate change as the driver of all problems”. Rather, 
climate change should be understood “within a broader context of high ecological variability, as 
well as considered in relation to political and economic factors that are co-responsible for the 
current risks faced by dryland inhabitants” (ibid.: 67).  
While evidence for climate change resulting in surface-level warming would appear to be 
incontrovertible (IPCC, 2013), the consequences for pastoral production in the HoA are far less 
clear. Impacts pertaining to rangeland vegetation, herd dynamics and herd composition are thus 
likely to be varied, site-specific and uncertain (Ericksen et al., 2013; Herrero et al., 2016; Carabine, 
2014; Sloat et al., 2018). One concern is that increased frequency of droughts will allow 
insufficient time for herd recovery in the years when there is no drought (Thornton and Herrero, 
2010; Bersaglio et al., 2015). Climate change is also likely to bring more frequent and intense 
disease outbreaks in both crop and livestock systems (Kumssa and Jones, 2010; Herrero et al., 
2016). Increases in maximum and minimum temperatures, combined with more CO2 could, on the 
other hand, increase net primary productivity of grasslands in the presence of more rainfall 
(Herrero et al., 2016).  
For Blackwell (2010: 1322), climate change is now the primary driver of poverty and conflict 
among pastoralists in the Greater HoA, as “competition escalates for shrinking pasture and water 
sources”. With increased frequency of droughts, pastoralists’ traditional “survival strategies” are 
overwhelmed, leaving people increasingly dependent on food aid (ibid.). The recent statistics 
certainly bear this out. Following the El Nino-induced droughts affecting parts of the HoA between 
2015 and 2017, some 5.6 million people were estimated to need some form of food assistance in 
the predominantly pastoralist lowlands of Ethiopia, and 2.2 million in Kenya.16 In contrast to 
Blackwell’s study, research by Witsenburg and Roba (2007) in Marsabit District in northern Kenya 
found that, in times of drought and water scarcity, there was less violence between neighbouring 
groups, not more. Despite poverty, strong but flexible customary institutions governing water 
resources helped people adjust in times of scarcity. Elsewhere, Scoones et al. (2019: 231) observe 
that resource-based conflicts are more likely to take place where resources are relatively abundant, 
using the example of large-scale ‘land grabs’ in sub-Saharan Africa: “scarcity narratives do not 
merely describe, but justify changes in access to and control over resources, in ways that reallocate 
                                                        






scarcities across regions and populations.” This has relevance for my own research, as later 
chapters reveal, where we learn that narratives of transformation and commercialisation are, in 
part, driving the redistribution of resources in dryland areas. 
2.3.3 ‘Climate resilience’ and the ‘green economy’  
In the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007/08, and in the context of an emerging consensus 
on the need to tackle climate change, the UNEP launched its ‘Global Green New Deal’ report in 
2009, followed by ‘Towards a Green Economy: Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty 
Eradication’ in the run-up to the 2012 World Summit on Sustainable Development. Advocates of a 
‘green economy’ present it as an unquestionable ‘triple win’ – an economic pathway that is ‘low 
carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive’ (UNEP, 2011). The notion of a ‘green economy’ 
has since gained international traction, endorsed by many global institutions and national 
governments, mostly in the Global North, but also more recently in the Global South, including 
several African nations (Death, 2016).  
‘Climate resilience’ is essentially a reaction to the multiple challenges of climate, energy and food 
security (SDC, 2011; UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2019) – and is, as we shall discover later, a 
metaphor that is at the heart of both Ethiopian and Kenyan policy discourse around drylands 
development. This discourse brings the ‘climate crisis’ and the ‘environmental crisis’ to the 
forefront, together with their impact on what are perceived as particularly vulnerable societies in 
the Global South. A World Bank programme launched in 2009, entitled ‘Making Development 
Climate Resilient in Sub-Saharan Africa’, puts emphasis on “adaptation and climate risk 
management as a core development component” (World Bank, 2009, cited in Death, 2015: 2212). 
According to Methmann and Oels (2014, cited in Death, 2015: 2212), a ‘resilient green economy’ 
is to be achieved by a “combination of technical interventions by the state and development 
institutions, together with ‘empowered communities’ who (it is hoped) can draw on their sources of 
resilience.” Dominant forms of knowledge include development disciplines like crop science, water 
engineering and disaster-risk management (World Bank, 2012). Key interventions include 
development projects at the regional or local scale intended to provide renewable energy, food 
security and ‘safety nets’ for the core subjects of green resilience, namely ‘vulnerable 
communities’ (World Bank, 2012; USAID, 2014). A related discourse is ‘green growth’, which has 
been the dominant framing of the green economy since the financial crisis of 2007/08 (Death, 
2015). In this discourse, environmental changes and programmes are viewed as an economic 
opportunity, not a threat (World Bank, 2012). Ethiopia and Kenya both clearly have strong growth-





schemes such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF),17 REDD+18 and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), investment in sectors such as renewable energy and ‘climate smart agriculture’ 
are seen as paths to development and job creation (Yirgu et al., 2013; Maina et al., 2013; Otto-
Naess et al., 2015).  
2.3.4 Pastoralism and the green economy 
How then are pastoralists affected by this new enthusiasm for ‘climate resilience’ and the ‘green 
economy’? With global demand for meat and dairy projected to increase by 37% and 58% 
respectively between 2010 and 2050, there is growing concern about the livestock sector’s 
continued demand on natural resources and its contribution to carbon emissions and loss of 
biodiversity (Gerber et al., 2013, Willet et al., 2019). There have been calls for a ‘livestock 
revolution’, which can somehow meet growing demand for livestock products whilst reducing by 
half livestock’s impact on the environment (Delgado, 1999; Steinfield et al., 2006). Such concerns, 
as we shall discover in Chapters 5 and 6, can be detected in current ‘green economy’ and ‘climate 
smart agriculture’ narratives, which – in the case of Ethiopia – include the desire to reduce overall 
herd size and produce more output from less animals (FDRE, 2011b). Yet, as the authors of the 
IUCN / UNEP report ‘Pastoralism and the Green Economy – a Natural Nexus?’ argue, comparing 
the natural resource efficiencies of traditional pastoral systems against more intensive modes of 
livestock production is unconstructive (McGahey et al., 2014: 18). For McGahey et al (2014), 
extensive rangeland pastoral systems are multifunctional, providing economic value, but also 
contributing essential ecological services.19   As more international climate funding becomes 
available, there is potential for pastoralists to benefit from schemes whereby they are rewarded for 
managing rangeland for its ecosystem functions, or to capitalise on the growth of new, certified, 
green ‘niche markets’ for high-value livestock products (McGahey et al., 2014). While the authors 
make an important contribution to debates around the role of pastoralism in a changing climate, 
their report makes no attempt to unpack any narratives underpinning a normative understanding of 
the ‘green economy’ as unquestionably good, or who is likely to benefit the most from such a 
transition, as this research does.  
                                                        
17 The Green Climate Fund (GCF), an output of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
(UNFCCC) COP15 held in Copenhagen in 2009, set a goal of channelling over US$100 billion a year to developing 
countries by 2020 to support them in limiting and adapting to GHG emissions.  
18 Under REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Land Degradation) – a tool of the UNFCCC – countries 
with extensive forest and/or grasslands are compensated if they agree to manage these lands in ways that reduce 
greenhouse-gas emissions and enhance carbon storage (FAO, 2009).  
19 Earlier work by Hesse and McGregor (2006), Davies (2007), and Nassef et al., (2009) has highlighted the important -
and often undervalued - contribution of pastoralist mobility to natural systems – mobile grazing opens up pastures, 
stimulates vegetation growth, fertilises the soil, enhances the soil’s water infiltration capacity by hoof action breaking 
the soil crust, aids in seed dispersal to maintain pasture diversity, prevents bush encroachment and enhances the cycling 
of nutrients through the ecosystem. The concept of TEV (see page 18) is designed to appraise such non-traditional 






Concerns have been expressed elsewhere that the growth of global markets for ‘green’ products 
and ecosystem services will create new risks for extensive rangeland systems (Fairhead et al., 
2012). Land in Kenya and Ethiopia – as Chapters 6 and 7 will reveal – is increasingly being 
alienated from pastoralists for renewable energy and conservation purposes. The term ‘green 
grabbing’ has been used to describe the process of appropriation of land and other resources, 
notionally for environmental ends, such as biodiversity conservation, carbon sequestration or eco-
tourism, but in practice to meet commercial or other imperatives. For Fairhead et al. (2012: 251), 
“green grabbing constructs and rides on discourses of ‘marginal land’, assisted by satellite imagery 
that occludes people, livelihoods and social-ecological relationships from view, rendering land 
open to new ‘green market’ uses.”  
2.4 Policy processes and pastoralism in Ethiopia and Kenya 
As we have seen above, uncertain resource tenure and restrictions on mobility, or denial of access 
to rangeland resources, are constraints to extensive livestock herding and can lead to environmental 
degradation and loss of livelihoods (IIED and SOS Sahel 2009; Galvin, 2009; AU, 2010). Limited 
formal education and lack of access to state services further disadvantage pastoralists. Some 
researchers have highlighted pastoralists’ ‘multiple marginalisations’ within African states and lack 
of representation or ‘voice’ (Catley et al., 2013; Hesse and Pattison 2013; Schlee, 2013).  
There has, nonetheless, been considerable political change in the HoA in the past 30 years. 
Notably, the federal division of Ethiopia along ethnic lines into nine Regional States in 1994 (see 
Map 2), and a shift to multi-party democracy and a new era of political and administrative 
devolution underway in Kenya since 2010. Little (2013) is of the view that not all these transitions 
have had the positive impact on rural communities, including pastoralists, that was anticipated. 
Devolution in Kenya is not immune to ‘elite capture’ (Faquet, et al., 2015) and corruption by local 
leaders, resulting in inequitable distribution of resources, especially for poorer and less politically 
dominant pastoralist communities in dryland counties (Catley et al., 2013; Little, 2013; Manzano, 
2018), a theme explored in Chapter 7. As more international climate funds becomes available, 
concerns have also been expressed as to whether these will provide a new source of ‘rent’ for 
powerful elites, while offering little in the way of benefits to politically marginalised constituencies 
– such as pastoralists (Lockwood, 2013). 
In the following sections, I trace how attitudes and national policy prescriptions towards the 
drylands more generally, and especially policies on climate change and the green economy, have 
evolved in Ethiopia and Kenya in recent decades. In tandem, I review a number of existing studies 
that have examined how these policies are being driven by certain discourses and narratives, by key 





2.4.1 Ethiopian policy towards pastoral areas  
Since the overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, Ethiopia has been ruled by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – a coalition of four ethnically based political parties. 
While pursuing a predominantly market-based development strategy, the EPRDF retained close 
control of the economy and political system with little space for political opposition. This changed 
dramatically in 2018, with the appointment of Abiy Ahmed as Prime Minister (Roberts, 2019). 
Abiy Ahmed has embarked on a wide programme of political and economic reforms and opening 
of democratic space for opposition voices, although challenges remain – not least the re-emergence 
of ethnic-based conflicts within and between some Regional States (Minority Rights Group, 2019). 
 
Map 2: Administrative Regions and Zones, Ethiopia  
 
Source: Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC) Information Centre  
UN OCHA-Ethiopia. 
 
Ethiopia is Africa’s second biggest country by population – 112 million in 2019 (World Bank, 
2020a). The rapid expansion of population20 and the growth in services and in the agricultural 
sector have seen unprecedented levels of economic growth in Ethiopia over the last decade – 
averaging 9.9% a year (World Bank, 2020c). The share of the population living below the national 
                                                        
20 Ethiopia’s population has grown from 64 million in 1999 to 112 million in 2019 ( 





poverty line is reported to have decreased from 30% in 2011 to 24% in 2016 (World Bank, 2020a, 
2020c). With more than two thirds of the population living in rural areas, large numbers rely on the 
natural resource base for their livelihood security. In recent decades, the country’s agricultural 
systems have been subject to rainfall variability, leading to fluctuations in productivity, and to 
severe drought and food crises in parts of the country, most notably in 2011/12, and again in 
2015/16 (EU/ECHO, 2017; Gebremeskel et al., 2019). While current evidence suggests that 
temperatures will continue to rise and climate change will mean greater rainfall variability – 
becoming drier in some areas but with higher precipitation in others – there is a great deal of 
uncertainty on how these trends will affect food and livelihood security (Conway and Schipper, 
2011; Funk et al., 2012; EPCC, 2015). How the government and other actors respond to these 
climate uncertainties is significant for the country’s future development and for pastoralists in 
particular. 
In Ethiopia, arid and semi-arid pastoral areas comprise some 60% of the total land area with 
pastoralism estimated to support the livelihoods of close to 12 million people (FDRE-CSA, 2013), 
making it the country with the most pastoralists in Africa. The major pastoral areas include Afar, 
Ethio-Somali, parts of Oromia, Gambella, and Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ 
Region (SNNPR) (Map 2). Smaller numbers of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists also reside in 
Benishangul-Gumuz Region and Dire Dawe Adminstration.  Table 2.1. shows the growth in 
population in what have been described as pastoral woredas (administrative zones) in five regional 
states. The average population growth rate is about 2.6 percent - deemed a high figure for pastoral 
areas, which are traditionally characterised by sparsely distributed populations covering vast areas 
(Gebremeskel, et al. 2019). It is important to stress that some of this growth is accounted for by the 
influx and settlement of non-pastoralists in pastoral areas. Exact figures on the numbers who are 






                                                        
21 While some members of a pastoralist household (for example women, children and the elderly) may opt to  ‘settle’ in 
one place, other members of the same household (young men for example) may continue to follow a predominantly 
nomadic lifestyle, moving with their larger animals. Former pastoralists living in towns will often continue to own 
livestock, which are herded by others in the pastoralist economy (Fratkin, 2013).  Sedentarisation therefore is a process 
that operates along a continuum from highly mobile pastoral households to permanently settled households, of which 





Table 2.1 Ethiopian pastoral area population projections, 2014-2017 
Region 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Afar 1,678,000 1,723,007 1,769,002 1,812,002 
Somali 5,307,002 5,452,994 5,598,002 5,748,998 
SNNPR 722,655 738,346 753,880 769,817 
Oromia 2,022,309 2,074,007 2,126,327 2,178,734 
Gambella 138,640 142,067 145,529 149,410 
Total 9,868,606 10,130,421 10,392,740 10,658,961 
Source: Gebremeskel et al., (2019). Computed from the FDRE CSA Population Projection of Ethiopia, 2014 – 2017 for 
the woredas provided by the regions as pastoral woredas. 
 
According to the Ethiopian Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) (cited in Abera and Abdulahi, 2015), 
Ethiopia’s total livestock production contributes to an estimated 12% of GDP and over 45% of 
agricultural GDP. Anbessa (2015) reveals that ‘mobility versus settlement’ arguments have 
polarised policy debates on pastoralism in Ethiopia for some time. Those in the former camp argue 
for policies that delineate pastoral areas along with dry-season grazing areas and for designing 
clear land policies that safeguard collective and customary forms of tenure, while at the same time 
promoting improved public services in pastoral areas (Flintan, 2014; Anbessa, 2015). Those in 
favour of settlement and ‘transforming’ the drylands urge for the succession of pastoralism into 
agropastoral systems and non-agricultural activities, supported by greater market participation, and 
for increased livestock productivity through improved extension services (Anbessa, 2015; Yirgu et 
al., 2013). The current government’s determination to transform the pastoralist way of life into a 
sedentary one continues, argues Yimer (2015). In recent years, the state has been planning to 
resettle up to 1.5 million pastoralists under its ‘villagisation’ programme, ostensibly intended to 
improve access to basic services, despite the often outright opposition of many communities to 
engage (Flintan, 2011; Addis, 2015; Oakland Institute, 2019).  
In a working paper by Yirgu et al. (2013) entitled ‘Warming to Change? Climate Policy and 
Agricultural Development in Ethiopia’, the authors identify a number of core climate and 
agricultural narratives at the heart of Ethiopian agricultural policymaking, namely: ‘climate smart 
agriculture’, ‘intensification and commercialisation’ and ‘pastoralist transformation’. Yirgu et al. 
maintain that:  
The future onus will be on pastoralism fitting within a more commercial agropastoral 
narrative framing, in which rangelands are seen as high-risk (or degraded) areas, and the 






Yirgu et al. (2013) make use – as this research does – of an analytical framework for understanding 
policy processes that highlights the dynamic interaction between narratives and discourses, actors 
and networks, and political interests (Keeley and Scoones 2003), a framework described in more 
detail in Chapter 3. Their research is similar to my own, but in a rapidly evolving policy landscape, 
there is scope for further research to bring it up to date, and to narrow the focus to the impacts of 
policy narratives on the drylands and pastoralism, rather than on agriculture in general. 
The literature reveals that a predominantly ‘top-down’ approach to pastoral areas development in 
Ethiopia is not new – previous regimes undertook policy actions in favour of non-pastoral forms of 
land use, in particular irrigated agriculture (Morris, 1998; Dyer et al., 2008; Lavers, 2012; Behnke 
and Kerven, 2013; Yimer, 2015). According to some scholars, the ‘anti-pastoralist bias’ of the 
dominant highland agriculturalist culture has long persisted in Ethiopia (Morris 1998; Halderman, 
2004; Anbessa, 2015) – firstly during the imperial rule of Haile Selassie and then from 1974 for 
two decades under the Derg regime (Halderman, 2004). According to Anbessa (2015), the 
restructuring of the Ethiopian state into ethnically based Regional States in 1994 gave hope that the 
longstanding sense of pastoralists being at the margins was finally being addressed. The Ethiopian 
Constitution (1995) formally recognised pastoralists for the first time. Article 40 (5) of the 
Constitution states that “Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and 
cultivation as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands” (FDRE, 1995). The 
establishment of the Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) in the Ethiopian parliament, 
the holding of an annual ‘National Pastoralists Day’ and the setting up of Pastoral Commissions in 
several of the major pastoral Regional States would appear to open up new opportunities for 
political representation (Anbessa, 2015). The formulation of a new Pastoral Area Development 
Policy in 2018 (see Chapters 6 and 7) would appear to open a space for greater state recognition of 
pastoralism.  Nevertheless, the reality may not yet match the rhetoric. Customary claims to 
communal grazing land are not officially recognised, and the best land is being progressively taken 
over for irrigated cultivation as the agricultural sector becomes more commercialised (Dyer et al., 
2008; Headey et al., 2014; Yimer, 2015; Regassa et al., 2019). Lands that may appear to some as 
‘empty’, ‘marginal’ or ‘unused’ – or are claimed as such – are targeted for private and state 
investment, ignoring their function as critical dry-season grazing reserves for pastoralists (Galaty, 
2013; Mulatu and Bekure, 2013; Yirgu et al., 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Mosley and Watson, 
2016).  
2.4.2 Ethiopian climate-change and green-economy policy narratives 
Ethiopia is one of only a handful of African countries to have embedded climate-related objectives 
into the heart of their national development and growth plans (Death, 2016; Redda and Roland, 





strategy in 2011, a key plank of the Ethiopian Government’s wider and ambitious Growth and 
Transformation Plan (GTP), the aim of which is to achieve middle-income country status by 2025 
(FDRE-MoFED, 2010). The two strategies are designed to be complementary, with 
implementation of the CRGE contributing to the delivery of goals set out in the GTP. From 2015, 
the CRGE strategy has been more closely integrated into the second phase of the GTP, 2015–2020, 
(GTP2), taking a ‘sector-specific approach’ (GGGI, 2016). These plans are being rolled out in a 
context of a growing population and concerns around how climate change will impact on 
Ethiopia’s agriculture and long-term food security. The CRGE strategy builds on earlier work done 
to prepare a Climate Change National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) (FDRE, 2007). 
Ethiopia was the third African country to submit its Intended National Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) in the run-up to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) held in Paris  (FDRE, 2015). The CRGE strategy 
has been backed by a number of donors, including UKAID, USAID and the UNDP and, until 
recently, drew on technical support from the (South Korean-based) Global Green Growth Institute 
(GGGI).  
Death (2016:11) highlights Ethiopia as one of the African states that use “discourses of 
environmentalism” to legitimate their development politics. The prospect of becoming a “green 
economy front-runner” (FDRE 2011d: 1), of attracting international climate finance, and the 
opportunity to carefully frame the climate and development discourse within Ethiopia as an 
opportunity for modernisation and growth, led to this notable commitment from the highest levels 
of government. Both Death (2015; 2016) and Jones and Carabine (2013) maintain that the ‘top-
down’ and politicised nature of the CRGE’s original design are not dissimilar from the institutional 
arrangements in the development of past environmental plans and policies in Ethiopia, to address, 
for example, desertification or the challenge of food insecurity (see Hoben, 1995; Keely and 
Scoones, 2000). Central government, in this case, retained the direct control of the consultative 
process, with little room for meaningful participation or willingness to engage with other actors, 
other than donors or external consultants (Jones and Carabine, 2013; Redda and Roland, 2016). 
Death (2015, 2016) further observes that the discourse of ‘green resilience’, such as that found in 
Ethiopia’s CRGE, can never be confined to technocratic programmes and always has political 
impacts. In Ethiopia’s case, a green-economy strategy would seem to involve “strengthening the 
bureaucratic and coercive capacity of state institutions at the expense of local communities” 
(Death, 2015: 2213). While not made explicit, we can assume he is referring here to (among others) 
those pastoralists and agropastoralists who have been displaced from critical resources by large-
scale renewable energy projects, such as Gibe III on the Omo River, and associated irrigation 





On a more positive note, Jones and Carabine (2013) maintain that the CRGE strategy could be 
considered to have engaged the participation of powerful ministries that would otherwise not have 
been concerned with climate change. Nonetheless, Jones and Carabine (2013) argue that there is a 
greater likelihood of undesirable or ‘maladaptive’ outcomes with transformative approaches to 
climate policy, such as that found in Ethiopia’s CRGE strategy, compared with incremental policy 
formulation. The authors acknowledge that their study is limited – to the extent it does not 
incorporate many of the underlying historical and socio-political factors that influence the 
Ethiopian policy environment. They conclude that further research to determine to what extent 
implementation of Ethiopia’s CRGE leads to “fair distribution of benefits, particularly with regards 
the economic, political and social trade-offs at the local level… would be of considerable benefit” 
(Jones and Carabine, 2013:19). In later chapters, I explore the assumptions underpinning these 
‘green-growth’ and ‘climate-resilience’ policy discourses and narratives, the key actors shaping 
them and their interests, and what, if any, the ramifications are for pastoralists.  
Taking a different line of enquiry, Eriksen and Marin (2015) discuss the findings of a research 
project focused on two sites in the Afar region of Ethiopia in 2010. The study offers insight into 
how various government-led processes – the construction of the Tendaho dam on the Awash River, 
prioritising irrigation cultivation over extensive livestock keeping, sedentarisation, and the 
appropriation of land for biofuel production – all serve to undermine the autonomous adaptive 
capacity of local pastoralists. Participants in the research felt that they were not consulted and their 
local knowledge was ignored in development planning decisions that affected their livelihoods, 
including programmes rolled out under the Ethiopian NAPA from 2010 and the Afar State 
Adaptation Plan (2010). It was found that these programmes and interventions were leading to 
more, rather than less, vulnerability (Eriksen and Marin, 2015). Eriksen and Marin’s research is 
relevant to my own, in that they too argue that seemingly apolitical narratives of environmental 
change – such as those around climate vulnerability – may serve the interests of certain 
constituencies, or obscure the impacts of national policy and politics at the local level, including 
politicised and competing claims to land and other dryland resources.22  
2.4.3 Kenyan policy towards pastoral areas 
Like Ethiopia, Kenya has experienced high levels of economic growth in recent years, driven by 
agricultural exports and the growth in services, and boosted by the discovery of oil and new 
investments in formerly peripheral dryland counties (World Bank, 2020b; Lind et al., 2016). 
Devolution and improved public services are widely regarded as the biggest gains from the 
Constitutional reform process of 2010 (World Bank, 2020b). Significant development challenges 
remain, nonetheless, including high levels of extreme poverty and inequality, corruption, and 
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vulnerability to internal and external shocks (Daily Nation, 2015; Njoka, 2016; World Bank, 
2020b). Droughts are generally perceived by various policy actors (see Chapter 6) as having 
increased in frequency and intensity in recent decades, with particularly severe droughts 
experienced in 2010/11 and 2015/16 (Njoka, 2016). 
Kenya’s drylands – or ‘arid and semi-arid lands’ (ASAL) as they are more commonly referred to -
occupy some 80% of the landmass and are home to an estimated 4–5 million pastoralists and 
agropastoralists (out of a total population of 51 million), most of whom live in border areas.23 The 
ASAL counties are illustrated in a map below (Map 3).  There has been significant migration of 
non-pastoralists into the ASAL in recent decades, as people from high-density agricultural areas 
look for land for crop farming (Njoke, 2016), part of a broader trend of demographic growth in 
Kenya.24  Extensive livestock production contributes significantly to GDP, and market 
opportunities for pastoralism are growing as the regional economy expands (Catley 2017; Nyariki 
and Amwata, 2019). There is a consensus within the literature that state policy towards its drylands 
is marked by years of neglect, by both colonial and post-colonial regimes (Galaty, 1992; Elmi and 
Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Kirimi and Njeru, 2016; Njoka, 2016). Resources that were directed 
towards the ASAL in the post-independence period were largely spent on security and imposing 
the law of the state, with little investment in service delivery or economic development (Njoka, 
2016). What investment that did go towards crop farming and livestock development in post-
independence Kenya was targeted towards the ‘modernisation’ of agriculture, predominantly 
export-orientated crop production, and dairy farming in the ‘high-potential’ areas (Odhiambo, 








                                                        
23 Enumerating the exact number of ‘pastoralists’ and ‘agro-pastoralists’ in Kenya and elsewhere in the HoA in national 
census and other data-gathering exercises is a notoriously difficult task, not helped by the difficulties of classification 
(Randall, 2015).  






Map 3. Kenya’s Arid and Semi-Arid (ASAL) Counties 
 
Source: DLCI, Kenya.  
 
In a report entitled ‘The Unrelenting Persistence of Certain Narratives: An Analysis of Changing 
Policy Narratives about the ASAL in Kenya’, Odhiambo (2014) reviews the evolution and content 
of policy narratives surrounding the ASAL and pastoralism in Kenya. He argues that, for many 
years, the absence of state investment and recognition of the value of ASAL meant that the 
“interaction between these areas and development actors revolved around emergencies… this in 
turn fed a narrative of vulnerability about ASAL that characterised them purely in terms of 
disasters and food aid” (Odhiambo, 2014:10). Despite a noticeable shift in thinking, deeply held 
negative narratives depicting the ASAL as degraded, unproductive and prone to endemic conflict 
still persist today.25 These narratives have the potential to undermine the gains represented by what 
he identifies as “a new policy framework”, namely, Vision 2030 (Kenya’s overall national 
development strategy, subsequently being implemented in successive five-year plans) and the 
National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands, 2012 
(commonly referred to as ‘The ASAL Policy’) – all of which refer to the ASAL and the role of 
pastoral systems in a more positive light. Also significant, was the establishment in 2008 of a 
dedicated Ministry of State for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands 
(MDNKOAL) – the Ministry behind the ASAL Policy. This policy essentially sets out to close the 
‘development gap’ between the ASAL and the rest of the country and opened up space for non-
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state actors to engage in the policymaking process (Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). 
Mobile pastoralism is recognised for its important contribution to dryland livelihoods (GoK, 2012). 
While the MDNKOAL set out to align its own ASAL policy more closely with the interventions 
envisaged in Vision 2030, it argued at the time for a dedicated approach to the development of the 
ASAL, based on “appreciation of its unique ecology and livelihoods and culture of its people” 
(Odhiambo, 2014:14). 
In a parallel process, the promulgation of a new Constitution in 2010, which includes articles “to 
protect the interests and rights of minorities and marginalized groups” – including “pastoral 
persons and communities, whether they are (i) nomadic; or (ii) a settled community” (GoK-ICG, 
2016: 5) – has been welcomed by many.26 In tandem with this, has been a drive towards devolution 
of political power and budgeting processes to the county level. In theory, ASAL communities now 
have a stronger voice in local decision-making and in national government. The emergence of the 
Pastoralist Parliamentary Group (PPG) and an attempt to establish a pastoralist political party in 
Kenya are other notable developments. County Integrated Development Plans (CIDP) outline 
strategies to integrate local economic development and environmental management (King-Okumu, 
2015).  
Odhiambo (2014) maintains that Vision 2030, the establishment of the MDNKOAL and the ASAL 
Policy constitute a notable shift in discourse on the ASALs – away from their being seen as 
‘problem areas’ that need to be treated separately, to instead a perspective that regards them as an 
integral part of the national economy. While this is welcome, he continues, there is also now an 
underlying narrative within Kenyan policymaking that views the ASAL as ‘the new frontier’, with 
enormous ‘unexploited’ subsurface wealth in minerals, oil and gas, or with potential for large 
renewable energy infrastructure projects and tourism. Projects such as LAPSSET, mentioned 
earlier, are described in government documents as a means to ‘open up’ pastoral regions to 
investment by “improving national interconnectivity and even enhance market opportunities for 
pastoralist livestock producers” (LCDA, 2016: 42). In contrast is the argument that only those who 
have greater access to resources and capital in its various forms are able to use these to secure 
further benefits (Symons, 2014; King-Okumu, 2015; Mosley and Watson, 2016). 
2.4.4 Kenyan climate-change and green-economy policy narratives 
The increased frequency, magnitude and severity of droughts and floods in Kenya in recent years 
have seen new narratives emerging around climate change. One holds that the ASAL, and the 
people who live there, are ‘fragile’ and ‘vulnerable’ in the context of a changing climate (World 
Bank, 2012; Netherlands MFA, 2015; Practical Action, 2016). A second ‘counternarrative’ seeks to 
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frame ASAL communities as ‘resilient’ rather than vulnerable, with mobile pastoralists in 
particular better equipped with the traditional knowledge and experience to deal with climate 
variability and climate change which has long been a feature of the ASAL (IIED/ SOS Sahel, 2011; 
Hesse and Pattison, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). In Chapter 5, I examine how prevalent these – and 
related – narratives are within national policies and strategies. 
One (short) section of the paper by Odhiambo (2014) focuses on the key national actors responsible 
for defining policy on climate-change adaptation in Kenya, as well as how climate-change 
discourse has influenced ASAL policy and programming. Odhiambo observes that climate change 
has, to some extent, fed the ‘age-old narrative’ that views the ASAL as degraded and blames 
pastoral land use as a contributing factor. At the same time, an emerging counternarrative – one 
that seeks to address climate challenges in a way consistent with the ecological reality and that 
appreciates mobile pastoralism as an appropriate land-use system – is gaining ground. This 
narrative, which emphasises ‘resilience’ instead of vulnerability, can be detected in the Kenyan 
National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) of 2010, which recognises “the need to 
ensure sustainable pastoralism” in the ASAL (GoK, 2010: 52). While strong on context, and on 
identifying the multiple – and sometimes conflicting – narratives about the ASAL, Odhiambo’s 
review lacks a clear framework for analysing drylands and climate-policy narratives and policy 
processes. More rigorous and systematic research is needed to build on his important contribution 
and to bring his analysis of the policy context up to date. In particular, new policy frameworks, 
such as Kenya’s Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) (2015), a Green Economy Strategy 
and Implementation Plan (GESIP) (2015), the National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 
from 2013, various national Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) strategies from 2014 on, and a 
national Climate Smart Agriculture Strategy from 2015, all have implications for the ASAL and 
pastoralism. These are examined for their discursive content in Chapter 5. 
Elsewhere, Maina et al. (2013), in a paper entitled ‘Agriculture and Climate Change in Kenya: 
Climate Chaos, Policy Dilemmas’, examine emerging policy discussions on climate change and 
agriculture (including the livestock sector) in Kenya. The paper highlights how climate change and 
agriculture linkages are framed and the key actors and interests in relation to certain narratives. 
These narratives include both ‘climate change as a threat to food security’ and ‘climate change as 
opportunity to access new finance’. As in the study by Yirgu et al. (2013), discussed earlier, Maina 
et al. (2013) make use of Keeley and Scoone’s (2003) analytical framework for examining policy 
processes. Their paper argues that a lack of policy coherence between national climate-change and 
agricultural policies opens “significant space for powerful actors to influence and direct the climate 
change-agriculture agenda in the country” (Maina et al., 2013: 4). The authors suggest that the 
ways in which certain food security and carbon-funding objectives are currently being pursued 





farming, irrigation and biofuel production, rather than extensive pastoral systems. By narrowing the 
focus to pastoralists and the drylands (rather than Kenyan agriculture in general), my research 
aims, among other things, to build on the work of Maina et al. (2013), and to look at whether, six 
years on, their thesis that certain powerful actors are shaping the climate-change agenda for their 
own interests, while other groups, notably pastoralists, are being excluded, still holds. 
Elsewhere, Symons (2014) offers a critical appraisal of the 2010 NCCRS. While Kenya has been 
praised internationally as ‘an early adopter’ of climate policy, its plans, she argues, are driven “by 
particular imaginaries, specifically: (climate) adaptation as a ‘universal apocalypse’ and adaptation 
as a technical-economic problem” (Symons, 2014: 266). These discourses work together in a 
deliberate ‘anti-political’ strategy aimed at obscuring the “highly charged realities of adaptation” 
(ibid.: 266). For Kenya’s political elite, she continues, ‘adaptation’ is predominantly a matter of 
reducing the perceived climatic risks to economic growth and enhancing opportunities to gain from 
international climate finance sources (ibid.: 266).  
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how attitudes towards and understandings of pastoralism amongst 
policy actors, development practitioners and dryland scholars have evolved over recent decades. In 
doing so, it has sought to identify some of the discourses and narratives that underpin those 
understandings. I have also set out the broader context of environmental, political and economic 
changes currently being experienced by pastoralist communities in the drylands of the HoA, as well 
as flagged some of the policy responses being promulgated and implemented by the respective 
governments of Ethiopia and Kenya. In turn, I have touched upon some of the consequences of 
those policies for pastoralists – benefits accruing to more commercially-orientated livestock owners 
and local elites, while poorer pastoralists are increasingly losing access to the critical resources 
required to maintain mobility as the pastoral rangelands become increasingly fragmented (see also 
Chapters 6 and 7). 
It is clear that pastoralists, while facing many uncertainties, are responding to climatic and non-
climatic changes taking place in the drylands of the HoA in different ways. While the gap between 
wealthier and poorer pastoralists would appear to be growing, with many herders either opting to 
leave or forced out of livestock-keeping altogether, others are finding new ways to adapt and 
innovate by taking advantage of new markets and technologies or through livelihood 
diversification. At the same time, there is an increased focus by the governments of Ethiopia and 
Kenya, and by the donors who support them, on designing development strategies and policies that 
ostensibly seek to build ‘resilience to climate change’ and promote a ‘greener’ form of economic 
growth. A number of scholars have begun to unpack the narratives and discourses that underpin 





some of the narratives driving current climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and 
Kenya are not necessarily ‘new’, but are instead rooted in historical discourses around 
‘unproductive’ drylands, the poor as agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need 
for modernisation. Pastoralists are still perceived by some as ill adapted to ‘modern’ contingencies 
and in need of transformation. To what extent this is a fair and accurate reflection of contemporary 
discourse and narratives is examined in Chapters 5 and 6. A further theme emerging from the 
literature is that narratives of ‘climate resilience’, ‘climate adaptation’ and ‘green growth’, as 
currently articulated, are largely framed in apolitical or technocratic terms, often serving to mask 
the impacts of national policy and politics at the local level, including politicised claims to land and 
other resources.  
While there has been some important work done on identifying and deconstructing drylands 
development (and to lesser extent, climate-change) policy discourses and narratives in the HoA – 
focusing, as we have seen, on new forms of dryland policy narratives in general (Krätli, 2013; 
Odhiambo, 2014), climate-change narratives within agricultural policies (Maina et al, 2014; Yirgu 
et al, 2014); localised adaptation interventions (Erickson and Marin, 2015); climate adaptation as a 
form of capitalist growth (Symons, 2014); or on green-economy discourses and the role of the state 
(Jones and Carabine, 2013; Death, 2015) – it is evident, nonetheless, that there are still some 
shortcomings in the research to date, all of which is in need of updating. There are no academic 
studies that specifically look at the kinds of discourses and narratives around pastoralism found 
within national climate-change and green-economy policies or, in turn, examine what the 
consequences of these narratives are for pastoralism, now and in the future. Nor are there any 
studies that have done a comparative analysis of the Ethiopian and Kenyan contexts which might 
reveal similarities and differences between the two cases in terms of the kinds of discourses and 
narratives that are dominant, the role of the state and other actors in shaping policy narratives, and 
resulting outcomes. 
Thus, further research is justified to answer a number of critical questions – questions which form 
the basis for this study: What are the dominant narratives found in current national climate-change 
and drylands policies in Ethiopia and Kenya, and how do these compare? What actors are shaping 
and driving these narratives, and what are their interests? What are the consequences of the 
resulting policies for pastoralist livelihoods and the future of pastoralism in the two countries? In 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I endeavour to answer these questions. But first it is necessary to set out an 
analytical framework for my research (Chapter 3), before moving on to document the research 

































Chapter 3: Analytical Framework  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a framework for the analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan 
climate - and drylands-related - policy narratives that are the focus of this research. In the first 
section, I draw from, and add to, an analytical framework that helps to make sense of the dynamic 
interactions between narratives and discourses, actors and networks, and politics and interests (Roe, 
1991; Adger et al., 2001; Keely and Scoones, 2003; Wolmer et al., 2006). In the second section, I 
identify how emerging climate-policy narratives broadly correspond to three different discourses 
on pastoralism and drylands development, and the way in which certain narratives and associated 
concepts ‘frame’ what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interests are 
taken into consideration, or excluded from, policy processes. These narratives and key concepts 
form the basis of the content analysis (CA) and discourse analysis (DA) of Ethiopian and Kenyan 
climate-change and drylands policy documents, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5. 
3.2 Environmental policy processes, discourses and narratives 
It is useful at the outset to distinguish between the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘policy narrative’ as I 
employ them in this research. I define discourse as a shared meaning of a phenomenon. This 
phenomenon may be small or large, and the understanding of it may be shared by a small or large 
group of people at local, national and international or global level (Adger et al., 2001). The actors 
who adhere to the discourse participate in various degrees to its production, reproduction and 
transformation through written and oral statements (Adger et al., 2001). In turn, ‘dominant 
discourse’ privileges certain ways of seeing and acting in the world and by doing so legitimates the 
power of specific groups (Roe, 1991; Gilbert, 2008).  
Hajer defines discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations that are 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is 
given to physical and social realities” (1995: 44). For the French philosopher Michel Foucault 
(1980), such ‘ideas, concepts and categorisations’ are expressions of knowledge and power 
controlling human subjects by the categories imposed on them. In other words, discourses are 
‘frames’ that define the world in certain ways and, in the process, they exclude and marginalise 
alternative perspectives (Lakoff, 2014; Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Foucauldian writings on 
‘governmentality’ (see also Chapter 4) emphasise the values and expression of power concealed in 
the neutral language of policy (Foucault, 1991; Zhang, 2015; Death, 2016). The concept of 
governmentality, furthermore, allows space to consider diverse ‘technologies of rule’ (Morton, 





are enforced…. but also by policies made at various levels, property rights constructed and 
recognised in various ways, and different ways in which knowledge about them and their 
environment is defined, collected and fed back to them” (Morton, 2010; 16). ‘Discourse analysis’ 
(see Chapter 4) can help to identify such technologies of rule, and puts forms of knowledge at the 
centre of the study of power (Keely and Scoones, 2003; Morton 2010; Joseph, 2014). 
Within discourse analysis, ‘expressive means’, or the way the message of a discourse has been 
communicated, has been analysed in terms of ‘narratives’ – a storyline with a chronological order 
and often involving the archetypes, heroes, villains and victims (Roe, 1991; Adger et al., 2001; 
Hajer, 1995). An environmental policy narrative approach acknowledges that large-scale 
policymaking and planning – such as that favoured by donors and national governments – needs 
large-scale simplifications, or ‘crises narratives’, to generate political consensus and make action 
possible in the face of uncertainty (Roe 1991; Krätli, 2013). Narratives not only convey storylines 
of cause and effect; they often have embedded the advocacy of a particular policy solution 
(Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018). Moreover, narratives establish ‘frames of reference’ that define and 
bound what forms of knowledge count, and whose understandings and interest are legitimate 
(Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 2013; Whitfield 2016). James Scott in his book ‘Seeing Like a State: How 
Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed’ argues that: “the simplifications 
that state actors make to categorise and bring order to a complex and dynamic socio-environmental 
reality so they can manage, govern and implement policies, are integral to the way states ‘see’ their 
territories” (Scott, 1998, in Kronenburg-Garcia, 2018: 2). For Catley et al. (2013), it is critical that 
pastoralists, pastoralism and pastoral development are included and recognised as ways of 
‘knowing about’ or doing development. In other words, moving our gaze from “seeing like a state” 
or “seeing like a development agency” to “seeing like a pastoralist instead” (ibid.: 21). 
Keeley and Scoones (2003) argue that, in the contemporary policy world, the intersection of 
national and international policy processes is particularly important, not least in the context of 
climate change. Policy is, in effect, “co-constructed across space, through particular networks and 
connections linking global and local sites” (ibid.: 3). Discourses of ‘climate smart agriculture’ and 
‘green growth’ for example, are shaped not only by national policy imperatives but by powerful 
coalitions of donors, research institutions, UN agencies and private interests (Whitfield, 2016), a 
theme highlighted in later discussion (see also 3.3.3 below, and 7.3.2). While the influence of 
global policy actors can be strong, the located or contextualised nature of particular policy 
processes is also vital. Hence the changing nature of the state and associated bureaucracies, as well 
as the role of civil society and other actors, merit attention when examining national policies 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003). The role of science and research – and what is claimed as ‘fact’ – is 
also central in policy processes. Particularly when it comes to the promotion of certain initiatives 





recommendations on how farming and land management should be conducted (Whitfield, 2016). 
The largely technocratic, ‘one-size-fits all’ type responses to desertification that were characteristic 
of drylands interventions in the 1970s and 1980s, as discussed in Chapter 2, being a case in point. 
For Keeley and Scoones, understanding policy processes therefore means: “understanding the 
interaction of networks and relationships, agency and practice, and knowledge and power dynamics 
in particular contexts” (2003: 5).  
The most ‘successful’ or ‘dominant’ narratives are generally those that serve the interests of 
powerful constituencies. Historically in the HoA, these have been governments, aid bureaucracies 
and scientists (Roe 1991; Adams, 2009; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Whitfield, 2016). Emery Roe 
(1991) observes that the simplicity and political power of narratives makes them very persistent. 
Institutionalisation of narratives can thus occur over a long time. In Ethiopia, for example, the 
modernising and technocratic approach to agriculture and natural resource management that is a 
characteristic of state-led rural development policy, has its roots in the imperial era, but became 
embedded in successive regime institutions and the practices of government bureaucracies (Morris, 
1998; Halderman, 2004). In such cases, ‘scientific expertise’ helped to legitimise and shape the 
promotion of a range of interventions, with far-reaching consequences for dryland communities 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Adams, 2009; Behnke and Kerven, 2013). 
If we take the issues that have been discussed in this thesis so far, we can see that dominant 
narratives typically have a storyline, with a crisis scenario at the beginning ('the food crisis' or 
‘climate crisis’), a central section outlining the problem and its causes (‘mobile livestock herding is 
no longer viable due to climate change and resource scarcity’) and a final section defining or 
advocating a range of politically neutral, often technical, solutions (‘water development’, 
‘rangeland management’, ‘climate smart agriculture’), as well as offering fertile ground for 
scientific research (Krätli, 2013). As Keeley and Scoones (2003: 37) note, however, it is impossible 
to talk about policy neutrality. Rather, whatever a policy says carries assumptions and is in some 
sense prescriptive. The language in which it is framed is as significant as the actual content. As we 
have learned, certain all-encompassing narratives have been found to be inadequate in 
acknowledging the institutional and politicised nature of many environmental problems as 
experienced by different people in a variety of locations and circumstances – the drylands being no 
exception (Forsyth, 2003; Flintan 2011; Scoones et al., 2019). 
3.2.1 A framework of analysis 
Before identifying and examining in greater depth what discourses and narratives are shaping 
current climate-change and broader drylands-development policies in Ethiopia and Kenya (Chapter 
5), the role and influence of certain actors, interests and institutions (Chapter 6) and the 





analytical framework through which such an analysis can take place. Understanding the 
consequences of policy processes for pastoralists requires an approach that can help identify both 
what – and how – particular policies on climate change and the drylands are adopted by the state in 
Ethiopia and Kenya. Furthermore, it enables us to locate the emergence and framing of these 
policies within a broader political economy context of agrarian change.  
The framework employed here draws on the work of Keeley and Scoones (1999, 2003), later 
refined by Wolmer et al. (2006). It starts by deconstructing the notion of policy itself. A 
conventional view of policymaking sees it as a linear process that proceeds from the stage of 
researching and identifying a policy problem, weighing up the costs and benefits of different policy 
options, through to implementing policy (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Maina et al., 2013). In 
contrast, Keeley and Scoones (1999) and Wolmer et al. (2006) start with the premise that policy 
processes are best described as ‘incremental, complex and messy’, involving actors with competing 
agendas and interests. Their analytical framework (illustrated in a simple diagram – Figure 3.1) 
helps make sense of complex policy processes by distinguishing between:  
1. Discourses and narratives – how different forms of knowledge and expertise are articulated 
and how these shape and guide policy problems and courses of action; 
2. Actors, institutions and networks – gives primacy to the roles and agency of different 
actors in policy processes; 
3. Politics and interests – examines the underlying power dynamics in policy contestations 





























Figure 3.1 Conceptual lens for analysing policy processes (adapted from Wolmer et al., 2006). 
 
These three overlapping elements, or ‘lenses’, allow greater understanding of policy change 
through different dimensions of power, and different scales and disciplinary foci. An actor–
orientated approach to policy formulation would highlight the contribution, or ‘agency’, of 
individual policy actors, their networks and the power relations embedded in them (Scoones, 
2015). Networks, coalitions and alliances of actors (individuals or institutions) with a ‘shared 
vision’ are important in spreading and maintaining narratives through chains of persuasion and 
influence, such as conferences, journals and policy documents (Wolmer et al., 2006). At the same 
time, actor’s agency makes sense only in the context of broader narratives and frames of reference, 
as well as political and historical contexts (McKeon, 2015; Scoones, 2015). In the centre of the 
diagram are ‘policy spaces’. Actor networks are able to establish discourses in policy by taking 
advantage of policy space (Gaventa, 2005). Policy spaces may ‘open up’ or ‘close down’, 
depending on the configuration of narratives/discourses, actors/networks and politics/interests in 
any particular policy process (Scoones, 2015)27. Nonetheless, policy spaces can also allow room for 
                                                        
27 Early work by John Kingdon is influential here. Kingdon (1984) proposed a means of understanding public policy 
processes by highlighting how different problem, policy and political ‘streams’ flow along different channels and 
remain more or less independent of one another until, at a specific point in time, a ‘policy window’ opens. Under 
certain circumstances, policy-windows can be used by particular actors in a policy sub-system, in order to advance the 
engagement of issues they care about (Beland & Howlett, 2016) 
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alternative perspectives to be heard and gradually result in challenges or shifts in the knowledge 
and practices associated with previously dominant discourses (Keeley and Scoones, 2003; Otto-
Naess et al., 2015). In Chapter 2, we learned that the establishment of a new Ministry for 
Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands (MDNKOAL) in Kenya in 2008, along 
with Constitutional reform in 2010, opened up a space for pastoralist organisations to input into 
policymaking (Elmi and Birch, 2013). Thus, policy spaces are also, in effect, ‘livelihood spaces’ 
(Scoones, 2015), in that some may benefit from a particular policy change, while others lose out.  
The first of these lenses relates directly to the first of my three research questions: what are the 
dominant narratives found in current climate-change and drylands policy in Ethiopia and Kenya? 
Lenses two and three relate to my second research question: what actors (including influential 
global actors) are shaping and promoting these narratives, and what are their interests? In order to 
address my third research question – what are the consequences of these policy narratives for 
pastoralist livelihoods and for the future of pastoralism in the two countries? – I have modified 
Keeley and Scoones (2003) original framework, by adding a fourth element, namely, ‘policy 
outcomes’. This fourth element allows my research to move beyond the identification and 
understanding of discourses and narratives, actors and political interests currently shaping climate-
change (and dryland) policy processes in the HoA to look at the consequences of policy 
prescriptions for pastoralist livelihoods. This is important because it helps us to gain insight into 
the complex “political economy of winners and losers” (Adger et al., 2001: 688) from policy 
processes that might otherwise be obscured within simplistic policy narratives.  
3.3 Three discourses on pastoralism and climate change in the drylands 
Drawing from the literature, I identify three broad discourses that characterise much of the 
scholarly and development debate around pastoralism more generally, but are also relevant to the 
intersection between climate change and pastoralism. While there is a consensus that the 
uncertainties brought about by climatic (and other) changes in the drylands have implications for 
future pastoralist pathways (see Chapter 2), there is far less agreement on what sectors merit 
substantive investment, or where the constraints lie. One view – which I have categorised here as a 
‘pure pastoralism’ discourse – is that mobile pastoralism is the most ecologically and economically 
appropriate form of land use in dryland areas. Restrictions on mobility therefore constitute the chief 
constraint, and removing this constraint is the main solution. In contrast, a ‘transforming 
pastoralism and dryland areas’ discourse holds that nomadic pastoralism is no longer tenable in the 
face of the uncertainties brought about by climate change, food insecurity and increasing 
fragmentation of rangelands. Instead, these areas offer an opportunity for other, more ‘productive’ 
forms of investment. Distinguishing between a ‘purist’ position on the one hand, and a 





McPeak et al. 2011) but provides a useful basis on which to develop an analytical framework. I 
have added a third, perspective – what I refer to as a ‘modern, mobile and green pastoralism’ 
discourse. The term ‘modern and mobile’ comes from a title of a book by IIED/SOS Sahel from 
2009. I have added ‘green’ to reflect more contemporary concerns around climate change and the 
role of pastoralism in a green economy. This takes the middle ground, recognising pastoralists as 
entrepreneurs and innovators, and advocating for an improved policy environment, greater 
diversification of livelihoods, and for pastoralists to play a role in the ‘green economy’ and 
‘climate smart agriculture’.  
It is important to stress that these three discourses on the connections between climate change, 
pastoralism and drylands development are not necessarily mutually exclusive, or always clearly 
distinguishable. Nor are their associated narratives. Contemporary development and environmental 
policy will invariably be constructed around more than one narrative (Hajer, 2005). The case for 
sedentarisation and transforming the drylands may, for example, be built on certain green-economy 
or ‘climate-resilience’ narratives. Elements of a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse – the idea of 
improved governance of pastoral areas for example – can be found in ‘modern, mobile and green’ 
perspectives. Narratives may be overlapping or contradictory. Dominant narratives have the ability 
to absorb the language and concepts of counternarratives (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). Narratives 
are constantly shifting and evolving to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities arise, or as new 
contexts unfold (Otto-Naess et al., 2015; Whitfield, 2016).  
For each discourse, I suggest a corresponding or associated set of climate change and pastoral 
development narratives, within which I identify keywords or metaphors, the latter which form the 
codes for my CA (the findings of which are presented in Chapter 5). These keywords and 
metaphors are summarised at the end of this chapter (Table 3.1). It is necessary to provide a caveat 
here that many of the keywords – ‘resilience’ and ‘adaptation’ for example – cannot easily be 
isolated to fit a single discourse or category. They may be associated with more than one discourse, 
depending on the context in which they are used. While at first glance keywords such as ‘climate 
resilient’ and ‘renewable energy’ would appear to be more obviously associated with a ‘modern, 
mobile and green’ perspective, I have deliberately elected to place them in the ‘tranforming 
pastoralism and drylands’ discourse, for the very reason that some climate-resilience narratives in 
this context, such as that found in Ethiopia’s CRGE (see Chapters 2 and 5), and the drive for 
renewable energy (as manifested in the construction large infrastructure projects such as dams - see 
Chapter 7),  subscribe to the view that ‘pastoralism and drylands needs to be transformed’ (see 
3.3.2 below). At the same time I acknowlege that the decision to place these keywords here has an 
influence on the results of the CA (Chapter 5). Such analysis provides only partial insight and 
therefore needs to be tested, as is done through the DA and interviews that follow.  





together with the words that precede or immediately follow can give greater insight. Hence I 
distinguish, for example, between ‘resilience’ and ‘climate resilient’ and between ‘autonomous 
adaptation’ and ‘planned adaptation’. I have also left out certain ubiquitous words that cut across 
all three discourses, such as ‘climate change’, ‘food security’ and ‘sustainable development. A 
detailed description of the methodology of CA and DA and how sources of data (policy 
documents) were selected is provided in Chapter 4. 
3.3.1 ‘Pure pastoralism’ 
The first discourse can be labelled a ‘purist’ position than advocates the maintenance of pastoral 
mobility with minimal change to age-old pastoral livelihoods and practice (McPeak, et al., 2011). 
From this understanding, nomadic pastoralism – with its mobility and commonly managed 
resources – is a dynamic and sophisticated land-use system appropriate both economically and 
ecologically for the drylands (Behnke et al., 1993; Naimer-Fuller, 1999, Scoones, 1995; Vetter, 
2005; AU, 2010; Krätli, 2015). Pastoralists have a close relationship with and knowledge of their 
environment that enables them to both protect and exploit the rangeland’s biodiversity on which 
they depend (Notenbaert et al., 2012; Krätli, 2015). Pastoralists have been managing environmental 
variability and ‘adapting autonomously’ (adaptation undertaken informally or spontaneously by 
individuals, households or communities) to climate variability and other uncertainties in Africa for 
millennia (Ericksen et al., 2013; McGahey et al., 2014). Deviation from the traditional way of life 
is a threat to the system itself, will further marginalise and impoverish herders, and has negative 
consequences for dryland ecosystems – if, for example, mobile livestock-keeping is replaced with 
other inappropriate forms of land use (Behnke et al., 2013; Krätli, 2015). In this discourse, 
pastoralism is not a ‘problem to be solved’, but rather an inherently sustainable production system 
that needs to be acknowledged and protected. One way to do so would be to ensure pastoralists’ 
access to ‘key resources’ – such as crucial dry-season grazing reserves – and livestock mobility is 
safeguarded (Catley et al., 2013; Gebeye, 2016; Krätli et al., 2015).  
The emphasis here on ‘livelihoods’ and ‘pastoral systems’ draws not only on ‘sustainable 
livelihoods’ thinking – a concept to which the ideas of capabilities, equity and sustainability are 
central (Tanner et al., 2015)28 – but also the idea of ‘resilience’. Manzano (2017) maintains that 
pastoralist mobility is an inherently ‘resilient system’. Resilience can be defined as the amount of 
change a system can undergo and still retain the same function and structure, while maintaining the 
capacity for self regulation and adaptation (Berkes et al., 2003; Folkes, 2006). For the IPCC, 
resilience is understood as the “ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, 
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development thinking and practice since its emergence in the early 1990s. Scoones (2015) has argued that, while 
livelihoods approaches remains an essential lens for examining questions of rural development, such analysis needs to 





accommodate, or recover from the effects of hazardous events in timely and efficient manner” 
(2012: 5). McPeak and Little (2017) argue that ‘pastoralist resilience’ in the drylands is best 
conceived as a heterogeneous concept, with different sub-groups experiencing and responding to 
climatic and other ‘shocks’ in different ways. Other literature has tended to focus on resilience as 
less of a final outcome, or goal, of development and more of a process, involving learning, 
adaptation, anticipation and improvement in basic structures, actors and functions (Nelson et al., 
2007; Carabine, 2014; Bahadur et al., 2015). Hence the current preoccupation by many in the 
humanitarian and development sector with ‘resilience building’ – commonly regarded as a means 
to bridge the divide between emergency relief and long-term development (Levine, 2014; Joseph, 
2014). The danger here, clearly, is that, if pastoralist resilience is depicted as something to be 
‘built’ rather than just observed, then it increasingly becomes an “externally defined imperative” 
that is shaped by “state agencies and expert analysts” (MacKinnon and Derickson, 2012, in Felli, 
2016: 276) rather than a reflection of how pastoralists themselves are responding to change. 
A system’s ‘adaptive capacity’ is a measure of how it adjusts (incrementally) to changing 
circumstances while continuing to function effectively in terms of providing and maintaining 
ecosystem services and how it recovers from a crisis and develops new pathways (Béné et al., 
2014). In theory, the more adaptive capacity a system has, the greater the likelihood that the system 
can reorganise back to a ‘desirable state’ after a hazardous event (such as a drought). Resilience 
thinking often focuses on maintaining and strengthening adaptive capacity and assumes that the 
extent to which social actors and institutions can effectively ‘manage resilience’ will determine 
how successful or otherwise they are in crossing back to a ‘desirable state’ (Walker et al., 2004). 
On the other hand, the very notion of a ‘desirable state’ somehow assumes an agreed set of 
priorities among actors and vested interests towards some kind of ‘rational transformational 
change’ and adaptive management. This ignores the realities in many sites – the pastoral drylands 
being no exception – where significant conflicts exist over resource access, control and 
management due to unequal power relations (Flintan, 2011; Beymer-Farris et al., 2012; Pas 
Schrijver, 2019). While the difficulty of resilience in addressing issues of power, human agency or 
inequity has led to questions being raised about the utility of the concept in development and 
climate-adaptation contexts (Bahadur et al., 2010; Canon and Muller-Mann, 2010; Pelling, 2011; 
Beymer-Farris et al. 2012), there is little doubt that resilience has now become an “all-embracing 
mobilising metaphor” (Pain and Levine, 2012: 21) for many actors, not least in relation to the 
drylands of the HoA.29  
Within a pure pastoralism discourse, emphasis is put on the ‘rights’ of pastoralist peoples. 
Pastoralist peoples have a ‘right to sustainable development’ and a ‘right of participation’ in 
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development endeavours that effect them (Gebeye, 2016) – rights that are enshrined in the 
Ethiopian Federal Democratic Republic Constitution (Art. 43(1) and 43(2)), for example, but not 
necessarily protected. Advocacy groups and pastoralist organisations have called for improved 
forms of ‘governance’ in pastoral lands (Herrera et al., 2014; Jenet et al., 2016; Davies et al., 2016; 
Manzano, 2018) – affirmative action to be taken by the state that builds on pastoralists’ existing 
(customary) institutions, knowledge and aspirations, and which involves giving greater decision-
making power and resource rights to pastoralists (Davies et al., 2016; Gomarasca and Nori, 2016). 
Elsewhere, there are debates as to whether pastoralists should be recognised within national 
constitutions and legislative frameworks as ‘indigenous peoples’ (Sena, 2015). This has important 
implications for the extent to which local pastoralist communities in the drylands give their ‘free, 
prior and informed consent’ to private investments that affect them, and for the state’s 
responsibility to prevent human rights abuses by third parties (ibid.). 
In summary, the narratives associated with this discourse include the following: mobile pastoralism 
as a resilient and appropriate system for managing environmental and climatic variability in the 
drylands; pastoralists have been adapting ‘autonomously’ to climatic and other changes for 
millennia; restrictions on mobility and access to key resources are a bigger threat to pastoralist 
livelihoods than climate risk; improved governance of pastoral / rangeland areas is necessary to 
safeguard the rights, culture and aspirations of pastoralists.  
These narratives include a number of key concepts or keywords, including: ‘environmental 
variability’; ‘mobility’; ‘pastoral systems’; ‘livelihoods’; ‘resilience’; ‘rights’; ‘adaptive capacity, 
‘autonomous adaptation’; ‘customary institutions’; ‘key resources’; and ‘pastoral governance’. 
These – and other keywords identified below – form the basis for the CA conducted in Chapter 5. 
We now turn to a contrasting discourse. 
3.3.2 ‘Transforming pastoralism and dryland areas’  
The second discourse might be labelled a ‘transforming’ position – one often held by policymakers 
who feel that pastoralist mobility is the antithesis of modernity and the goals of a modern state 
(McPeak et al., 2011). Within this discourse, mobility is understood as being driven by lack of 
resources and as a ‘coping strategy’ vis-à-vis environmental instability, and as a limit to 
productivity. Consequently, stability – and by extension sedentarisation – are considered a rational 
response (Krätli, 2013). Governments, furthermore, require that pastoralists are somehow ‘settled’ 
in order for them to be ‘visible’ and taxable, and to benefit from the provision of modern services 
such as education and healthcare (Little et al., 2008; Catley et al., 2013; Krätli, 2013; Krätli, 2019). 
It would appear that Ethiopia’s official policies in recent decades have been largely intent to 
encourage pastoralist settlement, irrigated agriculture and commercialisation of the livestock sector 





Although Kenya has no official policy on sedentarisation, it has, nonetheless, continued to promote 
non-pastoral investments in the drylands, at the expense of pastoral mobility (Odhiambo, 2014; 
King-Okumu, 2015; Schilling et al., 2016; Lind et al., 2017). 
There is a powerful discourse here that pastoralists need to be ‘transformed for their own good’, or 
at the very least, kept somehow confined to those ‘leftover’ areas perceived as having ‘marginal 
value’ for other, ‘more productive’ forms of land use (Krätli, 2013; Shete and Rutten, 2015).30 On 
the other hand, ‘high-potential’ areas – along rivers, for example, that serve as key dry-season 
grazing reserves – are, as we have seen in Chapter 2, are targeted as ideal for commercial 
agriculture and other forms of development (Behnke et al., 2013; Krätli, 2015; Jenet et al., 2016; 
Mosely and Watson, 2016; Oakland Institute, 2019). An associated narrative, found in both 
Ethiopia and Kenya, is that the dryland areas – and livestock production – need to be integrated 
into the national economy if they are to play a strong role in national development (Odhiambo, 
2014). Such a position can be found in both the Ethiopian government Policy Statement for the 
Sustainable Development of Pastoral and Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia (FDRA, 2008), as well 
as the Kenyan National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid 
Lands’ (GoK, 2012) – documents among those examined in Chapter 5.  
For this position, a corresponding climate narrative is what Krätli and Enson (2013) refer to as the 
‘doomed-by-climate-change’ narrative: nomadic pastoralism is essentially no longer tenable in the 
face of the uncertainties brought about by climatic change, food insecurity, rapid population growth 
and increasing fragmentation of ‘fragile’ rangelands (Headey and Kennedy, 2012; Headey et al., 
2014; Cervigni and Morris, 2016). This view is re-enforced by national and international media and 
aid agency reports that frquently portray pastoralists as ‘victims of climate change’, as dependent 
on food-aid, engaged in endemic conflict over diminishing or ‘scarce’ resources, and that use 
testimonies of pastoral ‘drop-outs’ to perpetuate a common perception of the drylands as ‘failed 
areas’ (Shanahan, 2013; Odhiambo, 2013; Morland 2017). It follows therefore that, within this 
discourse, the kind of traditional ‘autonomous adaptation’ strategies, described earlier is imagined 
to be insufficient to deal with the enormity of projected climate change. Instead pastoralists 
increasingly resort to negative ‘coping strategies’ – cattle raiding, joining militant groups, ‘illegal 
grazing’ inside areas set aside for conservation – so having a harmful or ‘maladaptive’ effect on 
others (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai, 2014; Cervigni and Morris, 2016). Hence the need for the 
‘transformation of pastoralism’, and externally directed and managed climate-change adaptation. 
Within the transforming discourse, climate adaptation is viewed predominantly as “a process of 
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pastoralists and/or that may serve as critical dry-season grazing reserves – to investors by claiming such land is 





coordinated transitions to meet the demands of a changing external environment, directed by 
appropriate governmental institutions” (UNFCCC, 2007, in Taylor, 2015: xi).31 
Another associated climate-change narrative builds on the assumption that livestock contribute 
significantly to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that there is a need to reduce the national 
herd size, while simultaneously intensifying and increasing ‘livestock productivity’. While this can 
be considered as part of a broader ‘climate smart agriculture’ (CSA) approach (World Bank, 2011; 
FAO, 2013) – as described under the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse below – it falls in line 
with both Kenya’s and Ethiopia’s ambitions to transform and commercialise their agricultural 
sectors more broadly (discussed in Chapter 5). The idea of commercialisation of livestock 
production as a pathway to modernisation in the HoA is not new. In the 1960s and 1970s in Kenya, 
for example, World Bank-financed ‘livestock development’ programmes led to the dismantling of 
traditional rangeland governance systems and institutions, and benefited only a small number of 
wealthier livestock owners (McCabe, 1991; Zael and Dietz, 2000).  
A parallel ‘twist’ to the transforming discourse is when the drylands are seen as the ‘new frontier’ – 
sites for resource extraction, commercial agriculture and infrastructure development (Odhiambo, 
2014; Lind et al, 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016). This narrative has taken on even greater 
significance with the discovery of oil, gas and mineral resources in Kenya’s northern ASAL 
counties, as well as plans to develop the LAPSSET Corridor. Referring to the ‘frontier’ areas, 
Mosley and Watson maintain that both Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s respective national development 
strategies “articulate a desire to no longer just control and contain these regions, but also to 
transform them” (2016: 453). Arguably, the kinds of ‘green-growth’ investments in renewable 
energy (Danwatch, 2016; Yimer, 2015; Sena 2015), carbon sequestration projects (Fairhead et al., 
2012) or biofuel production (Nunow, 2013), which were described in Chapter 2, are also a 
manifestation of the ‘new frontier’ narrative, albeit in a new guise. In this discourse, environmental 
changes and programmes are viewed as an economic opportunity, not a threat (World Bank, 2012). 
Ethiopia and Kenya, as discussed in Chapter 2, both clearly have strong growth-orientated visions 
of a green economy.  
Conceivably, some climate-resilience narratives, such as that found in Ethiopia’s CRGE (see 
Chapters 2 and 5), subscribe to the view that ‘pastoralism needs to be transformed’. ‘Climate 
resilience’ is essentially a reaction to the multiple challenges of climate, energy and food security 
(SDC, 2011; UNEP, 2011, World Bank, 2019). This discourse brings the ‘climate crisis’ and the 
‘environmental crisis’ to the forefront, together with their impact on what are perceived as 
particularly vulnerable societies in the Global South. Dominant forms of knowledge and 
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technologies include development disciplines like crop science, water engineering, the use of 
satellite imagery to map changes in vegetation cover, and ‘disaster risk management’ (Cervigni and 
Morris, 2016; World Bank 2012; IGAD 2013). Key interventions include development projects at 
the regional or local scale intended to provide renewable energy, food security and ‘safety nets’ for 
the core subjects of climate resilience, namely ‘vulnerable communities’ – Ethiopia’s Productive 
Safety Net Programme (PSNP) being a high-profile example (Devereux and Tibbo, 2013; Lind and 
Birch, 2014). Nevertheless, as more international climate finance is made available, concerns have 
been expressed as to whether such funding will provide a new source of ‘rent’ for powerful elites 
and offer little benefit to already politically marginalised constituencies (Lockwood, 2013: 664).  
In summary, the climate-related narratives associated with this discourse include: climate change 
and degradation are fueling conflict over diminishing natural resources; ‘doomed-by-climate-
change’ (mobile pastoralism is no longer sustainable in the face of climate change and rapid 
population growth); mobile pastoralism is unproductive and environmentally destructive; 
adaptation requires deliberate policy decisions and planned action on the part of public agencies; 
extensive livestock systems contribute to GHG emissions; the drylands offer a ‘new frontier’ for 
economic growth, private investment and commercialisation of agriculture. Keywords and 
metaphors identified within this category include: ‘degradation’; ‘desertification’; ‘climate risk’; 
‘conflict’; ‘coping strategy’; ‘vulnerability’; ‘unproductive’; ‘sedentarisation’; ‘integration’; 
‘transformation’32; ‘climate-resilient’; ‘planned adaptation’; ‘commercial’; ‘renewable energy’.  
3.3.3 Pastoralists as ‘modern, mobile and green’  
In between these two somewhat polarised positions we can identify a third position on pastoralism 
– what I call a ‘modern, mobile and green pastoralism’ discourse (see also 3.3 above).  While 
sharing with a ‘pure pastoralism’ position that value needs to be placed on the importance of 
mobility, a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse focuses on the changing nature of that mobility – 
the responses of pastoralists as they continue to adapt to changing circumstances. In this discourse, 
pastoralists are considered “active agents of change and as entrepreneurs rather that as passive 
recipients of development….” (Moritz, 2013: 2). For those who hold a ‘modern and mobile’ 
position, a purist approach, outlined above, fails to acknowledge the considerable innovation of 
herders and ex-herders, who are quite likely to embrace new livelihood opportunities offered by the 
growth of urban centres, livestock markets and entrepreneurship possibilities, as described in 
Chapter 2 (Catley et al. 2013; Little, 2013; IIED/SOS Sahel, 2009; Catley, 2017). Notably, these 
pastoralist responses have little to do with development aid or government projects but are driven 
by market demands and pastoralists’ own innovation (Catley, 2017). As pastoralism is 
                                                        
32 I have excluded the word ‘transformative’ as a synonym in my framework for CA as this generally implies a more 
radical project of structural change to unequal systems of power. Instead ‘transformation’ in this context implies the 
desire to change or ‘modernise’ pastoral production into a more commercially orientated system, or fundamentally 





characterised by a low degree of dependency on external inputs and a high degree of resilience to 
shocks, it can switch relatively flexibly from a subsistence to a market orientation, without being 
radically transformed (Jenet et al., 2016). Nonetheless, the extent to which certain groups can taken 
advantage of these new opportunities and innovations in different contexts frequently depends on 
their asset status, connections to centres of political and economic power, and even ethnicity, as 
will be explored in Chapters 6 and 7.  
In this discourse, ‘pure pastoralism’ – if ever such a thing existed – may only be viable for a small 
number of herders given the increasingly limited availability of rangeland resources (Lind et al., 
2016). In other areas, with competing forms of land use, customary institutions are no longer 
sufficient to ensure land-tenure security (Bollig and Österle, 2008; Tache, 2013; Greiner, 2016). 
For some pastoralists, combining herding with new ‘non-pastoral’ and diversified income-
generating activities may offer a more viable pathway (McPeak et al., 2011; Little, 2013; Lind et 
al., 2016). Advocates of a ‘transforming’ approach, on the other hand, fail to recognise that 
extensive livestock systems hold a comparative advantage over other forms of land use in the 
drylands (IIED and SOS Sahel, 2009; Behnke and Kerven, 2013). Pastoralists may settle in towns 
to take advantage of new opportunities, or because hardship has forced them to do so. However 
spatial-temporal variability in water, forage and pasture still requires continued livestock mobility 
(Behnke and Mortimore, 2016: Yimer, 2015; Turner et al., 2019). Livelihood ‘diversification’ 
within a modern, mobile and green discourse is seen not so much as a ‘coping strategy’, or a ‘way 
out’ of pastoralism, but rather as a means to add value and complement existing livestock-keeping 
(Dyer, 2012; Fratkin 2013). At the same time there is recognition that, in light of the uncertainties 
brought about by climate change, certain groups of pastoralists may need a more sophisticated level 
of ‘social protection’ beyond those offered by food aid or by long-standing ‘safety-net’ 
programmes, such as the PSNP in Ethiopia (Devereaux and Tibo, 2013; Herrero et al., 2016; 
Tsegay, 2017). Index-Based Livestock Insurance (IBLI) schemes, such as those currently being 
piloted in both Kenya and Ethiopia by government agencies with support of the International 
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI), are heralded by some as an innovative means of offsetting 
climate risks (Laursen, 2017; MacMillan, 2017).33  
Within the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, climate change and the move to embrace an 
‘inclusive green economy’ (Bass et al., 2013) offer an opportunity – rather than a threat – to 
dryland communities. Climate change can help ‘focus minds’ on the drylands and is an opportunity 
for donors and national governments to support appropriate climate-change mitigation and 
adaptation strategies (Hesse and Pattison, 2013). The new (post COP 21 Paris Agreement) political 
consensus to tackle climate change offers potential to attract international climate finance for 
                                                        
33 Index-Based Livestock Insurance, (IBLI) works on the basis that payments are triggered when remote sensing indicates 





‘resilience building’ (Joseph, 2014), carbon sequestration (FAO 2013; McGahey et al., 2014; 
Dabasso et al., 2014), ‘climate smart agriculture’ (FAO, 2013), biodiversity protection and 
renewable energy schemes, as well as to provide greater recognition of the role of extensive 
livestock systems in drylands management and food security (Stull-Lane and Carabine, 2015; Jenet 
et al., 2016). It opens up spaces for pastoralists to connect better with domestic and international 
markets, and in particular to capitalise on the growth of new, certified, green ‘niche markets’ for 
high-value livestock products (King-Okumu, 2015; McGahey et al., 2014). There is potential, 
furthermore, for pastoralists to benefit from REDD+-type schemes, whereby they are rewarded for 
managing rangeland for its ecosystem functions, such as carbon sequestration. It follows that 
pastoralists should be acknowledged in their role as ‘custodians of the commons’ (Lane, 1998) and 
should be compensated for the environmental services and public goods they provide.34  
Another associated climate-change narrative is the call for ‘climate-smart’ livestock systems. 
Given the enormity of the climate challenge facing humanity, ‘climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA) is 
seen by its advocates as offering a ‘triple win’ – simultaneously increasing agricultural productivity 
to support food security, building adaptive capacity at multiple levels and contributing to a 
reduction of GHGs (Campbell et al., 2014; World Bank, 2016). CSA puts great emphasis on the 
mitigation potential that exists in the soils and forestry systems of developing countries (World 
Bank, 2011; FAO, 2013).35 Typical low-emission strategies for livestock, according to the FAO 
Climate Smart Agriculture Sourcebook (2013), include grassland restoration, manure management, 
improved feed and crop-livestock integration. Just as with ‘climate resilience’ and the ‘green 
economy’, it is not hard to gauge how narratives of ‘climate-smart agriculture’ and ‘sustainable 
intensification’ appeal to the governments of Ethiopia and Kenya, which are intent on tackling the 
twin challenges of climate change and food insecurity, while simultaneously investing in 
agriculture-led economic growth (Yirgu et al., 2013; Maina et al., 2013). The endorsement of CSA 
by a wide array of influential global actors, including the World Bank, FAO, CGIAR, AfDB and 
USAID, and the potential for CSA finance, adds a further incentive.36 
Within most mainstream policy discussions on climate-change adaptation that advocate a top-down 
or externally led approach (see the ‘transforming’ discourse above), there is an assumption that 
adaptation, and a transition towards a green economic trajectory, will occur in a linear sequence, 
given sufficient political will, the transfer of new technologies and adequate financing (Eriksen and 
Lind, 2009). However, evidence shows that expected adaptation actions, in terms of longer-term 
                                                        
34 Proponents of a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse, such as some Pastoralist Organisation representatives (see Chapter 6), on 
the other hand, are likely to be sceptical of claims that converting pastoral lands to new green market uses and REDD-
type initiatives, will bring benefits to local communities, pointing instead to examples of ‘green land grabbing’ 
(Fairhead et al, 2012). 
35 Critics view CSA as a ‘false solution’ to climate change, whereby the burden of mitigation is shifted from developed to 
developing countries (Stabinsky, 2014). 
36 In Kenya, for example, the WB are providing funding of $1.5 billion for the ‘North Eastern Kenya Initiative (NEDI), 





adjustments in practices and ecological and socioeconomic systems in response to actual or 
perceived changes in climate, do not necessarily take place (Smit and Pilfosova, 2003). This, 
according to O’Brien et al. (2006, cited in Eriksen and Lind, 2009: 818), is because any decision-
making is ‘nested’ in a wider set of institutional and societal changes and relations between actors. 
Within the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, adjusting to climate change is therefore not 
considered to happen in isolation from the way people – in this case, pastoralists – continuously 
respond to a multitude of pressures, uncertainties and ‘regular’ seasonal changes (Eriksen and Lind, 
2009; Scoones, 1995; Mortimore 1998). These dynamics are particularly apparent in the drylands, 
where, as we seen, different groups have developed sophisticated local production strategies in 
response to environmental variability. Eriksen and Marin argue that there is need to “reframe 
policy towards responses that shift, rather than reproduce, the development paradigm causing the 
climate problems and vulnerability in the first place” (2011:9). They maintain there is a need for 
‘sustainable adaptation’ rather then ‘adaptation as development as usual’ – adaptation that 
recognises the broader context of vulnerability, that thinks critically about what types of adaptation 
are desirable and which groups or interests are being promoted at the expense of others, and that 
integrates local knowledge into national responses (Eriksen and Marin, 2011; 2015).  
Proponents of a modern, mobile and green discourse are also likely to advocate for improved 
governance, as outlined in the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse above, along with greater investment by 
the state in ‘public goods and services’ such as health and education in pastoral areas. In addition, 
some agencies have called for a ‘territorial approach’ to rangeland management and climate 
adaptation in the drylands (Jenet et al., 2016; GIZ, 2017). As pastoralism is by definition mobile 
and occupies vast territories, agreements and ‘policy harmonisation’ between neighbouring 
counties and countries is necessary to promote livestock trade, facilitate movement of pastoralists 
and their herds (especially during periods of drought), control transboundary diseases, mitigate 
conflict, etc. In this case, efforts to support pastoralism need to be focused on regional as well as 
local areas or territory – rather than just on national-level policies (AU, 2010; Gomarasca and Nori, 
2016; Odhiambo 2017; World Bank, 2020). 
In summary, the climate-related narratives associated with this discourse include: pastoralists are 
innovators and entrepreneurs in the face of climatic and other uncertainties; pastoralists as 
‘custodians of the commons’, who have an important role in climate mitigation and adaptation and 
who can benefit from schemes in which they are compensated for protecting environmental 
services; efforts and policies to support pastoralism call for a regional or territorial approach.  
Keywords and/or metaphors within this category are: ‘entrepreneurs’; ‘diversification’; ‘green 
economy’; ‘climate-smart’; ‘sustainable adaptation’; ‘sequestration’; ‘payment for environmental 





Table 3.1 summarises the keywords and their synonyms for each of the three discourses on 
pastoralism and pastoral area development discussed above. These discourses and keywords form 
the basis (codes) for my content analysis and discourse analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan climate-
change and drylands policy documents, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Table 3.1 Summary of pastoralist discourses and associated keywords  






























Variable (climate, rainfall, environmental, 
rangelands); Heterogeneous; Heterogeneity 
Mobility Mobile (pastoralists / people / livestock / health / 
education – excludes mobile communications) 








Community / community-based / local / pastoralist / 
endogenous adaptation(s) 
Adaptive capacity  
Resilience  
Rights  
Indigenous (people, knowledge, livestock, technology – excludes 
crops, trees, enterprises)  
Pastoral governance Rangeland governance; Governance in /of 
pastoral(ist) / rangeland areas 
Key resources Pastoral resources; Dry-season / drought grazing 





































Climate (change) risk(s) / hazards(s) / shock(s) / 
impacts(s) / disaster(s) / event(s) / emergency(ies); 
Climate (change) related risk(s) / hazard(s) / 
shock(s) / disasters(s) / event(s) / impact(s); Climate 
(change) induced risk(s) / hazards(s) / shock(s) / 
disaster(s) / impacts(s) / event(s); Drought risk; 
Extreme (climatic) events 
Vulnerable Vulnerability; Vulnerabilities 
Degradation Degraded; Fragile; Scarce / scarcity (of resources); 
Desertification; Overgrazed / overgrazing 
Conflict Conflicts (communal, resource based, people and 
wildlife) 
Insecurity Insecure (Food, livelihoods, land tenure) 
Coping strategy Coping strategies / mechanisms(s); Maladaptive; 
Maladaptation 
Transform Transformed; Transformation; Transforming; 
Modernise; Modernize; Modernization; 





Discourse Associated keywords  Synonyms  
areas / production only – excludes ‘transformative’) 
Sedentarise Sedentarize; Sedentarisation; Sedentarization; 
Resettle; Resettlement; Villagization  
Integration Integrate(d); Mainstream, mainstreamed (of policy / 
programmes / planning;   of drylands / rangelands / 
pastoral areas / livestock production) 




Commercially; Market based / led /driven; Private 
sector / investment / investors (applies to 
adaptation, agriculture, livestock, forestry and 
drylands only)  
Value chain(s) Value addition; Value added; Add value (related to 
livestock and agricultural products only) 
Productivity  Productive (applies to agricultural, livestock, 
forestry and drylands productivity only 
Climate resilient   
Rewable energy Clean energy; Green energy; Renewables; 
Alternative energy; wind / solar / geothermal / hydro 
(electric) energy / power 






















































































Pastoral(ist) innovators / innovation / enterprises; 
Local innovation 
Diversify Diversification; Diversified; Diversifying (of 
Livelihoods, Income, livestock only); 
Complementary livelihoods 
Green economy Green economics; Green / low emissions growth; 
Green / Niche markets 
Sustainable adaptation   
Carbon sequestration Carbon credits / trading / markets / sinks / stocks / 
initiatives; REDD; REDD+ 
Climate-smart  (agriculture / livestock); CSA; sustainable 
intensification (of crops, livestock, land use) 
Payment(s) for 
environmental services  
Payment(s) for ecosystem services; PES 
Cross-border Trans-boundary / cross-boundary; Inter-county 
Social protection   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed an analytical framework employed in subsequent chapters, examining 
Ethiopia’s and Kenya’s climate-change and pastoral area policies. This framework, which builds 
on the work of Keeley and Scoones (2003), provides a systematic way of understanding the 
dynamic interactions between narratives and discourses, actors and networks, and politics and 
interests within environmental policy processes. Only by examining such dynamics can we gain a 





processes in Ethiopia and Kenya and their consequences for pastoralist livelihoods in local 
contexts. In the first part of the chapter, I introduced the elements of Keeley and Scoones’ 
framework and their relevance to each of my research questions. I also added a fourth element – 
policy consequences. In the second part, I identified how emerging climate-policy narratives 
broadly correspond to three broad discourses on pastoralism and drylands development, and the 
way in which certain narratives and associated concepts ‘frame’ what – and who – is taken into 
consideration, or excluded from, policy processes. Keywords were then extracted from these 
discourses and depicted in tabular form (Table 3.1). These discourses and keywords form the basis 
(codes) for my CA and DA of Ethiopian and Kenyan climate-change and drylands policy 
documents, the results of which are presented in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I examine the extent to 


































Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the research design and methods used in this study. First, I set out the 
epistemological perspective that informs my study and my own positionality. Second, I discuss 
why a two-country comparative case study is appropriate for this research. Third, I elaborate on the 
appropriateness of the research methods used to answer the three research questions – content 
analyses (CA), discourse analysis (DA) and semi-structured interviews – as well as justifying the 
sources of data chosen for analysis. I give particular emphasis to the strengths and limitations of 
using CA and DA, drawing from a number of different approaches and theories. Finally, I describe 
the systematic approach that was taken to analysing and interpreting the data that emerged from the 
interviews, while highlighting some ethical issues. 
4.2. Epistemological perspective and positionality 
My research follows a constructivist epistemological perspective. Constructivists believe that facts 
and values are always intertwined and that most concepts can be contested, particularly in the 
social sciences: “outside a field of reference there is simply no fact of the matter” (Kratcochwil, 
2008: 88). From a constructivist perspective, ‘adaptation to climate change’, for example, is not 
simply a response to meteorological parameters, but it is primarily driven by discourses about these 
phenomena in a society (Cannon and Muller-Mahn, 2010). In my study, I am not disputing the 
realities of climate change or the need for mitigation and adaptation, but rather seek to explore how 
the narratives about climate change and pastoralism are constructed and moulded, how these 
narratives influence decision-making, and what repercussions these decisions may have on 
pastoralist livelihoods. As Carswell and Jones (2004: 205) note, suggesting that the environment, 
and environmental problems, are socially constructed is entirely different from suggesting that 
‘there is no real nature out there’ or that environmental problems do not exist. 
I am also interested in how social construction of knowledge about the environment can in itself be 
the means by which power is exercised over both nature and society. To this extent, I draw on the 
ideas of ‘political ecology’ – a field of study that seeks to provide a framework for understanding 
the interrelations of politics and power, structures and discourses with the natural environment 
(Robbins, 2012). There are numerous strands within political ecology but useful to this research is 
the ‘post-structural’ strand that explores the genealogy of global environmental narratives (why 
certain narratives become dominant), and that emphasise political economy as a causal theme 





research is engaged with what has been described as a “broadly defined political economy” 
(Blaikie and Brookfield (1987:17). In other words, no explanation of environmental change is 
complete without some analysis given to “who profits from changes in control over resources, and 
without exploring who takes what and from whom” (Robbins, 2012: 59). This has relevance to my 
study when we consider how access to and control over land and other key resources in pastoral 
drylands is increasingly being contested by different state and non-state actors – as will be explored 
in Chapters 6 and 7.  
Poststructuralists tend to employ discourse analysis and deconstruction as their primary analytical 
tools. In political ecology, the exercise of power has to be understood at a discursive as well as at 
the material levels (Bryant and Baily, 1997; Carswell and Jones, 2004) (see also Section 4.4 
below). Political ecology, furthermore, allows me to add an interpretive dimension to my research, 
rather than relying entirely on an empirical evidence-based approach. Robbins (2012) maintains 
that, in contrast to a ‘hard constructivist’ epistemology, which holds that it is social context alone 
that conditions and determines our concepts for understanding the world, most political ecologists 
align themselves with a ‘softer’ form of constructivism, one that “holds that our concepts of reality 
are real and have force in the world, but that they reflect incomplete, incorrect, biased and false 
understandings of empirical reality” (Robbins, 2012:128).  
In research there is a need for reflexivity, both during data collection as well as when interpreting 
qualitative research. Acknowledging the researcher as an actor in his/her own right is critical 
(Gilham, 2000). Not only am I a white European ‘outsider’ who had never spent a long period of 
time in either country, I am cognisant that my own views over the last decade have been shaped by 
my membership in the pastoralist advocacy network CELEP37, by personal encounters with 
pastoralists though my work, and by having been influenced in my reading of scholars who have 
challenged historical discourses on pastoralism (see Chapter 2). To claim I hold no ‘value 
judgments’ (May, 2011: 48) through the research process – around the role and interests of the state 
or other powerful actors in displacing pastoralists from formerly communally managed rangeland, 
for example – would be disingenuous. Interpretative researchers and constructivists, nonetheless, 
recognise that value-free knowledge is impossible (Edge and Richard, 1998). They acknowledge 
they are asserting their beliefs when they chose what they want to research and how they interpret 
the findings. Notwithstanding the need to be sensitive to, and minimise, personal bias (see also 
4.4.6 below), a degree of personal interpretation is still integral to the research output. 
                                                        
37 The Coalition of European Lobbies for Eastern African Pastoralism (CELEP) is a network of European members and 






4.3 A two-country case-study analysis: Ethiopia and Kenya 
This research employs a comparative case study approach composed of two macro-units of analysis 
(Ethiopia and Kenya). Yin (2003: 13) defines a case study as “…an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident”. Case studies are frequently 
bounded by, for example, time, location or activity (Creswell, 2014). While a case study is by no 
means representative, or ‘typical’, of all cases, what it tells us about the case may suggest wider 
implications (Grey, 2009; Rowley, 2002). While Yin (2011) warns against efforts to use single case 
studies for statistical generalisation, as is common in quantitative studies, Bartlett and Vavrus 
(2017) assert that qualitative work, particularly comparative case studies, allows for 
generalisability through the generation of theoretical insights. Case-study methodology, notes Yin 
(2003), is particularly relevant when the researcher believes the context to be highly pertinent to 
the subject under study, hence my rationale for choosing such an approach that allows for ‘cross-
national’ (Hakim, 2000: 71) comparisons between policy narratives and processes in Ethiopia and 
Kenya – two countries that have much in common but also have quite different contexts. It is 
important to stress at this point that this study is not an exercise in direct comparison with a fixed 
set of variables, as is often used in comparative studies, as the complexities of each country’s 
individual policy processes would not allow for such as approach. Instead, for both cases, the 
different contexts are explored, policy discourses and narratives unpacked, actors and actor 
networks mapped and policy consequences considered by applying the same analytical framework 
and research questions. Similarities and differences between – and across – the two cases that 
emerge in the findings (as presented in Chapters, 5, 6 and 7) are highlighted as they arise, and 
conclusions drawn where appropriate. 
While pastoralism and livestock-keeping have been – and continue to be – a livelihood strategy of 
both necessity and choice for millions of people across the Sahel, the HoA and West Africa, and 
climate change is an ‘all-Africa’ issue, there is much to be learned by focusing on the policy 
dynamics in a particular region and on just two countries. Ethiopia and Kenya were intentionally 
selected for a number of reasons. Focusing on discourse and narratives; actors and institutions; and 
pastoralist experiences, in climate policymaking processes in these two neighbouring countries 
allows me scope to compare and contrast experiences and perspectives across two states in the one 
region – the HoA. These countries are of interest as they represent two of the most prominent 
‘early adoptees’ in the African continent of policies favoured as part of the new international 
consensus around green development and climate-change governance (Death, 2015; Redda and 
Roland, 2016). As we saw, both countries have embarked on ambitious national green-economy 
and climate-resilience type strategies and are investing in renewable energy, carbon-sequestration 
projects and irrigated agriculture in dryland areas (Death, 2015; Jones and Carabine, 2013; Held et 





significant populations who identify themselves as pastoralists or agropastoralists. Certain 
pastoralist groups, such as the Borana, dwell on both sides of the Kenyan–Ethiopian border. Both 
countries have been considered relatively successful in economic development terms, experiencing 
high levels of economic growth (World Bank, 2020b, 2020c) and similar development and climatic 
challenges. In recent years, both countries have seen increased frequency and severity of drought – 
albeit with impacts and consequences that are site-specific, varied and uncertain (Carabine, 2014; 
Funk et al. 2012; Herrro et al., 2016).  
At the same time, Ethiopia and Kenya have clearly followed quite different political trajectories 
and show differences in their approach to national development planning and local natural-resource 
governance (see Chapter 2). Both countries have quite different histories of state formation. 
Ethiopia was never colonised, and despite a brief occupation by Italy between 1936 and 1941, was 
ruled as an empire before the removal of the last Emperor, Haile Selassie, in 1974. Ethiopia does 
not have a history of the peaceful transition of power (Clapham, 2004). The country was in effect a 
‘one-party state’ from 1991 up until 2018, marked by a crackdown on opposition parties, civil 
society and independent media (Burke, 2017; HRW, 2017)38. While a recipient of large amounts of 
official development assistance (ODA) from a number of donors, Ethiopia sees itself as a 
‘developmental state’ taking an active role in managing its own economic and social development 
(Shumuye, 2015). In contrast, Kenya was colonised by England but maintained favourable 
relations with the West after independence in 1963. Kenya is a multiparty democracy and, unlike in 
Ethiopia, power has changed hands through electoral processes. The country has maintained 
relative political stability despite low-level conflicts and insurgency in some border districts. 
Nevertheless, elections (most notably in 2007) have been marred by civil unrest and violence. 
Kenya is a wealthier country than Ethiopia, with a per-capita GDP for 2018 of US$1,711 compared 
with Ethiopia’s US$772 for the same year.39 Both countries suffer from high levels of inequality. 
Whilst Ethiopia does not receive quite the same level of net ODA per capita as Kenya (US$45 
compared to US$48)40, this needs to be considered within the context that Ethiopia’s population is 
almost double the size of Kenya. Table 4.1 below illustrates key statistical data for the two case-
study countries. 
  
                                                        
38 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) has won every major poll for more than 20 years 
and, at one stage (2017), occupied every seat in the 537-strong parliament (Burke, 2017). Reforms in 2018 led by 
Prime Minister (PM) Abiy Ahmed have opened up space for a more open multi-party system. 
39 World Bank figures: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=ET-KE  









Total land area:  1.104 million km² 580,367 km² 
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Levels of Net ODA received 
(2018): 
 
US$4.732 billion47  
 
US$2.401 billion48  
 







Human Development Index 
(2019): 
 
Ranked 173 out of 189 countries49 
 
147 out of 189 countries50 
 
GINI coefficient index (2015): 
 
35.00 (ranked 104 out of 159 
countries)51 
 
40.80 (ranked 56 out of 159 
countries)52 
 
There were also theoretical reasons why I chose these two countries. On the basis of my first 
reading of the literature, I anticipated that, as Ethiopia’s official policies in recent decades would 
appear to be intent on encouraging pastoralist settlement, irrigated agriculture and 
commercialisation of the livestock sector (Galaty, 2012; Lavers, 2012; Abbink et al., 2014; Kratli, 
2019), then a ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ policy discourse (as identified in Chapter 3) 
                                                        
41 https://data.worldbank.org/country/ethiopia  







49 UNDP National Development Report 2019 (http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/ETH.pdf 







would be more to the fore. In Kenya, in contrast, Constitutional reform and the parallel process of 
devolution from 2012 on, are considered to be reasons for the kinds of ‘deliberative inclusionary 
processes’ (Njorge et al., 2017: 541) in climate-change and drylands-related policymaking (Njorge 
et al., 2017; Odhiambo, 2014; Elmi and Birch, 2013), not found in Ethiopia. Therefore I expected 
that narratives more in line with the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses, 
described in Chapter 3, might feature more prominently in Kenyan policies and strategies, and 
among Kenyan policy actors. In Chapters 5 and 6, I reveal that this hypothesis proved correct.  
In sum, while sharing commitments to reorient their economies towards a ‘climate-resilient’ green 
development trajectory, these two countries represent different types of states: a one-party 
developmental state in the case of Ethiopia, and an electoral democracy committed to free-market 
capitalism in the case of Kenya. There are also different political, economic and social dynamics in 
each. Nevertheless, in terms of the climate-change policy and pastoralism nexus, there is much that 
can be learned by examining the two together. By analysing discourses and narratives, actors and 
institutions motivations and interests, and policy consequences across these two countries, both 
variation and uniformity can be assessed – across time, actors and policies. In the following 
sections, I explain how the methods of CA, DA and interviews can illuminate these issues.  
4.4 Methods of data collection and analysis 
This study is based on multiple sources of evidence, essential for ensuring validity in case-study 
design (Hakim, 2000; Yin, 2003), using a mixed-methods approach. The results of CA, DA and 
semi-structured interviews are used collectively to address the three core research questions 
outlined above. These methods complement and build on each other, allowing a comprehensive 
exploration of the topic. CA enables a search for use of keywords and patterns over time in relevant 
national climate policy and drylands-related documents. DA allows a deeper examination of how 
policy discourses around climate change, drylands, pastoralism and the green economy are 
constructed, and the assumptions on which such discourses and narratives are based. In turn, the 
interviews with key informants conducted during six weeks of fieldwork in Ethiopia and Kenya 
during May and June 2018 generated original data that illuminated the themes that emerged in the 
preceding document analysis. In this way, the methods collectively help to address the 
shortcomings of each should they have been used individually. These methods are discussed below. 
4.4.1 Sources of data for content and discourse analysis and timeframe 
As my study is interested in national policy discourses and narratives, it examines a number of key 
documents related to climate change, green economy and drylands that were produced in Ethiopia 
and Kenya between 2007 and 2017. Policy documents from this period that made no reference at 





study is interested in recent and current policy narratives and current (and possible future) policy 
outcomes, it was necessary to set an appropriate timeframe for documents selected for analysis. 
2007 was deemed an appropriate starting point, a significant year in terms of international climate 
negotiations. In the run-up to the 13th COP to the UNFCCC, held in December 2007, developing 
countries were being encouraged to commit to GHG emissions reductions as part of a strengthened 
Kyoto Protocol (Muller, 2008). Substantive finance for adaptation in developing countries was also 
being made available through a newly established global Adaptation Fund. Consequently, 2007 
was the year Ethiopia’s first National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) was released. All 
of the policies reviewed are available in English and were in the public domain (and all but two 
available online) when the documents were analysed in 2017.53 At no point was I made aware of 
other non-English language policy documents of relevance existing. Nonetheless it is quite possible 
that these may exist at the Regional / County level. If they do, they are not known to this researcher 
and were not deliberately excluded from the sample. 
Of the 17 documents selected for Ethiopia (Table 4.2), 15 were, or are, national and/or sub-national 
policies or strategies, and include the main government climate-change mitigation and adaptation 
policies and plans, two Regional State climate plans, several documents specific to the agriculture 
and/or livestock sector, a national development plan, as well as a policy document specific to 
development of pastoral areas. The remaining two are an example of policy-relevant climate-
resilience programme documents produced by donors and /or implementing partners in Ethiopia, 
chosen to provide insight into donor agency narratives.  
 
Table 4.2 Sample of Ethiopian policy documents  
Agency Year Title 
FDRE-NMA 2007 Ethiopian National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA)  
FDRE 2008 Policy Statement for the Sustainable Development of the Pastoral and 
Agro-Pastoral Areas of Ethiopia (‘Pastoral Areas Policy’)54 
FDRE 2010 Afar Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate Change 
FDRE 2011a Somali Regional State Programme of Plan on Adaptation to Climate 
Change 
FDRE–MoA 2010 Agricultural Sector Policy and Investment Framework (PIF) 2010–2020 
                                                        
53 References, including online links, for all of the policy documents analysed are provided in a separate section within 
the Bibliography. 
54 At the time of conducting fieldwork (2018), the GoE was working on a new Pastoral Development Policy and 
Strategy, not included in the analysis of policy documents reviewed here. Reference to this new policy is, however, 





Agency Year Title 
FDRE-EPA 2011 Ethiopian Programme of Adaptation to Climate Change (EPACC) 
FDRE 2011b Climate Resilient Green Economy Strategy (GES) 
FRDE/WB 2013 Coping with Change: How Ethiopia’s PSNP and HABP are building 
resilience to climate change 
FDRE 2014 Growth and Transformation Plan 2 (GTP II) 2015–2020 
FDRE-MoA 2015 Ethiopian Livestock Master Plan (LMP) 2015–2020: Roadmaps for 
Growth and Transformation  
FDRE 2015 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (EINDCs) 
EPCC  2015 EPCC Climate Change Working Group First Assessment Report: Impacts, 
Vulnerability, Adaptation and Mitigation – Agriculture and Food Security  
FDRE-MECC 2015a CRGE: Agriculture and Forestry Climate Resilience Strategy 
FDRE-MECC 2015b CRGE: Water and Energy Climate Resilience Strategy 
USAID / 
Mercy Corps 
2016 Climate Resilient Development Case Study – Ethiopia: Integrating climate 
change into market-based development programmes 
Farm Africa 
Ethiopia 
2016 Market Approaches to Resilience  
FDRE  201755 National Adaptation Plan, Ethiopia’s Climate Resilient Green Economy 
(NAP-ETH) 
 
In the case of Kenya, while policymaking specifically directed towards the ASAL dates back to 
2003, with the publication of the Economic Recovery Strategy and gaining momentum with the 
launch of Vision 2030 (Kenya’s national development plan) in 2008, the first dedicated climate 
policy document The National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) did not appear until 
2010. Nevertheless, keeping in line with the 11-year timeframe used to analyse Ethiopian policies, 
my sample takes the National Livestock Policy (NLP) from 2008 as its starting point. Of the 16 
Kenyan documents analysed (Table 4.3), 15 are national policies and include all key climate-
change policies and plans during this time (excluding the 2016 Climate Change Act, a legislative 
document setting out the institutional framework for climate action), several important agriculture 
and/or livestock sector-specific documents, a national development plan, a national green-economy 
strategy, a national land-use policy, and a policy specific to the development of the ASAL. In 
addition, one local government livestock strategy is analysed to provide insight into discourses and 
narratives towards pastoral production at county level, through which implementation of Kenyan 
policies are increasingly channelled (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 
                                                        
55 The latest Ethiopian NAP was first published in 2017, which is the document analysed here. However, a revised NAP-
ETH, with just some minor additions to the text, was prepared in 2019. Only the 2019 document is currently available 
online. See: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/NAPC/Documents/Parties/NAP-






Table 4.3 Sample of Kenyan policy documents  




2008 National Livestock Policy (NLP) 
GoK-MALF 2010 Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) 2010–2020 
GoK 2010 National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) 
GoK-
MDNKOAL 
2012 National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and 
other Arid Lands (‘The ASAL Policy’) 
GoK-MDP 2013 Vision 2030: Second Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2013–201756 
GoK 2013a Kenya National Climate Change Action Plan (NCCAP) 2013–201757  
GoK 2013b Sector Plan for Drought Risk Management and Ending Drought 
Emergencies (EDE): Second Medium Term Plan 2013–2017 
GoK-MENR 2014 National Climate Change Framework Policy (NCCFP) 
GoK-MENR 2015a Kenya’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)  
GoK-MENR 2015b Green Economy Strategy and Implementation Plan (GESIP) 
GoK  2015 Kenya Climate Smart Agriculture Framework Programme 2015–2030 
GoK-MALF 2014 Ending Drought Emergencies: Common Programme Framework for 
Sustainable Livelihoods  
GoK-NDMA 2014 Ending Drought Emergencies: Common Programme Framework for 
Drought Risk Management  
GoK-MENR 2016 Kenya National Adaptation Plan (NAP) 2015–2030  
GoK-MLPP 2016 Draft National Land Use Policy (NLUP)  
GoK-ICG 2016 Isiolo County Livestock Strategy and Action Plan 2016–2020 
 
As is clear from the Tables above, the majority of documents are at the national level, partly 
because Regional (Ethiopia) and County (Kenya) level documents are harder to obtain, but also 
because the focus of this study is primarily on national level policy makers. The inclusion of more 
Regional / County level documents – additional county livestock plans in Kenya for example – 
may have resulted in slightely different findings. Nonetheless, taken together, these Ethiopian and 
Kenyan documents provide a comprehensive picture of how certain attitudes towards, and 
narratives around, pastoralism and the drylands, as well as the policy prescriptions that emanate 
from these narratives, are articulated within policies relevant for climate change and green 
economy over a specific time period. 
                                                        
56 At the time of document analysis (2017), Kenya’s Third Medium Term Plan 2018 -2022 was still in preparation and 
not available to review. 






4.4.2 Content analyses  
CA has been defined as “a systematic, replicable technique for compressing many words of text 
into fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding” (Stemler, 2001:1). CA can reveal 
broad patterns of word usage within documents over time. These patterns can be used to infer 
meanings from the text and the emergence of ideas and concepts (Krippendorf, 2004; Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005). It can be a useful technique for allowing us to discover and describe the focus of 
individual, group, institutional or social attention (Weber, 1990). An advantage of CA is that it is 
systematic and the boundaries of the analysis are clearly set, thus making it replicable (Stemler, 
2001). By examining the frequency and patterns of word use over a sample of policy documents 
over an 11-year period (2007–2017) and across multiple governmental departments and agencies, 
CA was deemed an appropriate tool for my research, as it provides an insight into which discourses 
have greater dominance in policy processes and how these vary over time. These broad patterns 
form the basis for the DA and fieldwork (interviews) that followed, which in turn allow for a more 
detailed – or micro-level – understanding of the way in which these words, and the ideas they 
represent, are used to build certain narratives and policy prescriptions, and in whose interests such 
policy prescriptions lie. 
My study uses ‘qualitative content analysis’ – one that “focuses on the characteristics of language 
as communication with attention to the content or contextual meaning of the text” (Hsieh and 
Shannon, 2005: 1278). Qualitative CA goes beyond merely counting words to examine language 
intensely for the purpose of classifying large amounts of text into a number of ‘categories’ that 
represent similar meanings or have similar connotations (Weber, 1990). As discussed further 
below, I grouped certain keywords (and their synonyms) into three categories that in my view 
represent three contrasting – and sometimes overlapping – broad discourses on pastoralism within 
policies related to climate change and drylands, as set out in the previous chapter. 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) identify three distinct approaches to qualitative CA: conventional, 
directed or summative. All three approaches are used to interpret meaning from the content of text 
data and, hence, could be said to adhere to the naturalistic paradigm (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). The 
major differences among the approaches are coding schemes, origins of codes, and issues of how to 
establish reliability and validity. In conventional content analysis, coding categories are derived 
directly from the text data. With a directed approach, analysis starts with a theory or relevant 
research findings as guidance for initial codes. A summative content analysis involves counting 
and comparisons, usually of keywords or content, followed by the interpretation of the underlying 
context (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). 
I use a deductive ‘a priori’ coding approach (Stemler, 2001); in other words, categories were 





concepts through a review of the literature and existing theory. There is a danger here, as using 
prior theory has inherent limitations, in that I approach the data as informed, but also with my own 
biases. Asking my research supervisor, as well as a topic specialist, to examine the definitions 
before the CA started increased the validity of the predetermined categories. Using a-priori coding 
is in line with the kind of ‘directed content analysis’, as defined above; however, there is also a 
strong ‘summative’ element. A summative approach goes beyond word counts to allow for the 
process of interpretation of content. It is particularly appropriate when examining texts such as 
policy documents (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005). While word frequency is taken into account, it is 
important to understand the underlying contexts for the use of explicit versus euphemistic terms. 
As with directed CA, codes or keywords are mainly derived in advance from a review of the 
literature. 
For the purposes of my study, I used a framework or coding scheme designed to isolate keywords 
and associated synonyms that represent three contrasting – and sometimes overlapping – broad 
discourses on pastoralism within policies related to climate change and drylands – a ‘pure 
pastoralism’ discourse, a ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ discourse, and a ‘mobile, modern 
and green’ discourse (see Table 3.1). The rationale for selecting these particular keywords was 
provided in Chapter 3. As all documents, with the exception of one (The Isiolo County Livestock 
Strategy), were available electronically (as PDFs), and in English, it was possible to use a word or 
text search tool within Adobe Reader software to isolate and count keywords.  Keywords in the 
remaining document were counted by hand. 
As policy documents reviewed for this study were of varying lengths, word frequency was 
calculated by taking the total word count for a particular term (and/or its synonym) in a particular 
document and calculating it as a percentage value of all keywords counted in that document (see 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2). This then allowed a comparison of how frequently terms associated with each 
of the three discourses are used in relation to each other within documents and across documents 
by different government ministries or agencies over time. Bar charts were also created for each 
country, visualising the aggregate value breakdown for each of three discourses and for each 
document (see Fig. 5.1, and Fig. 5.2), allowing for a further comparison across time. 
4.4.3 Discourse analysis  
In Chapter 3, I clarified the difference between ‘discourse’ (a shared meaning of a phenomenon) 
and ‘narrative structures’ (the ways in which a discourse is communicated – often in the form of a 
storyline, with a chronological order and involving archetypes such as heroes, villains and victims) 
(Hajer 1995; Adger et al., 2001). I also discussed why an analysis of discourses and narratives can 
help reveal how governments and other actors (donors and development agencies, for example) 





making possible in the face of uncertainties (Roe, 1991; Krätli, 2013). Here I provide an overview 
of ‘discourse analysis’ (DA) as a methodological tool and why I feel it is appropriate to my study.  
DA enables me to address the ideas, arguments and assumptions that underpin drylands 
development and climate governance in a way that content analysis cannot. Rather than identify 
broad patterns of word use only, DA adds another level to the study and addresses the substantive 
issues raised by my first research question – what are the dominant discourses and narratives on 
pastoralism found within national climate-change and drylands policies in Ethiopian and Kenyan 
policies? DA can help to understand “what narratives shape activities in a particular policy sector 
or policy domain, how they are used strategically by various actors, and how they effect material 
practices and outcomes” (Robinson and Crane, 2016: 4).  
DA draws from the constructivist epistemology I referred to earlier, which focuses not directly on a 
specific phenomenon itself, but rather on claims concerning the phenomenon, the claim makers, 
and the claim-making process (Adger et al., 2001). DA is appropriate for my study as it builds on 
the content analysis by examining how certain ‘global’ discourses of climate governance and the 
green economy are used in drylands development policies and, in turn, how certain development 
discourses (in this case, particular discourses and narratives around pastoralism) are evident in 
climate policies. While not adhering strictly to a specific type of discourse analysis, it is influenced 
by the work of Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and van Dijk (2001) – theorists generally associated 
with the ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ (CDA) school – by Foucault’s understanding of power and 
his concept of ‘governmentality’, as well as drawing on Hajer’s (1995; 2006) guidelines for ‘doing 
discourse analysis’. Each of these theoretical elements is discussed in turn. 
4.4.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis 
CDA theorists, such as Fairclough (1992), Fairclough and Wodak (1997) and van Dijk (2001), 
understand discourse to be represented by written text and spoken communication, whilst also 
recognising that discourse is shaped by social practices. Fairclough’s (1992) analytical framework 
involves three levels that make up the discursive event: text, discursive practices and social practice. 
‘Discursive practice’ is how texts are produced and how texts are consumed.58 ‘Social practice’ 
represents the non-discursive element of institutions and is connected to the text by discursive 
practice. In this way, discourse can shape social practice but is also shaped or constituted by social 
practice and context (McConnon, 2015: 55). CDA is ‘critical’ in the sense that it focuses on how 
“discourse structures enact, confirm legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and 
dominance in society” (van Dijk, 2001:353). By analysing discourse, these relationships can be 
exposed and ultimately changed (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). This understanding is useful for this 
study when we see how certain discourse and narratives – around climate vulnerability and food 
                                                        





insecurity, for example – are used by the state and other actors to legitimise policy change in favour 
of non-pastoralist forms of land use, leading in many cases to unfavourable outcomes for 
pastoralists (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7). 
This conception of discourse distinguishes the approach from more radical poststructuralist 
approaches, such as Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘discourse theory’, which treats all social practice as 
discourse (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002). In CDA, “language as discourse is both a form of action 
through which people can change the world and a form of action which is socially and historically 
situated in a dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social” (Phillips and Jorgensen 2002: 
62). Ruth Wodak (2001) takes a ‘discourse historical approach’ to CDA by viewing every 
discursive act as being embedded in a number of previous discursive acts that it refers to and builds 
upon (a phenomena referred to as ‘intertextuality’). Therefore, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the historical context behind the discourse (Wodak and Meyer, 2009) – 
particularly appropriate when considering the Ethiopian and Kenyan policymaking contexts. An 
example of this would be Ethiopia’s top-down, modernising and ‘technocratic’ approach to 
agriculture and natural resource management (see Chapters 2 and 3), an approach deemed to have 
its roots in the imperial era, yet which became embedded in successive regime institutions, with 
‘scientific expertise’ helping to legitimise and shape the promotion of a range of interventions with 
far-reaching consequences for dryland communities (Adams 2009; Hoben 1995; Keeley and 
Scoones, 2000). This understanding is useful for studying a number of different documents from 
different agencies over a period of time, as is the case with my study. ‘Interdiscursivity’ occurs 
when different discourses and genres are combined and recombined in new and complex ways 
(Fairclough, 1992). According to CDA theory, a ‘high level of interdiscursivity’ is associated with 
progressive change, while a ‘low level’ signals reproduction of the established order (Phillips and 
Jorgensen, 2002). 
It is important, nevertheless, to stress here that, while I accept that many of the social problems 
faced by pastoralists are based on unequal power relations, to adopt wholesale the assumptions 
found in a CDA approach would have restricted this study.  To conceptualise power only in terms 
of ‘power over’ (or dominance), as van Dijk (1993; 2001) is inclined to do, negates the collective 
agency of those who resist, adopt and innovate, thereby creating their own ‘power from below’ 
(Morton, 2010). 
4.4.3.2 Foucault’s understanding of power 
For theorist Michel Foucault, the term ‘discourse’ does not refer to formal linguistic aspects, but to 
how the social world, expressed through language, is affected by various sources of power. 





…there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social 
body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor 
implemented without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse 
(1980: 93). 
In other words, the use of language is not neutral but can be used to establish or legitimise social 
values and practices (van Dijk, 2001; Given, 2008). Foucault’s ideas on the production of discourse 
raise broader questions about the practices of government, and how “public policy is formed, 
shaped and reshaped” (Hewitt, 2009: 5). Analysis of discourses has the potential to show the link 
between political rhetoric and how discourses are created and maintained. Foucault’s concept of 
power acknowledges the diverse influences of social and political relations on policy, beyond the 
immediate political arena (Hewitt, 2009).  
For Foucault, power is not solely something that states, institutions or individuals can exercise over 
other individuals or citizens, but instead “comes from everywhere” (Foucault, 1990: 93). This has 
relevance for my own study when we consider that power is rooted in society as well as in the state 
– for example, forms of power lie within pastoralist organisations, traditional leaders and civil-
society platforms (Morton, 2010) or can be found emerging from pastoralist social movements, a 
theme explored in Chapter 6. Power, furthermore, is not a finite resource that can be held by some 
and taken away from others. Discourse “transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also 
undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile, and makes it possible to thwart it” (Foucault, 1990: 
101). Through DA, we can become aware of the “contingent nature of the policy process” (Hewitt, 
2009:7) – in other words, that certain policy options are rationalised by deciding whose and what 
knowledge to include, and whose and what to exclude. This is particularly important when it comes 
to considering if and how ‘pastoralist voices’ are heard in the policy and decision-making 
processes that affect them. 
4.4.3.3 Governmentality and pastoralism 
The term ‘governmentality’ offers a broader concept for understanding all the mechanisms 
(including forms of knowledge and discourses) through which we are governed (Foucault 1991; 
Dean, 1999, Joseph, 2014). Foucault’s work on governmentality is concerned with the intersection 
of ‘rationalities’ (the reasoning underlying the way people govern others and themselves) and the 
‘technologies’ (or practices) of governance (Foucault, 1991). Foucault reworked the concept of 
government to distinguish a new form of power (governmentality) from two older forms, 
sovereignty and discipline, by which he refers to any calculated activity “employing tactics other 
than laws, and even of using laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a way, that 
through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved” (Foucault, 1991:95). As 
states promulgate systems of governance (often indirectly) through populations, people and actors 





governing (Robbins, 2012). Morton (2010) argues that there are a number of good reasons why 
governmentality is useful for the study of pastoral development. Firstly, the emphasis on specificity 
and contingency found in governmentality thinking relates to the fact that the situation of 
pastoralists across Africa is hugely different, not only in relation to ecology and political economy, 
but also in the context of history and political cultures. These combine in contingent ways. This is 
relevant to my own study when we consider the heterogenous nature of pastoralists, and 
pastoralism, in Kenya and Ethiopia. It is important to ask how power is functioning in specific 
situations and contexts and what kinds of knowledge are ‘taken for granted’: Secondly, a 
governmentality approach pays heed to multiple actors, including the governed and their own 
contribution to governance – through for example traditional leaders, community-based pastoralist 
organisations and representatives and advocates at different levels (Morton, 2010) – also of interest 
to this research (Chapter 6). The concept of governmentality further allows space to consider 
diverse ‘technologies of rule’. Pastoralists are governed: “not only by the laws of the state and the 
ways these are enforced…. but also by policies made at various levels, property rights constructed 
and recognised in various ways, and different ways in which knowledge about them and their 
environment is defined, collected and fed back to them” (Morton, 2010: 16). This is especially 
pertinent when we consider issues relevant to pastoral area governance, as I do in Chapters 7 and 8. 
DA can help to identify such technologies of rule and puts forms of knowledge at the centre of the 
study of power.59  
4.4.4 ‘Doing a discourse analysis’ 
Environmental policy discourse analysts, such as Hajer (1995) and Dryzek (2013), whose work is 
influenced by Foucault’s concepts, have devised their own methods of carrying out DA. Hajer 
(1995; 2006) has proposed three tools to help identify discourses within research materials – 
‘metaphor’, ‘storyline’ (narratives) and ‘discourse coalitions’ – a framework I found useful for my 
own analysis. Metaphors are generally 2–3-word phrases or rhetorical devices – such as the ‘green 
economy’ or ‘climate resilience’ – that symbolise the key ideas of a discourse. In my study, most of 
these metaphors were identified at the CA stage. Storylines, or narratives, encapsulate the essence 
of a discourse in shorthand, using the metaphors. Actors operating within the discourse may use the 
same narratives in communication but this does not mean each use is based on the same 
understanding or depth of knowledge. Nevertheless, together they can produce “meaningful 
political interventions” (Hajer, 2005: 301). ‘Discourse coalitions’ are defined as “groups of actors 
that in the context of an identifiable set of practices, share the usage of a particular set of storylines 
over a particular period of time” (Hajer, 2005: 302). In addition to the three tools above, Hajer 
(2006) has prescribed a number of steps for doing a DA. These include: desk research (a first 
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chronology and reading of events); document analysis – to identify metaphors, narratives and 
discourse coalitions, as well as ‘sites of discursive struggle’ (Wodak and Meyer; 2009:10); 
interviews with key players to enable the researcher to identify the interviewees’ discourses and 
their recognition of alternative perspectives; analysis of actors’ positioning; and interpretation – the 
researcher’s own account of the discursive structures, practices and sites of production (Hajer, 
2006: 73-74). Hajer’s tools and steps for conducting a DA were useful to follow in my study 
because they provided a clear approach to addressing my first two research questions: What are the 
dominant discourses and narratives on pastoralism found within national climate-change and 
drylands policies in Ethiopian and Kenyan policies? And, what are the interests of the actors and 
actor networks driving these discourses and policy narratives? Hajer’s steps also allow space for 
my own interpretation of findings in light of theory and the broader political economy context. 
For my study, I am particularly interested in the following three aspects of DA: the way the 
messages of the discourses have been communicated – in other words, the narratives used to 
‘frame’ a particular discourse; analysis of the actors and actor networks, producing, reproducing 
and transforming discourses (the ‘discourse coalitions’ that Hajer refers to); and the policy 
prescriptions and outcome – or consequences – of the discourses. Drawing on these methods, 
relevant policy documents from the two case-study country governments were analysed using CA 
and DA, with the purpose of identifying common themes and discourses, and unpacking the 
assumptions, arguments and evidence that underpin them, as well as examining what actors and 
networks and policy prescriptions connect these discourses to local outcomes. Themes emerging 
from this analysis, combined with pertinent issues derived from the literature, were then used as the 
basis for formulating an interview schedule (Appendix E). The interviews in turn, by generating 
additional data, illuminated and developed themes that had emerged in the preceding analysis, and 
were examined for their own discursive content. 
4.4.5 Limitations of discourse analysis and content analysis as research methods 
This chapter has so far discussed the strengths of CA and DA and argued why they are appropriate 
methods to look at how policy discourses around climate change, drylands, pastoralism and the 
green economy are constructed and evolved over time, as well as unpack the assumptions on which 
such discourses and narratives are based. However, there are some limitations. DA is largely a 
qualitative and interpretive method. Its application in this thesis is challenged when faced with the 
difficulty of moving beyond the specific text-based materials (the policy documents) to address the 
wider context and discourses within which they are located. A criticism of DA is that it only 
operates at the ‘micro’ level of social order (i.e. language use, writing, verbal interaction and 





Dijk, 2001).60 In this case, CA is useful because “it allows micro-level DA to be placed in the 
context of broader shifts in language use over time, across different organizations or agencies, and 
across documents” (McConnon, 2015: 44). In turn, CA has been criticised for decontextualising the 
words from the text being examined, or that mere counting can lead to attaching too much 
significance to certain words that are used most frequently, leading to misleading conclusions 
(Billig, 1988). Nevertheless, CA provides an empirical grounding for the in-depth DA that follows. 
At the same time, it is important to stress here that the results of the CA in this study are a function 
of the sample of policy documents for each country (where, as flagged above (4.4.1), the addition 
of additional regional state (Ethiopia) or county (Kenya) level documents may have led to a 
different set of results), the ordering of documents examined, as well as the categorisation of 
keywords within each of the three discourse (Table 3.2). This is acknowledged as a limitation of 
the methodology. 
One strength of DA is that it allows a deeper level of examination to just patterns in word use, 
allowing an investigation into the way these words are used to frame issues, and the ideas and 
assumptions they represent. By using interviews, another level of analysis was added. Had the 
study been limited to just content and discourse analyses of written policy, there would have been a 
danger of it, firstly, confining itself to ‘old data’ and, secondly, becoming too self-referential and 
bearing no resemblance to how that policy is articulated through development planning and 
interventions at the local level. By conducting interviews with key informants, the findings from 
the CA and DA were tested (Chapter 6), actors’ positions identified (Chapter 6), and the question 
of how climate-change and green-economy policies are manifesting in terms of their implications 
for pastoralism explored (Chapters 6 and 7).  
There is also a concern that the documents analysed are somehow not ‘representative’ of the main 
actors in the area, or that some texts – propagating perhaps a different set of discourses and 
narratives – remain hidden. Conscious of this, I was careful to review as many national policies 
related to climate change, green economy and drylands that had been produced in Ethiopia and 
Kenya within a particular time period and made reference to pastoralism as was possible within the 
scope of the study (see Section 4.4.1 on ‘Sources of data for document analysis’ above). As all of 
these documents were produced for public consumption, they represent what certain key actors 
were thinking at a particular point in time. Again, interviews were a useful means of crosschecking 
if the actors who participated in the interview process were invoking similar discourses and 
narratives – in itself, evidence of the power of discourse.  
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4.4.6.1 Interviews as a source of data 
The bulk of the analysis presented in Chapters 6 and 7 comes from the findings from semi-
structured interviews with 68 key informants (Appendix A), most of which were conducted during 
six weeks of fieldwork in Ethiopia and Kenya during May and June 2018, with some follow-up by 
Skype. Their aim was to gather primary data that would provide answers to my second and third 
research questions: Who are the principle actors, actor networks and institutions shaping and 
driving policy narratives, and what are their interests? What are the consequences of these policy 
narratives for pastoralists and for the future of pastoralism in the two cases? Informants consisted 
of actors and stakeholders with knowledge and experience of climate change and/or drylands and 
pastoralist-related policy processes within the Ethiopian and Kenyan contexts. Care was taken to 
identify and select informants from a range of sectors, actor groups and perspectives, including: 
central government (different line ministries and departments); local government; statutory 
agencies; international donors; international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs); 
pastoralist organisations (POs) and networks; pastoralist public representatives (MPs); and national 
and international dryland researchers and/or consultants who are usually resident in or have spent 
long periods in one or both countries. For convenience, these are classified into nine different 
categories (see Table 4.4). It is worth noting here the gender imbalance in interviewees, especially 
so in Ethiopia (only 1, compared to 9 women in Kenya) - reflective perhaps of the lower number of 
women professionals in the civil service and related sectors in Ethiopia.61 The male/ female 
breakdown for each category is recorded in Table 4.4. It is impossible to speculate if this gender 
imbalance had any bearing on the kinds of responses given by interviewees, nonetheless the small 
number of women interviewed for this study is acknowledged as a limitation.  
As the research was focused on the policy level, it did not involve any fieldwork with local 
pastoralist communities. This is acknowledged as a significant limitation of this research, in that 
the views of those groups who are being most impacted, or likely to be affected, by the material 
outcomes of policy narratives and processes are not heard directly in this study – but rather through 
the interpretation of intermediaries. To conduct such site-specific fieldwork – focus groups with 
local pastoralist community members, for example – would have added another valuable layer of 
data to the study, but was beyond the scope and time limits of this research project. 
Interview participants were identified using purposive, convenience and ‘snowball’ sampling, 
which are all ‘non-probability’ methods (Mays and Pope, 1995; Denscombe, 2014). In this 
sampling strategy – often used in qualitative research – the researcher does not seek to establish a 








random or representative sample, and therefore focuses less on sample size and more on ensuring 
an ‘appropriate’ sample - one that is composed of specific groups of people who best represent or 
have knowledge of the social phenomenon being studied (Bowen, 2008; Mays and Pope, 1995). In 
my case, participants were identified on the basis of their work with relevant specialist 
governmental and non-governmental agencies and/or on the basis of their existing expertise on the 
subject area. Through my professional work and my membership of two pastoralist advocacy 
networks – CELEP (see 4.2) and the Pastoralist Knowledge Hub62 – I already knew a number of 
participants in Ethiopia and Kenya who were considered to have experience or views related to the 
phenomenon. In this case, it was convenient for me to contact these participants, many who in turn 
recommended further potential informants. Denscombe (2014) states that, in such ‘snowball 
sampling’, the sample develops through a process of reference from one person to another. The 
process is repeated until the researcher has collected sufficient data for the scale and scope of the 
research (Jupp, 2006), or reached ‘saturation point’ – where enough data have been collected to 
ensure the research questions have been answered, a sufficient range of perspectives has been 
heard, or no benefit can be gained by adding to the sample (Baker and Edwards, 2012; Corbin and 
Strauss, 2008). In this case, I employed an iterative approach to data collection and analysis and did 
not set a fixed number of interviews in advance, preferring to reflect on the findings and themes 
being discussed as they emerged, to ensure the research questions were being answered and a range 
of voices or perspectives had been heard. Other participants who were not known to me, or who 
were not recommended by others, were identified independently through my reading of policy 
documents and related literature and by reviewing government and organisational websites for 
names of key contacts. This reduced the risk inherent in snowball sampling, in which participants 
might be inclined to recommend only those who share a similar perspective. Participants were 
contacted directly by email or by phone and invited to participate in the study, and the purpose of 
the study was explained to them.  
The sample of respondents identified as ideal subjects for an interview across the two countries 
eventually grew to 162. Of these, 68 (58 men and 10 women) agreed to participate (32 in Ethiopia 
and 36 in Kenya), representing a broad spectrum of interest groups and perspectives. This was 
certainly an appropriate sample given that it was composed of specific groups of people who I 
believe have knowledge of the social phenomenon being studied. Interviewing all 162 subjects 
initially identified would have also have proved logistically impossible given the time contraints 
imposed on fieldwork and it is unclear what added value additional interviews with certain actor 
groups – INGO informants or dryland researchers for example – would have generated. 
Nevertheless, there were some gaps. It is very likely that more interviews with certain actors would 
have added further insights that are missing from the data. Requests for interviews with 
government officials in Ethiopia, whose responsibility specifically included the green economy or 
                                                        





renewable energy, were ignored. In Kenya, I was unable to interview anyone from a donor or 
bilateral aid agency, despite these agencies’ importance as policy actors (see Chapter 6). It also 
proved difficult to secure interviews with officials from certain government departments in Kenya 
where pastoral area affairs are not considered as part of their brief (members of the Climate Change 
Directorate, for example, or those in the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation responsible for 
water development). It is likely that those government officials who did respond and agree to be 
interviewed, especially in Kenya (see Chapter 6), are more favourably disposed towards pastoralist 
development. I surmise that central or local government officials working on, for example, a large-
scale irrigation or renewable-energy project in Kenya’s ASAL might offer a different perspective 
to those whose work is more directly focused on pastoral area development or drought 
management. In the same way interviews with more women informants (in Ethiopia especially) 
may have provided different perspectives not captured in the findings.  These gaps in the 
interviewee sample are acknowledged as a further limitation of this research. A full list of the 
institutions and agencies from which interviewees were drawn can be found in Appendix B. Table 
4.4 sets out the numbers of interviewees in each category across the two countries, as well as the 
male/female breakdown. 
Table 4.4 Breakdown of interviewee categories 
 Ethiopia  Kenya 
Interviewee category  Total M F Total M F 
Government official  7 7 0 6 6 0 
Donor / bilateral aid agency 
staff  
4 4 0 0 0 0 
INGO staff member63 7 7 0 6 4 2 
International researcher or 
consultant (includes UN 
agency staff)64 
6 5 1 10 8 2 
Local researcher or 
consultant 
6 6 0 5 4 1 
Local NGO / CSO65 staff 
member 
0 0 0 3 2 1 
Pastoralist Member of 
Parliament (MP) 
0 0 0 1 1 0 
Pastoralist organisation 
representative  
2 2 0 4 2 2 
Private-sector organisation 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Totals 32 31 1 36 27 9 
 
                                                        
63 The category ‘INGO’ (international non-governmental organisation)) includes both ‘local’ Ethiopian/ Kenyan staff as 
well as expatriate staff working for INGOs operational in Ethiopia and/or Kenya. 
64 UN = United Nations; Interviewees in the category ‘International researchers’ were defined by the organisation they 
were working for rather than by nationality. It includes both citizens of Ethiopia and/or Kenya as well as expatriate 
researchers or consultants who currently live, or have lived for long periods, in Ethiopia or Kenya and have substantive 
‘in-country’ expertise.  





In line with Dublin City University ‘Guidelines on Best Practice in Research Ethics’,66 interviews 
were conducted with the full assurance of anonymity and based on the informed consent of 
participants. Participants were issued with a ‘Letter of Information’, outlining the aim of the 
research and how the findings will be used, and were asked to sign an ‘Informed Consent Form’ 
before the interviews took place (Appendix C). Interviews were, where possible, conducted face-
to-face during two separate visits to the region: the first while attending a three-day seminar in 
Kenya in March 2018 (enabling me to ‘pilot’ the interview schedule with several informants 
known to me and make modifications accordingly), the second, more extensively, as part of six 
weeks of field-research in Ethiopia and Kenya undertaken during May and June 2018. In a small 
number of cases where a face-to-face interview was not possible, interviews were conducted using 
Skype.  
Interviews lasted between 40 minutes and 1 hour, and all bar one were recorded with the 
participant’s consent using a digital recording device. Notes were also hand-written by the 
researcher during the interviews, while memos on each interview were written up later the same 
day. Field notes are a type of data that contains some conceptualisation and analytical remarks, 
whereas memos are lengthier and more in-depth thoughts about the event and usually written up 
shortly afterwards (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). They can include observational notes describing the 
interview, the researcher’s reflections on the interviews or new ideas that emerge, and reminders 
about some procedural or methodological aspect of the research. These memos proved helpful 
during the process of analysis and coding. 
In retrospect, the time given for fieldwork was quite short – three weeks in Ethiopia and four weeks 
in total in Kenya, with some interviews done via Skype outside of that period. More time in each 
country may have allowed me to secure additional interviews with some officials in certain 
Ministries or state departments who proved hard to contact. It would also have given me time to 
visit pastoral areas and interview some more local government officials and local PO 
representatives, and gain a greater sense of the kinds of change underway. Nonetheless, assisted by 
careful preparation in advance of fieldwork and given the constraints of time and cost, I was able to 
meet and interview a significant number of informants, representing a broad spectrum of actor 
groups, in a relatively short amount of time. 
4.4.6.2 Interviews as a method 
Interviews were semi-structured, which allows the interviewer to casually guide the themes 
explored in the interview. The interviews followed a set of predetermined questions derived from 
issues that emerged from the content and discourse analysis, as well as from the themes discussed 
in the literature. In the interview schedule (Appendix D), open-ended questions were categorised 






under four main areas of enquiry: (1) Context – challenges and policy responses; (2) Actors’ 
interests, motivations and sources of legitimacy; (3) Policy prescriptions and pastoralist outcomes; 
and (4) The future of pastoralism. The ‘semi-structured’ nature of the interview schedule allowed 
flexibility to explore certain key themes relevant to aims of this research in more depth, depending 
on the interviewee and the initial responses to core questions.  
I employed several strategies to attempt to minimise personal bias. By interviewing a range of 
actors, I allowed space for multiple views. All interviewees, regardless of their role and interests, 
were asked the same set of interview questions (with some allowance for country-specific probing 
questions). When conducting interviews, I tried to detach myself from any preconceived notions of 
the topic and to remain open at all times to perspectives different from my own. By avoiding 
‘leading questions’, by not expressing my own opinion during an interview and by allowing 
interviewees to express themselves in their own terms, I attempted to overcome limitations due to 
positional bias, discussed earlier. Sometimes it was necessary to ask more probing questions to 
move the discussion on to areas I felt were not being sufficiently addressed. Throughout the 
fieldwork and subsequent transcribing and coding, I constantly re-assessed my findings to ensure 
different voices that challenged my own assumptions and biases were heard and evaluated.  
I was also conscious of certain cultural and political sensitivities, particularly when it came to 
issues pertaining to land and other forms of ‘rights’ or to pastoral displacement. I was careful not to 
ask questions that could be perceived as overtly political – about reported human rights violations 
for example. Civil servants – in Ethiopia especially, where policy and decision-making, have, up 
until recently, been largely top-down and tightly controlled (Chapters 2 and 6) – may have been 
reluctant to offer views that could be perceived as in any way critical of state policy.  
While the (changing) role of patoralist women is discussed in Chapter 2 (see 2.3.1), gender 
inequality as a theme is not explicitly considered in the analysis of interview data (Chapters 6 and 
7), just as it it not the focus of the CA and DA of policy documents (Chapter 5). The reason for this 
is that it is not the primary focus of this study - which is on the narratives and discourses and actors 
interests shaping policies in the drylands of the HoA their implications for pastoralist livelihoods. 
To do justice to the issue of the rights and changing roles of women in pastoralism would require a 
dedicated study on Gender and Pastoralism. Nonetheless the small number of women interviewed 
for this study (10 in Kenya but only 1 in Ethiopia) is acknowledged as a limitation.  It is quite 
possible that different perspectives would have emerged should womens’ voices have been more 
the fore. 
4.4.6.3 Interview data analysis / coding  





Key insights and points of view were highlighted through a process of data coding (done separately 
for each country) – using NVivo qualitative data-analysis software to organise and manage the data. 
Nvivo allows the user to import each interview transcript (‘files’), create codes / categories 
(referred to as ‘Nodes’ in Nvivo) and hierarchies of codes / categories, and generate reports. 
‘Coding’ is the process of gathering material by topic, theme or case – for example, a direct quote 
from an interviewee that the researcher deems matches a particular code.  One quote or sentence 
(identified as a ‘reference’ in Nvivo) can be coded to more than one code or category. ‘Cases’ can 
also be created (for a particular interviewee category for example) and content coded to each case. 
Coding allowed me to identify, classify and categorise common themes and sub-themes using 
thematic analysis. I performed coding at two levels – Open and Axial (Corbin and Strauss, 2008; 
Punch, 2009) – referred to as ‘Phase 1’ and ‘Phase 2’ in Nvivo - using a combination of deductive 
and inductive approaches. Open codes served to reduce the mass of textual data into manageable 
groups. To open-code the data, I started by using the three thematic elements of the research as set 
out in the research questions – discourses and narratives, actors and actor networks, and policy 
consequences – as the main categories for coding. Under each category, a number of sub-categories 
or codes were created – generated initially from key words, concepts and issues that had emerged 
from the literature review and document analysis. Paragraphs, sentences and words in the interview 
transcripts were then assigned under each code. Further open coding involved assigning more 
specific substantive labels or concepts, as well as ‘in vivo codes’ (codes that emerge from 
respondents’ exact words) to chunks of text. The process of assigning and revising codes 
eventually generated 75 open codes in the case of Ethiopia, and 57 in the case of Kenya (where 
several codes were merged for convenience). I constantly checked and rechecked the codes and 
concepts, aiming to identify patterns and discover theoretical properties. Codes were clustered into 
substantive sub-categories and these category codes were compared across interview transcripts, as 
well as with data from the policy documents reviewed earlier. The aim here was to identify 
“similarities, differences and general patterns” (Bowen, 2008; 144). If new categories were 
suggested by new data, then previous transcripts from the interviews, together with data from the 
policy documents, were re-examined to determine the presence of these categories – a process 
known as ‘constant comparison’ (Grey 2009). In turn, axial codes were used to capture the essence 
of the data in terms that are more abstract or theoretical than open codes (Corbin and Strauss, 
2008). Frequent and widespread use of key terms suggested their relevance as conceptual 
categories. With some merging of codes, the eventual number of axial codes generated for Ethiopia 
was 32, and for Kenya 31 (see Appendix E).67 Coding was also used to assign references (specific 
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‘Vested interests’, in the Kenya report is a sub-category of the theme ‘Actors motivations and interests’. The column 
‘Files’ refers to the number of interview transcripts from which a quote or reference has been taken.  Of the 36 
interviews conducted in Kenya, 25 have one or more references that explicitly match the code of ‘vested interests’. The 





quotes taken from the interview transcripts) for each actor type (Table 4.4) that specifically 
matched an assumption or narrative in line with one of the three discourses on pastoralism 
identified in Chapter 3, so providing a basis for analysis of actors and their narratives (see Table 
6.1 in Chapter 6).  
As the analysis progressed, I moved beyond the actual words in the interview transcripts to 
interpretation of the content, or to making connections between categories and sub-categories 
(Grey, 2009). This interpretation is the narrative that is presented in Chapters 6 and 7. During data 
analysis, ‘theoretical sensitivity’ was maintained at all times – “the capacity to separate the 
pertinent from that which isn’t” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, cited in Grey, 2009: 511). This was 
done by making reference back to the literature and by comparing and contrasting my findings with 
what previous studies have found, and by contextualising my data, just as had been the case for the 
preceding content and discourse analysis. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined my own epistemological perspective and positionality with respect to the 
research, together with the research design and specific methods used. While not disputing the 
realities of climate change or the need for climate mitigation and adaptation, aligning myself with a 
constructivist epistemological position allowed me to explore how narratives about climate change 
and pastoralism are constructed and moulded, how these narratives influence decision-making, and 
what repercussions these decisions may have on pastoralist livelihoods. I also draw on the ideas of 
political ecology – a field of study that seeks to provide a framework for understanding the 
interrelations of politics and power, structures and discourses, with the natural environment. 
Influenced by the work of Foucault, the ‘post-structural’ strand within political ecology explores 
the genealogy of global environmental narratives and emphasises political economy as a causal 
theme. This has relevance when we consider how ‘new’ narratives – around, for example, 
pastoralist vulnerability to climate change or the need for climate-smart agriculture – are rooted in 
historical discourses around pastoral areas, and how access to and control over land and key 
resources in dryland areas are increasingly contested by different state and non-state actors. 
Acknowledging my own positionality, I sought to minimise personal bias by careful sampling of 
policy documents, by interviewing as wide a cross-section of policy actors in each case as possible, 
and by ensuring that different voices that challenged my own assumptions and biases were heard 
and evaluated throughout.  
The research is a comparative study of two cases that share much in common, but also have 
important differences – and draws its analysis from multiple sources of evidence. The results of 
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CA, DA and semi-structured interviews are used collectively to address the three research 
questions at the heart of this study. When used together, these methods address the possible 
shortcomings of each individual method. CA is deemed an appropriate tool for my research, as it 
provides an insight into which discourses around pastoralism have greater dominance in policy 
processes and how these vary over time and across different agencies. In turn, DA builds on the CA 
by examining how certain ‘global’ discourses of climate governance and the green economy are 
used in drylands development policies and, in turn, how certain development discourses (in this 
case, discourses and narratives around pastoralism) are evident in climate policies. While not 
adhering strictly to a specific type of discourse analysis, it is influenced by the work of several 
theorists associated with the CDA ‘school’, by Foucault’s understanding of power, as well as by 
environmental policy DA. The possibility that policy exists in isolation from practice, and that 
content and discourse analysis can be accused of confining itself to ‘old data’, removed from how 
policy is actually implemented, was addressed by conducting interviews with key informants. This 
chapter has also highlighted research limitations, such as the gender imbalance in terms of the 
male/female breakdown of interviewees, the fact that the study did not involve any fieldwork with 
local pastoralist communities  (only those speaking on their behalf), and that despite considerable 
care being given to ensure an appropriate sample of interviewees for this study, I was unable to 
secure interviews with certain government departments in Ethiopia and Kenya or with 
representatives of donors in Kenya. Allowing a longer period for fieldwork may have enabled me 
to gain access to these actors. In the following three chapters, I present and analyse the results of 












Chapter 5: Discourses and narratives within Ethiopian and 
Kenyan policies  
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the results of a CA and DA of Ethiopian and Kenyan policy documents 
related to climate change and drylands development spanning the period 2007–2017. The 
background and context for these policies were outlined towards the end of Chapter 2, while a 
closer examination of the key actors, institutions and networks that shape these policies, and their 
interests, is provided in Chapter 6. The aim of this analysis is to identify and examine what 
discourses and narratives are dominant within contemporary climate-change and dryland-
development policies in the two cases, to see if there have been any noticeable changes in these 
over time and to examine differences and similarities between the two countries. The chapter looks 
at each set of policy documents in turn. The first part presents the results of a CA and DA of 
Ethiopian policy documents, while the second part presents the results for Kenyan policy 
documents.  
The results of this analysis are broadly congruent with my hypothesis when selecting the two cases 
(see Section 4.3): that a ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ policy discourse would be more to 
the fore in the case of Ethiopia, whereas narratives closer to the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, 
mobile and green’ discourses were more likely to feature in Kenyan policies and strategies. What 
emerges from the CA is that, while there are some significant variations between different policy 
documents (reflecting the particular focus of certain policies, and especially the positions of 
whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for their production and implementation), it is more 
difficult to detect an obvious pattern in how each discourse has evolved over the time period 
examined, in either Ethiopia or Kenya.  Based on the sample here, ‘transforming pastoralism and 
drylands’ remains the dominant discourse around pastoralist development in both countries, if 
somewhat more pronounced in Ethiopia. A ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse is less prominent, but does 
nevertheless have a strong presence within many of the documents analysed. Meanwhile, keywords 
and concepts associated with a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse appear less frequently, but 
are growing in significance, if slightly more so in Kenya.68 The DA, in turn, reveals that deeply 
embedded ‘environmental-crises’ narratives of ‘unproductive and conflict-ridden drylands’ and 
‘climate-induced pastoralist vulnerability’ remain at the heart of policymaking in both cases, 
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flagged earlier (4.4.1) the addition of additional regional (Ethiopia) or county (Kenya) level documents may have led 
to a different set of results); the ordering of documents examined; and the categorisation of keywords within each of 





despite greater acceptance over time of mobile pastoralism as a legitimate form of land use. These 
narratives amplify the perception that some kind of intervention needs to take place, and opens up 
space for the state or other actors to claim stewardship over land and other resources previously 
managed under customary institutions. There are calls to ‘intensify and commercialise agriculture’ 
(including livestock production) or to ‘build pastoralists’ resilience’ through ‘market-led 
approaches’, livelihood diversification and – in the case of Ethiopia – sedentarisation. At the same 
time – and a trend that clearly not fully captured by the CA – the DA reveals that narratives that 
derive from new understandings of pastoralism and rangeland ecology, which emphasise the 
inherent adaptive nature of mobility and argue for greater support for the rights and livelihoods of 
pastoralists, have evidently gained currency among certain state ministries and agencies, 
particularly in Kenya. Meanwhile, newer narratives and messages around ‘climate resilience’ and 
the ‘green economy’ have emerged, driven by the imperatives of responding to climate change 
while maintaining economic growth, as well as the promise of new sources of donor funding. 
Trends, as we will see in Chapter 6, which are reaffirmed by the findings of the interviews with 
state actors in both counries. 
These findings endorse what the existing literature has, in a limited manner, already highlighted 
(Chapter 2): that, while the language may have evolved, some of the narratives driving current 
climate-change and green-economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily ‘new’, but 
are instead rooted in historical arguments and assumptions around ‘unproductive’ drylands, the 
poor as agents and victims of environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation (Maina et 
al., 2013; Yirgu et al., 2013; Odhiambo, 2014; Weisser et al., 2014; Kratli, 2019). And that 
narratives of ‘climate resilience’, climate adaptation’ and ‘green growth’, as currently articulated, 
are largely framed in politically neutral and technocratic terms, often serving to mask the impacts 
of national policy and politics at the local level, including politicised and competing claims to land 
and other dryland resources (Eriksen and Marin, 2015; Symons, 2014; Death, 2015, 2016). 
5.2. Analysis of Ethiopian policy 
This section draws from a CA and DA of relevant Ethiopian policy documents spanning the period 
2007–2017. A list of these documents (Table 4.2) and their rationale for inclusion can be found in 
Chapter 4. 
5.2.1. Content analysis of Ethiopian documents 
This section sets out the results of CA applied to Ethiopian climate-change, green-economy and 
dryland development policies that have relevance directly, or indirectly, to pastoralist livelihoods. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the coding scheme isolated keywords that represent three contrasting – 





and drylands: ‘pure pastoralism’, ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ and a ‘mobile, modern 
and green’ discourse. The pre-determined keywords and associated synonyms (Table 3.1) were 
derived from an extensive review of the literature.  
As Ethiopian policy documents reviewed for this study were of varying lengths (from 2-236 
pages), word frequency was calculated by taking the total word count for a particular term (and/or 
its synonyms) in a particular document and calculating it as a percentage value of all keywords 
counted in that same document.69 Table 5.1 shows these percentage values for Ethiopia. This 
allows a comparison of how frequently terms associated with each of the three discourses are used 
in relation to each other within documents, and across documents by different government 
ministries or agencies over time. For the full word-count, see Table 7, Appendix F. The final 
column in Table 5.1 shows the percentage value for each keyword (and/or its synonyms) in relation 
to the total keyword count across all the documents in the sample. Figure 5.1 is a bar chart 
visualising the aggregate percentage value breakdown for each discourse and for each document 
(for example, keywords asscociated with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse account for 25.3% of the 
total count of keywords in the Ethiopian National Adaptation Programme of Action – FDRE-
NMA, 2007, while keywords associated with the ‘transforming’ discourse account for 69.6% in the 
same document) allowing a comparison across time. Keywords in the bibliographies and contents 












                                                        













Figure 5.1 Aggregate percentage for each discourse in Ethiopian policy documents  
 
5.2.1.1 ‘Transforming pastoralism and drylands’ 
What is most evident from Figure 5.1 is that there is no clear pattern or noticeable change of 
dominance of a particular discourse over time in the documents analysed here (which, as has been 
noted earlier, vary considerably in length). The breakdown of words in Table 5.1 shows that 
‘transforming pastoralism’ is clearly the most prominent discourse across almost all Ethiopian 
policy documents analysed – the only exception being the FDRE-MECC Agriculture and Forestry 
Climate Resilience Strategy from 2015. 
The aggregate percentage value for the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse ranges from 69.6% in 
2007 through counts as high as 94%, 90.6% and 62.5% in 2010, 2014 and 2016, respectively. It is 
evident that, despite the ‘new thinking’ on rangeland ecology and models of pastoralist 
development that has informed most drylands-related research since the 1990s and the emergence 
of narratives that see pastoralists as playing an important role in the ‘green economy’ (see Chapter 
2), the use of terminology more associated with ‘old narratives’ of unproductive, fragile and 
conflict-ridden drylands and vulnerable communities in the face of climate change remains high. 
Table 5.1 shows, for example, that the word ‘vulnerable’ has the highest frequency of any keyword 
across all documents (10.2% overall) and, in two documents, has a count of >25%.  
What is noticeable from Table 5.1 is the contrast of discourses and terminology across policy 
documents, reflecting the particular focus of certain policies and strategies, as well as perhaps the 
positions of whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for their production and 
implementation. Not surprisingly, the terms ‘commercialisation’, ‘productivity’ and ‘value 





















Investment Framework (PIF), the 2015 Livestock Master Plan (LMP), as well as the second 
Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP-II) from 2014. These three documents also have the 
highest aggregate word counts associated with the ‘transforming’ discourse (94%, 77.9% and 
90.6%, respectively). The term ‘transform’, or its synonyms, also features most strongly in the 
GTP-II, with a percentage value of 25.3%, as is be expected from a document that sets out 
Ethiopia’s intentions to become a ‘middle-income country’ by 2025. In a similar vein, the term 
‘climate-resilient’ becomes much more apparent in documents from 2013 on – the year Ethiopia 
released its vision for a Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE).  
We have already seen in Chapter 2 that plans for extensive irrigation in lowlands areas, and for 
water development in general, are at the heart of Ethiopia’s development strategies, and this is 
borne out by the CA. The keyword ‘irrigation’ has a high percentage value across all Ethiopian 
policy documents (8.4% overall). Unsurprisingly, its highest counts are in the 2011 Green 
Economy Strategy (GES) (19.5%) and the 2015 ‘Water and Energy Climate Resilience Strategy’ 
(18.5%). 
5.2.1.2 ‘Pure pastoralism’ 
When examining the extent to which terms associated with a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse feature 
in the Ethiopian sample, Table 5.1 shows that the adaptation plans produced by the two Regional 
States, Afar (FDRE 2010) and Somali (FDRE 2011a), both have high aggregate percentages: 
37.7% and 38.5%, respectively. Given that both Regional States are characterised by arid and semi-
arid lands with pastoralism as the dominant production system, this is to be expected. It may also 
reflect the extent to which a broader range of local actors were involved in the drafting of these 
documents70. Hence, we can observe in both documents a high count of terms such as ‘variability’, 
‘mobility’ and ‘livelihoods’, while terms such as ‘pastoral systems’, ‘customary institutions’, 
‘autonomous adaptation’ and ‘key resources’ also feature.  
Table 5.1 reveals that, in the only policy document specifically addressed to pastoral areas – the 
2008 FDRE ‘Pastoral Areas Policy’ – while having a relatively high count of the terms ‘mobility’ 
(8.1%) and ‘livelihoods’ (13.1%), certain other keywords associated with a ‘pure pastoralism’ 
discourse, such as ‘resilience’, ‘rights’ and ‘indigenous’, do not feature at all. As Table 5.1 also 
shows, in documents such as the 2013 FDRE/WB document or the 2015 EPCC report, the high 
percentage of just a few keywords, such as ‘variability’, ‘livelihoods’, and especially ‘resilience’, 
has a somewhat distorting effect on overall aggregate scores (see Fig. 5.1). Similarly, the high 
aggregate count of the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse is apparent for the 2011 Ethiopian Programme 
of Adaptation to Climate Change (EPACC) document (at 32.4%), but this is a reflection of the high 
score (12.9%) of another single term – ‘adaptive capacity’. While for the purposes of this CA, I 
                                                        





have located these keywords in the ‘pure pastoralism’ category, it is evident that such words are 
used by numerous and often quite different policy actors, across multiple policies. Just as with the 
term ‘sustainable development’, they have to some extent lost clarity of definition through frequent 
expression and are context dependent. Table 5.1 reveals that the word ‘resilience’, for example, has 
high percentage values in several cases (21.3% for the 2013 FDRE/WB Coping with Change 
document, 34.8% for the 2015 FDRE-MECC Agriculture and Forestry Climate Resilience 
Strategy). While this supports the view that resilience is a convenient “all-embracing mobilising 
metaphor” (Pain and Levine, 2012: 21) for governmental and non-governmental actors alike, it 
does not necessarily imply that a narrative constructed around ‘the inherent resilience of pastoralist 
mobility’ has suddenly been endorsed by Ethiopian policymakers.  
Interestingly, Table 5.1 shows that the keyword ‘pastoral governance’, or its synonyms, do not 
appear at all in any of the Ethiopian policy documents reviewed, while terms such as ‘autonomous 
adaptation’, ‘rights’ and ‘key resources’ barely feature. The absence of ‘rights’ may be a reflection 
of the 2009 Charities and Civil Society Proclamation, which severally restricted CSOs from 
engaging in advocacy or ‘rights-based’ work for almost a decade (see Chapter 6). This pattern 
contrasts sharply with the strong emphasis placed on pastoral, land and other forms of ‘rights’ in 
the Kenyan sample analysed below. 
5.2.1.3 ‘Modern, mobile and green’  
Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 show that terms associated with the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse 
remain low across the Ethiopian sample. While there are high counts for ‘green economy’ and 
‘renewable energy’ in the 2011 GES or the 2015 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(EINDC) document, there is clearly little room for mobile pastoralism in Ethiopia’s vision for a 
modern and ‘climate-resilient green economy’. As Table 5.1 reveals, the keywords ‘pastoralist 
entrepreneurs’, ‘sustainable adaptation’ and ‘payments for environmental services’ – popular in 
recent international agency reports and academic studies on the drylands – barely feature.  
The metaphor ‘climate-smart agriculture’ – somewhat surprisingly given its prominence in 
contemporary global food security discourse – appears in only two of the documents analysed – 
EPCC 2014 and FDRE 2017. Similarly, Table 5.1 reveals infrequent use of the term ‘cross-border’ 
(or its synonyms), which appears in only three documents, pointing to the apparent low priority 
given to transboundary pastoralist movement and trade. This is consistent with the thesis of 
Anbessa (2015) that indifference or hostility by Ethiopian policymakers towards informal trade by 
lowland pastoralists is a result of historic and systematic bias in favour of the predominantly crop-





While the aggregate percentage score for the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse is noticeably 
high at 43.5% for the FDRE 2011 GES, this is a result of the high count (34.3%) of a single 
keyword – ‘green economy’.  
In the two consortium documents reviewed (Farm Africa, 2016; USAID, 2016), where one might 
expect a higher showing of terminology associated with the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, 
words associated with the ‘transforming’ discourse are still predominant, with high percentage 
values for keywords such as ‘vulnerable’, ‘integration’, ‘commercial’ and ‘climate resilient’.  
In sum, on the basis of this CA, we can infer that, despite an increase in the use of certain keywords 
such as resilience, there is no noticeable pattern of change over time regarding discourses on 
pastoralism found within Ethiopian policies related to climate change and drylands from 2007 to 
2017. ‘Transforming pastoralism’ is clearly the most dominant discourse across almost all 
documents analysed. While a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse does show some quite high aggregate 
scores for certain documents, this is generally a reflection of the high percentage values of a 
handful of keywords I have associated with that discourse but which could equally apply in the 
other discourses depending on how they are framed, or in what context they are used. Meanwhile, a 
‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, favoured by certain donors and international agencies, does 
not feature in the CA as prominently as might have been expected. 
5.2.2 Discourse analysis of Ethiopian documents  
DA of these same Ethiopian policy documents supports the findings of the CA – that ‘transforming 
pastoralism and drylands’ is the most dominant discourse across almost all documents analysed, 
with little change over time, despite some inroads made by emerging climate-resilience and green-
economy narratives. Nevertheless, from the DA, we can begin to gain a deeper understanding of 
the kinds of assumptions, ideologies and narrative structures underpinning each discourse – as well 
as the policy prescriptions emanating from these. Of the 17 documents examined, I have organised 
these around a particular theme or focus in common, rather than in chronological order. The first 
set of documents analysed are policies that have climate adaptation as their primary focus, although 
included here is also the Pastoral Areas Policy (2008), which touches on the impacts of climate 
change on pastoralism. The second group are policies that specifically address the agricultural 
sector, including livestock production, in the context of climatic and other uncertainties. The third 
set of policies examined comprises those associated with Ethiopia’s drive for a ‘Climate Resilient 







5.2.2.1 Climate-change adaptation  
Looking at Ethiopia’s policies, from the first National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) 
of 2007 to the most recent National Adaptation Plan (NAP-ETH) (2017), it is evident that – 
although there is a great deal of consensus on the climate vulnerability of drylands and pastoralists 
– the planned policy responses differ on the importance of supporting pastoralist adaptation or on 
the role pastoralist mobility. 
Ethiopia’s first NAPA was prepared as part of Ethiopia’s commitment to the UNFCCC and as a 
precursor to accessing adaptation funds (FDRE-NMA, 2007). Land degradation and poverty are 
framed in the same deterministic manner as Malthusian narratives of overpopulation (of people and 
livestock), poverty and climate hazards leading to environmental degradation and food insecurity 
that have been a feature of drylands planning in the HoA for many decades (Chapter 2). According 
to the NAPA: 
drought and famine, flood, malaria, land degradation, livestock disease, insect pests and 
earthquakes have been the main sources of risk and vulnerability in most parts of the 
country…. While the causes of most disasters are climate related, the deterioration of the 
natural environment due to unchecked human activities and poverty has further exacerbated 
the situation (FDRE-NMA, 2007: 16).  
Recurrent drought is “the single most important climate related natural hazard impacting the 
country” (ibid.: 25), with arid and semi-arid areas most affected. “Rain-fed farmers and 
pastoralists”, who are engaged in “coping mechanisms” as they deal with climate extremes, are 
identified as “the most vulnerable” (ibid.: 5). There is an assumption that existing systems are 
inefficient and unproductive, and some kind of (state-led) intervention needs to take place, in line 
with the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse identified earlier. According to NAPA, there is a 
need for “greater awareness about natural resource management amongst livestock keepers” and 
for more “rational use” of resources (FDRE-NMA, 2007: 33). Adaptation measures proposed 
include: ‘improved/productive animal breeds to reduce herd size and its pressure on the land’, 
‘promotion of grazing management’, ‘de-stocking of livestock on a regular basis’, ‘promotion of 
irrigation for agricultural development’ and the introduction of ‘mixed farming systems, where 
appropriate’ (ibid.: 40). On page 44, there is a call for the “reorganisation of drought-affected 
community”. These (predominantly technocratic) framings resonate with the arguments of Krätli 
and Enson (2013: 15) that, in the case of “crisis-scenarios with anthropogenic roots” – such as land 
degradation – blame has to go somewhere. As none of the key players – government ministries, 
scientists, international agencies – involved in policy formulation want it, “blame drifts towards the 
margins”, typically reaching groups that are considered ‘uneconomic’ or ‘unproductive’, such as 





Sedentarisation emerges as a theme in the Pastoral Areas Policy from 2008 – a document that 
presents a somewhat conflicting picture of how sustainable development is to be achieved in 
pastoral areas. While this policy predates government concerns about climate change, it refers to 
pastoral areas being characterised by “unpredictable and unstable climate conditions as well as 
ecologically fragile environments” (FDRE, 2008: 6). At the same time, there is acknowledgment 
that “pastoralism constitutes a unique and important way of life for a large part of Ethiopia” 
(FDRE, 2008: 5). There is also a commitment to “continue supporting pastoral livelihoods” (ibid.: 
7), and to “developing participatory land-use and ownership policy based on traditional communal 
land-use system” (ibid.: 10). 
Nonetheless, in the longer term, the government envisions: 
…gradual and voluntary transition towards permanent settlement especially along the perennial 
riverbanks….In order for this vision to be realized, there is need to: encourage and support 
voluntary settlement of pastoralists and agro-pastoralists and support the expansion of irrigation 
development to diversify and sustain the livelihoods of pastoralists (ibid.: 2). 
This vision is clearly influenced by the belief that traditional pastoralism cannot survive in its 
current form in the face of climatic shocks – what Krätli and Enson (2013) refer to as a ‘doomed-
by-climate-change’ narrative. In this storyline, pastoralists are amongst the groups most ‘at risk’ 
from external constraints that are regarded as unstoppable, ultimately making it difficult for them to 
resist dispossession of their resources: “one cannot be dispossessed of something that is already 
lost” (Krätli and Enson, 2012:15).  
In 2011 the NAPA was replaced by the EPACC. It sets out climate-related risks as well as 
adaptation strategies and options across a number of sectors, including those relevant to pastoral 
areas. There is evidence of strong intertextuality in this (and later) climate-related policy, in that 
ideas are repeated and built upon from earlier documents. Ethiopia is identified in the EPACC as a 
country “most vulnerable to climate change because of its low adaptive capacity…The country’s 
smallholder farmers and pastoralists are those with livelihoods most vulnerable to changes in 
climate” (FDE-EPA, 2011: vi). Pressure on resources often leads to “increased mobility and the 
probability of conflict” (ibid.: 10). The adaptive measures proposed in the EPACC nevertheless 
show some recognition of the positive role that mobility and the heterogeneity of drylands play in 
animal production. There are calls to “rehabilitate and manage dry-season rangelands through 
customary institutions” (ibid: 38) and for “promotion of cross-border livestock trade” (ibid.: 39) as 
well as “dissemination of indigenous knowledge” (ibid.: 40).  
It is in the two Regional State plans for adaptation, the Afar Plan and the Somali Plan, where 
elements of a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse and a more nuanced understanding of the causes of 





“exposed to drought and chronic food shortages, risks of flooding hazards, and conflict over 
increasingly scarce and fragile resources” (FDRE, 2010: 13), there is also recognition that “climate 
stressors and shocks are not new in these contexts of pastoral and agro-pastoral systems” (FDRE, 
2010: iii). Pastoralists are engaged in “opportunistic management” (ibid.: 26) and “endogenous 
adaptation strategies” (ibid.: 58). Nevertheless, the case for intervention is reiterated. Traditional 
systems need to be: 
 …supplemented and supported by modern adaptation approaches and external (institutional) 
interventions with a view to strengthening local adaptation strategies, empowering vulnerable 
groups and building resilience and resistance to climate change impacts (ibid.: 58). 
Unlike the naturalistic framings of vulnerability and change that are a characteristic of several other 
policy documents reviewed here, the Afar Plan observes that “the vulnerability of pastoral 
communities to climate risks and shocks is thus more a consequence of their marginalization than 
climate change per se” (FDRE, 2010: 3). Similarly, the Somali Plan maintains that “for a long 
time, a poor understanding of herding systems resulted in inappropriate policies that undermined 
pastoral development — such as by constraining herd mobility, leading pastoralists to become 
sedentary” (FDRE, 2011a: 82). The same plan asserts that “climate alone is rarely the reason 
people fall into poverty; instead, it interacts with existing problems and makes them worse” (ibid.: 
8). Both plans are careful nonetheless to steer away from any overtly political statements. While 
the expansion of irrigated commercial agriculture is highlighted, the resulting loss of access to dry-
season resources as a contributor to pastoralist vulnerability (see Eriksen and Marin, 2015) is not 
mentioned. Instead, pastoralists have been hindered by “the lack of pastoral friendly market 
systems and structures” (FDRE, 2010: 28), “weak extension services” (ibid.: 29) and a “decline in 
rangeland productivity…due to recurrent drought caused by climate variability” (ibid.: 30).  
In the language of CDA, the Afar and Somali texts can be read as “sites of discursive struggle” 
(Hajer, 2006: 73), in that they reveal traces of different discourses (in this case, both ‘transforming 
pastoralism’ and ‘pure pastoralism’) and ideologies struggling for dominance. Such 
‘interdiscursivity’ (Fairclough, 1995) can, nevertheless, be a positive sign of creative discursive 
and socio-cultural change. 
Ethiopia’s 2017 National Adaptation Plan (NAP-ETH) builds on the earlier NAPA and EPACC 
documents and is designed, according to its authors, to address the perception that climate change 
adaptation initiatives have been overly “sector-specific, and regionally focused” (FDRE, 2017: 3). 
“Short term coping mechanisms” in the predominantly pastoral regions of Afar, Somali and Oromo 
are deemed no longer sufficient in the face of climate change so there is a need instead for 
“building resilience and adaptive capacity for vulnerable communities” (ibid.: 12). Unlike the 
Regional State plans reviewed above, there is no reference at all to non-climatic drivers of 





– “improved (livestock) breeding and feeding systems and improved pasture/grazing management” 
(ibid.: 18), “improving the resilience of value chains and marketing systems for livestock” (ibid.: 
20), “improved early warning systems” (ibid.: 20) and “strengthening crop and livestock 
insurance” (ibid.: 20), along with adaptation options that include “livelihood diversification and 
voluntary resettlement” (ibid.: 19) – are once again to the fore. Clearly, the discourse in Ethiopia’s 
latest NAP, as with its predecessors, is predominantly a transforming one, drawing on narratives of 
pastoralist vulnerability, resource scarcity and the need for integration of pastoral production into 
the national economy. And where largely technocratic solutions are being privileged over the kinds 
of pastoral governance or resource rights concerns found within the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern 
and mobile’ discourses.  
5.2.2.2 Agricultural intensification and commercialisation 
A number of policies address the agriculture sector in the context of a changing climate. All of 
these documents contain a strong narrative thread of the need to intensify and commercialise 
agricultural – including pastoral production – in order to meet the twin imperative of tackling 
climate change and food insecurity, while also driving economic growth. Central to this 
transformation is the extension of commercial agriculture into ‘under-utilised’ lowland areas 
(FDRE-MOA, 2010: 6). According to the Agriculture Sector PIF 2010-2020: 
Vulnerability to droughts is greatest in the pastoral areas of the lowlands and the densely 
populated, food-insecure districts of the highlands. Drought-induced famines are further 
exacerbated by limited coping mechanisms and inadequate contingency planning for drought 
mitigation and the threat of climate change (ibid.: 4).  
The authors argue that the PIF will lead to “improving the adaptability of the agricultural sector to 
climate change and achieving national carbon neutrality by 2020” (ibid.: 28). There is no mention 
of mobile pastoralism as a viable production strategy. Instead: 
…rangeland degradation threatens the livelihoods of pastoral communities in large areas of 
the lowlands, calling for alternative forms of income generation to reduce grazing pressure, 
and better rangeland management including the use of exclusion areas, forage development 
and drought preparedness (ibid.: 20).  
In the GTP II, ‘modernisation of agriculture’ remains central to Ethiopia’s vision for a CRGE 
(FDRE, 2014: 2). The target set for irrigation schemes is 4.1 million hectares by 2020, while the 
ambitious target for national forest coverage is 20% by end of GTP II (ibid.: 95). As afforestation 
means less land is available for crop cultivation or livestock grazing, there are implications for the 
pastoral lowlands. There is an assumption that the problems of climate change and food insecurity 
are best solved by applying ‘irrigation-centred sedentary agriculture” (ibid.: 27) and technical 
solutions (FDRE, 2014). GTP II states that the livestock sub-sector is “still at the lowest state of 





transform the sub-sector” (ibid.: 122). The term ‘pastoral development’ is used only once in GTP 
II, and in conjunction with crop farming (FDRE, 2014: 121). 
Ethiopia’s LMP (2015)71 sets out similar investment interventions to improve productivity in the 
livestock sub-sector, albeit with only a small section devoted to pastoralism. While the LMP is still 
within a broader frame of ‘transformation’, there are a number of specific policy constraints and 
proposed actions for pastoral areas identified that are not articulated in earlier agricultural policies. 
These echo the kind of calls for greater affirmative action by the state in support of ‘pastoral 
governance’ that are more typical of the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ 
discourses (see Chapter 3). The plan argues for: “stronger policy, legal and institutional 
frameworks to support sustainable pastoral and agro-pastoral production” (FDRE-MoA 2015: 110).  
Similar counternarratives to the dominant transforming discourse can be found in the EPCC 
Assessment Report (2015), which focuses on agriculture and food security. This report provides an 
insight into what messages are coming from the Ethiopian scientific community. While the EPCC 
document typically portrays a bleak outlook on future climate impacts on agriculture, there are 
mixed messages. On the one hand, the authors reproduce Malthusian narratives of resource scarcity 
and pastoralist vulnerability:  
The combination of weather events, a doubling of pastoral populations, the loss of prime dry 
season grazing, reduced mobility and a substantial increase in the number of poor and very 
poor pastoral households, are resulting in levels of resilience to drought being much 
reduced…some pastoralists are trapped in a permanent livelihood crisis (EPCC, 2015: 180). 
Pastoralism is, nonetheless, acknowledged as: “a proven, adaptive livelihood system that supports 
human populations to inhabit one of the most remote and inhospitable regions of the world, 
including in remote areas that cannot access rivers and therefore benefit from irrigation” (ibid.: 
185). Investing in pastoralism, the authors argue, can “help secure livelihoods, conserve ecosystem 
services, promote wildlife conservation and strengthen cultural values and traditions” (ibid.: 209). 
The report also offers a less naturalistic framing of vulnerability and highlights instead the fact that: 
....poorly formulated pastoral area policy, has exacerbated pastoral vulnerability...the general 
development trend has been to promote sedentary agriculture as an alternative to mobile 
livestock keeping…the result of these policies has included huge investment in water resource 
development and the dislocation of former tried and tested rangeland management systems 
(ibid.: 190). 
In sum, national policy frameworks that focus on agricultural growth clearly reveal a narrative 
thread that calls for the expansion of irrigation and sedentary agriculture in the ‘under-utilised’ 
lowlands, legitimised by the twin challenges of climate change and food security – in line with the 
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‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ discourse. The two (science-led) documents, the LMP and 
the EPCC Assessment Report, in contrast, show somewhat higher levels of interdiscursivity: also 
emphasising the need for a commercially orientated livestock sector, while simultaneously 
acknowledging the multiple forms of vulnerability and policy constraints facing pastoralists.  
5.2.2.3 A Climate Resilient Green Economy 
Several of the documents reviewed come under the umbrella of Ethiopia’s vision for a ‘Climate 
Resilient Green Economy’ (CRGE), which in turn is closely linked to its drive to achieve ‘middle-
income status’ by 2025 (FDRE, 2014). The 2011 GES is the first of these. Its objective is “to 
identify green economy opportunities that can help Ethiopia reach its economic growth targets 
while keeping GHG emissions low” (FDRE, 2011b: iii). Agriculture and forestry are seen as 
offering the greatest “GHG abatement potential” (ibid.: 28). The GES explicitly refers to the 
“creation of new agricultural land in arid areas through irrigation…new agricultural land could be 
created from un-cultivated non-forest areas, thereby reducing emissions from the expansion of total 
cropland” (ibid.: 138). Elsewhere, there are plans to increase the production of biofuels “on 
marginal lands” (ibid.: 172). There is no reference to the potential social and environmental 
consequences of such changes in land use in the name of GHG abatement.  
The emphasis on agriculture-led growth, irrigation and transforming production systems remains 
central to the GES. However, in line with earlier policies, some slight differences in thinking can be 
observed. There is no explicit mention of ‘voluntary settlement’ of pastoralists. Nonetheless, the 
assumption that traditional pastoral systems are no longer tenable is still strong. With more 
emphasis on mitigation rather than adaptation, policy prescriptions include: “reducing herd size and 
switching to more efficient livestock systems”, “improving (rangelands) to enhance their carbon 
sequestration potential” and encouraging “a partial shift towards lower emitting sources of protein, 
e.g. poultry” (ibid.: 24) – all of which offer the “combined benefit of supporting economic growth, 
increasing farmers/pastoralists income and limiting emissions” (ibid.: 24). There is a sense here 
that state policies are making available – through, for example, carbon-sequestration schemes – 
assets such as land and forests for what had been described as “the new green economy of repair” 
(Fairhead et al., 2012: 251), while the role of international development partners is to provide 
finance, advice and support.  
The theme of ‘climate resilience’ is central to two CRGE strategies produced in 2015. The first of 
these sets out challenges faced in the agriculture (including livestock) and forestry sectors related 
to current and future climate change (FDRE/MECC, 2015a). A number of alternative future 
scenarios are documented based on different climate model projections. There is an 
acknowledgment that “there is a high degree of uncertainty in projections of how global climate 





impacts and costs of climate change on agriculture and forestry are potentially very significant, 
which could put our ambition of reaching middle-income status by 2025 at risk” (ibid.: 6). 
Drylands are identified as “highly vulnerable” (ibid.: 21). Under future scenarios of higher average 
temperature, there are generally “large impacts on livestock production and net revenues, with 
some studies reporting a decline of approximately 50% or more in livestock revenues by 2050” 
(ibid.: 38). Interestingly, the same document stresses “the need for resilience responses that are 
grounded in the local context” (ibid.: 17). Despite revealing a broader understanding of resilience, 
the document contains little that has not been stated elsewhere, or that moves beyond a narrow 
focus on technocratic solutions. Adaptation options for the livestock subsector and pastoral areas 
typically include: “value-chain improvements”, “herd diversification”, “breeding of climate 
resistant livestock”, “fodder and feed improvement” and “rangeland rehabilitation and 
management” (ibid.: 46). There is a strong emphasis on an “increasing role for the private sector in 
delivering a resilient agriculture” to make up anticipated shortfalls in public-sector and 
international climate funding (ibid.: 54). 
The second resilience strategy focuses on water and energy (FDRE/MECC, 2015b). While there is 
no direct reference to pastoralism, it is relevant in that it sets out Ethiopia’s plans to expand 
irrigation and energy in peripheral areas, including the predominantly pastoralist Afar and Somali 
Regions. Once again, the emphasis is on technocratic solutions. To avoid any “unintended negative 
impacts on local communities”, “Social and Environmental Impact Assessment” is encouraged as a 
necessary first step (ibid.: 30). In the case of renewable energy, however, the need for such 
assessment is not mentioned. The emphasis instead is on “diversifying the energy mix” (ibid.: 36), 
and “securing energy access for all…including enabling non-grid access for remoter communities” 
(ibid.: 40). Plans to expand forest cover, exploit renewable energy potential (notably the 
construction of large dams) and reduce emissions from livestock are also at the heart of Ethiopia’s 
INDC commitments from 2015 (FDRE, 2015). I will examine the consequences of these green-
economy plans for pastoral areas in Chapter 7.  
Two documents that are outside of official state policymaking but nonetheless provide some insight 
into how donors and INGOs are thinking are the Farm Africa (2016) and USAID (2016) papers 
describing donor-funded resilience programmes underway in pastoral areas. Here, we might expect 
a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse to feature more prominently. However again, there are 
mixed messages about the sustainability of the pastoral way of life and its contribution to 
adaptation in the drylands. While the importance of ‘customary institutions’ is recognised and 
certain keywords such as ‘resilience’, ‘adaptive management’ and even ‘green technologies’ are 
used, the (by now familiar) Malthusian narrative that traditional pastoralism is no longer viable in 
the face of climate change, population growth and other uncertainties is still predominant. Such 





conflict between neighboring communities” (Farm Africa, 2016: 2). Pastoralists “lack climate 
information and adaptation strategies, as well as the ability to effectively manage natural 
resources” (USAID, 2016: 2). There is an assumption that “market-based approaches” and 
“diversification of livelihoods” can improve the “resilience of vulnerable pastoralists” (ibid.: 2). 
We gain little sense of pastoralists’ own agency being acknowledged – how pastoralists are already 
innovating and taking advantage of market opportunities (Catley, 2017). Nor are any suggestions 
made as to how mobility – pastoralists’ primary means of dealing with climate and dryland 
variability – can be protected. Instead, the message from these documents is that ‘resilience’, and 
‘pastoral development’, are processes that only the state, donors or INGOs can facilitate. Arguably, 
certain forms of knowledge and management solutions – namely those offered by the state, donors 
and INGOs – are being privileged here over local / indigenous forms of knowledge and practice – a 
form of ‘discursive power’ in the Foucauldian sense (Chapter 4).  
We can conclude from this DA that there are mixed, and sometimes contradictory, messages on 
pastoralism emanating from Ethiopian climate-change and related policies. These emanate from a 
predominant discourse that, for the main part, believes in state-mediated commercialisation and 
‘transformation’ of the Ethiopian pastoral lowlands. Across all three categories of documents 
reviewed, the impact of climate change and the drive for rapid economic growth and food security 
are clearly guiding narratives for greater sedentarisation of pastoral communities and for 
‘transforming’ production systems – just as similar narratives of desertification and tragedy of the 
commons shaped drylands planning in the past (discussed in Chapter 2). For the main part, the 
adaptation plans and resilience strategies reviewed here – the Afar and Somali plans and the EPCC 
Assessment being exceptions – frame vulnerability and change in the drylands in terms of naturally 
occurring hazards. Although mobile pastoralism is acknowledged as a proven adaptive livelihood 
strategy in some documents, any positive direct references to pastoralism are lost in the overall 
negative representations. In sum, the Ethiopian findings provide firm evidence to support what has 
been suggested elsewhere (Yirgu et al., 2013; Kratli, 2019): that, while the language may have 
evolved, some of the assumptions driving current climate change and other policies are not 
necessarily ‘new’, but are instead rooted in the same historical narratives around ‘unproductive’ 
pastoral lowlands, pastoralists as victims of environmental change, and the need for modernisation.  
5.3 Analysis of Kenyan policy documents 
This section draws from a CA and DA of Kenyan policy documents spanning the period 2008–





5.3.1 Content analysis of Kenyan policy documents 
This section sets out the results of CA applied to Kenyan policy documents and strategies that have 
relevance directly, or indirectly, to pastoralist livelihoods. The same discourses and keywords (see 
Table 3.1) that were used for the analysis of Ethiopian documents apply again here.  
As the documents vary in length from 7–230 pages, Table 5.2 shows a percentage value for each 
key-word count that can be contrasted across documents and within documents. For the full word 
count of Kenyan policy documents, see Table 8, Appendix F. The final column in Table 5.2 shows 
the percentage value of that keyword across all the documents in the sample. Figure 5.2 is a bar 
chart visualising the aggregate percentage value breakdown for each discourse and for each 












Figure 5.2 Aggregate percentage for each discourse in Kenyan policy documents  
 
  
5.3.1.1 ‘Transforming pastoralism and drylands’ 
Just as with the Ethiopian policy documents, the CA reveals that a ‘transforming pastoralism and 
drylands’ remains the more dominant discourse category across 14 of the 16 analysed Kenyan 
policies.72 Figure 5.2 shows, furthermore, that there is no clearly identifiable pattern over time. 
While certain years may show a higher frequency of keywords associated with a ‘pure pastoralism’ 
or ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, this – as we shall discover – is a reflection of particular 
policies and their attendant institutional provenance, rather than any significant pattern of change 
from one discourse to another over time. 
Of the 16 documents analysed, the aggregate percentage value of the ‘transforming’ discourse 
remains greater than 50% in all but three cases. In 2010, the aggregate percentage value of the 
‘transforming’ discourse is as high as 91.9% for the 2010 GoK-MALF Agricultural Strategy and – 
with a couple of notable exceptions – high counts of this particular discourse persist throughout the 
period reviewed. The National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS) of 2010 has an 
aggregate percentage value of 75.8%. The 2013 GoK-MDP Vision 2030 MTP2 has an aggregate 
percentage value of 80.3% – as is to be expected, in view of its focus on economic transformation. 
While the 2014 GoK-MALF Ending Drought Emergency (EDE) Framework for Sustainable 
Livelihoods has a lower aggregate value for the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse (47.8%,), 
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from 2015 the aggregate counts are high again – the only exception being the GoK-Isiolo County 
Government (GoK-ICG) Livestock Strategy, where keywords associated with a ‘pure pastoralism’ 
discourse are more dominant. In the cases of the 2015 GoK Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) 
Framework, the 2016 National Adaptation Plan (NAP) and the 2016 GoK-MLPP National Land 
Use Plan (NLUP), we can observe aggregate values of 75.5%, 65.2% and 72.01%, respectively. In 
the most recent national policy in the Kenyan sample, the 2016 GoK-MLPP NLUP, Table 5.2 
shows that several keywords associated with a ‘transforming’ discourse, namely ‘degraded’, 
‘conflict’ and ‘productivity’, have high word counts of 21.1%, 14.7% and 16.7% respectively. The 
term ‘vulnerable’ appears in every document in the sample, with a percentage value as high as 19% 
in one case. This would appear to support the findings of Odhiambo (2014), discussed in Chapter 2, 
that deeply held narratives depicting the ASAL as ‘degraded’, ‘unproductive’ and ‘prone to 
endemic conflict’ persist in Kenyan policy.  
In almost all cases, there is use of the word ‘integration’ (or its synonym ‘mainstream’), with word 
counts as high as 23% for the GoK-MDP 2013 Vision 2030 MTP2, 13.3% for the GoK-MENR 
2014 National Climate Change Framework Policy (NCCFP) and 18.4% in the GoK-MENR 2015a 
INDC document. This is consistent with what has been highlighted by a number of scholars 
(Abbink et al., 2014; Elliot 2016; Odhiambo, 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016) that the ASAL are 
no longer perceived by the Kenyan state and other actors as ‘no-go’ peripheral areas, but instead 
offer a ‘new frontier’ for capital accumulation and resource extraction.  
What is clearly noticeable from Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 is the strong contrast of discourses and 
terminology across policy documents, reflecting the particular focus of certain policies and 
strategies, as well as the positions of whatever ministries or agencies are responsible for their 
production and implementation (explored further in Chapter 6). This would suggest that there is no 
significant ‘unifying position’, or single discourse, around pastoralism across Kenyan ministries 
and associated government agencies, but rather a high level of interdiscursivity. This becomes even 
more apparent in the findings of the DA (see 5.3.2).  
Terms such as ‘commercial’, ‘productivity’ and ‘value chains’ are used consistently in policies 
specific to the agricultural and/or livestock sector, for example. ‘Commercial’ (or its synonyms), 
the most frequently used keyword across all Kenyan documents (11.3%), appears in GoK-MLD 
National Livestock Policy (NLP) from 2008, the GoK-MALF Agriculture Sector Development 
Strategy (ASDS) of 2010 and the GoK 2015 CSA Framework, with counts of 19.2%, 24.3% and 
15.1%, respectively. This points to the strong emphasis being put on market liberalisation and the 
integration of dryland agriculture into both the national and the global economy.  
In turn, terms such as ‘climate risk’, ‘vulnerable’ and ‘renewable energy’ feature prominently in 





keyword that appears in all 16 documents, its highest word counts are in the GoK 2010 NCCRS, the 
GoK 2013 NCCAP, the GoK 2013 EDE MTP, the GoK 2014 NCCFP and the GoK-MENR 2016 
NAP. The term ‘climate-resilient’, meanwhile, appears less frequently than was the case in the 
Ethiopian sample, with low percentage value counts – with the exception of the GoK 2013 NCCAP 
(11.3%). 
5.3.1.2 ‘Pure pastoralism’ 
What Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 also show is that, although dominant in only one policy document 
(the 2016 GoK-ICG Livestock Strategy), keywords associated with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse 
have a strong presence within many of the Kenyan documents analysed. In this discourse, the 
inherent adaptability and resilience of pastoral systems are considered as part of the solution to 
climate-change challenges, rather than being part of the problem. 
This is in part a reflection of the noticeable prominence of a single keyword, ‘resilience’, 
particularly from 2013 onwards. In the GoK-MENR 2014 NCCFP, for example, ‘resilience’ has a 
score of 18.4%, contributing (along with ‘adaptive capacity’) to a high aggregate score of 29.8%. 
In the GoK-MENR 2016 NAP, ‘resilience’ has a percentage value count of 15.3%, influencing the 
overall aggregate value of 25.9%. However, these high aggregate scores – derived from a single 
term or two – do not necessarily reflect that strong support for mobile pastoral systems or ‘pastoral 
governance’ can be found in these particular policies and constituencies.  
Nevertheless, there are several documents where we can observe a wider range of terminology 
associated with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse. These provide a clearer picture of where 
‘counternarratives’ concerning pastoralists have gained currency among – or are being produced by 
– certain policymakers, and suggests  - as Odhiambo (2014) and others have observed (see 2.4.3) - 
that a substantive shift in thinking occurred in light of the changing policy context resulting from 
Constitutional reform of 2010, the process of devolution that followed, and in particular, the 
establishment of a dedicated MDNKOAL (Elmi and Birch, 2013), a theme explored further in 
Chapter 6. In the 2012 GoK–MDNKOAL ‘ASAL policy’, for example, a wider range of terms, 
including ‘variability’ (2.9%), ‘mobile’ (11.9%), ‘livelihoods’ (6.6%), ‘customary institutions’ 
(2.0%), ‘rights’ (3.7%), ‘indigenous’ (1.6%) and ‘pastoral governance’ (4.9%), are used. However, 
it is within the one county level document analysed - the 2016 GoK-ICG Livestock Strategy - 
where the highest aggregate score for ‘pure pastoralism’ can be found (54.7%). Here again, there is 
evidence of a wider range of terms associated with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse, with the 
keywords ‘pastoral systems’, ‘customary institutions’ and ‘key resources’ scoring higher counts 
that in any other document reviewed (8.3%, 9.1% and 8.2%, respectively). This is unsurprising, in 





in Isiolo” (GoK-ICG, 2016: 12).73 Interestingly, the term ‘rights’, in contrast to its low count in the 
Ethiopian policy documents, appears in 12 of the 16 documents reviewed (and with a count of 
7.4% in the case of the 2013 GoK-MDP MTP), reflecting perhaps the higher value paid to 
minorities, land and other forms of rights found in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution (GoK, 2010).  
5.3.1.3 ‘Modern, mobile and green’ 
As in the case of Ethiopia, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 show that keywords associated with the 
‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse appear less prominently in the sample analysed. 
Nevertheless, there are some interesting results. ‘Climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA) is referred to in 
nine of the documents reviewed, particularly in those from 2015 onwards, with word counts of 
6.1% and 6.9% in two cases. One of these documents – the Kenya CSA Framework 2015–2030 – is 
dedicated to promoting CSA as a response to climatic challenges. There is also reference to the 
‘carbon sequestration’ potential of rangelands in 11 out of the 16 documents. The emphasis here on 
CSA and carbon markets would appear to support the claim that national climate-change policies 
are driven in part by the desire to capitalise on new sources of donor support for climate adaptation 
and mitigation (Lockwood, 2013; Maina et al., 2014).  
In contrast to its almost total absence from the Ethiopian policies reviewed above, the keyword 
‘cross-border’ (or one of its synonyms) is used in 12 Kenyan policy documents. For one document, 
the 2016 GoK-MLPP NLUP, it scores a percentage value as high as 6.4%. This would suggest the 
possibility that regional (HoA) initiatives on the drylands74 have influenced how Kenyan 
policymakers view the need for greater regional policy harmonisation around such issues as 
drought management, cross-border livestock trade and animal disease control.  
Table 5.2 also shows that other keywords in this discourse, such as ‘diversification’, ‘green 
economy’, ‘climate smart’, ‘payments for environmental services’ and ‘social protection’ – terms 
considered by some as deliberately apolitical in how they are framed (Symons, 2014) – appear 
across a number of the documents reviewed here. They generally do so, however, with lower 
percentage values than might be expected from the relevant literature.  
Finally, while the aggregate percentage score for the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse is 
noticeably high at 48.4% for the 2015 GoK-MENR Green Economy Strategy (GESIP), this is a 
result of the high percentage value (44.2%) of a single term – ‘green economy’. Similarly, the high 
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Methods chapter (4.4.1).  
74 See, for example, IGAD’s Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDDRISI) from 2013. The 
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aggregate count of this same discourse is apparent for the 2014 GoK-NDMA EDE Framework for 
Drought Risk Management (at 22.3%), but this is largely a reflection of the high score (17.7%) of 
another keyword – ‘social protection’. Clearly the word counts in these cases do not reveal the 
context in which such keywords are used.  
In sum, the CA of sampled Kenyan documents suggests  that – just as in the Ethiopian case – there 
is no clearly identifiable pattern in discursive emphasis over time, but rather discursive emphasis is 
a reflection more of particular policies and their attendant institutional provenance. The 
‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ discourse remains the more dominant one across 14 of the 
16 analysed Kenyan policy documents. Within this discourse, the high count of keywords such as 
‘integration’, ‘commercial’ and ‘productive’ reveal the strong desire on behalf of the state for 
greater integration of the ASALs into national development. Nevertheless, keywords associated 
with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse also have a strong presence within many of the Kenyan 
documents analysed, with the caveat that this is, in part, a reflection of the prominence of a single 
keyword, ‘resilience’, particularly from 2013 onwards. As with the Ethiopian documents reviewed 
earlier, keywords associated with a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse appear less prominently 
in the sample analysed, with the exception of one document, the 2015 GoK-MENR GESIP. 
5.3.2 Discourse analysis of Kenyan documents  
The DA of Kenyan policy documents supports the findings of the CA: that there are mixed – and 
sometimes conflicting – messages about the sustainability of the pastoral way of life and its 
contribution to adaptation in the drylands. While ‘crises narratives’ (Roe, 1991) of ‘pastoralist 
vulnerability’, ‘conflict over resources’ and ‘food insecurity’ are still to the fore, the analysis 
suggests that other (counter) narratives – associated with the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, 
mobile and green’ discourses – have influenced the thinking of certain policymakers. As the CA 
above also reveals, this appears to be a reflection of the positions and ideologies of whatever 
ministries or agencies are responsible for the production and implementation of specific policies, 
rather than of any common understanding across Kenyan policymaking circles.  
As in the case of the Ethiopian policies above, I have chosen to structure my analysis by grouping 
together documents that share some common thematic focus, rather than examine each policy in 
strict chronological order. The first set of documents analysed are policies that address either 
climate change directly, as in various national climate mitigation and adaptation plans and 
strategies, or are focused on agriculture but make reference to pastoralism in the context of a 
changing climate. The section that follows looks at two specific policies of relevance: firstly, the 
2012 National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands 
(referred to as the ‘ASAL Policy’), where pastoralist rights emerge as a strong theme, and, secondly, 





policies examined, are those built around Kenya’s ‘Ending Drought Emergencies’ (EDE) initiative, 
where changes affecting the drylands and pastoralism in the context of climatic and other 
uncertainties is a priority focus. For convenience, I include the National Land Use Policy (NLUP) 
from 2016 in this last group. 
5.3.2.1 Climate change and pastoralism  
The 2008 GoK-MLD NLP and the 2010 GoK-MALF ASDS were written before climate change 
emerged as a central issue of Kenyan policy. Nonetheless, these are relevant documents. There is a 
strong narrative that declining range resources, climate-induced droughts and demographic change 
are making nomadic pastoral systems untenable. A related narrative points to pastoralist practices 
as contributing to land degradation. According to the NLP: “The range environment is fragile and, 
due to its inappropriate use, degradation of the range has been observed in some areas. This 
situation reduces the capacity of the land to support enough livestock in the rangelands” (GoK-
MLD, 2008: 21). Likewise, in the ASDS – designed to guide the development of a commercially 
oriented and modern agriculture sector – ASALs are described as: 
…fragile ecosystems with scarce and erratic rainfall patterns. Despite the enormous livestock 
potential, development in these areas has been low compared with the rest of the 
country…pastoral systems are changing with increasing sedentarization due to changing 
lifestyles and land tenure, and adoption of crop production in marginal lands (GoK-MALF, 
2010: 40).  
The ASDS continues:  
…the frequency and severity of drought has increased in recent years… coupled with 
overstocking and the degraded environment, this has had a devastating effect on pasture 
regeneration and on the livelihoods of pastoral communities .... livestock migration has 
resulted in conflicts over use of pastures and water sources, and in environmental degradation 
(ibid.: 40). 
Clearly, pastoralist mobility is perceived here as part of ‘the problem’, rather than as a strategic 
response to climatic and resource variability. In turn, policy prescriptions are generally framed in 
‘technical fix’ and managerial-orientated terms, typically focusing on the need for improved 
livestock inputs and livestock health, marketing and value addition, disaster preparedness, 
rangeland management and livelihood diversification (GoK-MLD, 2008; GoK-MALF, 2010).  
The ASDS essentially sets out a vision for agricultural modernisation in the ASAL that includes:  
…exploiting the 9.2 million-ha irrigation potential; developing water resources for livestock, 
domestic and irrigation use; constructing roads; managing natural resources; facilitating 
sustainable exploitation of renewable sources of energy to support agricultural development; 
exploring the possibility of providing a livestock insurance scheme for producers in arid areas; 





The challenges of drought and conflict over resources are also highlighted in the second MTP of 
Vision 2030, Kenya’s national development plan:  
Competition between communities over natural resources increases insecurity within Kenya 
and across its borders. Insecurity in turn increases vulnerability to drought, by impeding 
migration, curtailing access to services and resources, destroying assets, and damaging inter-
communal relations (GoK-MDP, 2013: 41).  
Under “emerging issues and challenges”, “pastoral transformation” (ibid.: 42) is highlighted. While 
pastoralism is recognised for its importance to the economy and livelihoods, it is understood in this 
document that transformation is inevitable. In the same section, however, reference is made to 
barriers to pastoral mobility: “Pastoralism is affected by the disruption of seasonal transhumance 
patterns, the expansion of community conservancies, the unchecked influx of people and livestock, 
and the spread of invasive species” (ibid.: 42). There is also a caveat about the potential 
“environmental challenges” brought about by new investments in the ASAL – such as oil and 
mineral extraction (ibid.: 42).  
Two documents in which climate concerns are central are the 2010 NCCRS and the 2013 NCCAP. 
These documents largely exclude any analysis of the broader socio-economic and political changes 
underway in Kenya’ drylands, preferring instead to promulgate a narrative of environmental crises, 
not dissimilar to that found in the agriculture policies discussed above. According to the NCCRS: 
“Climate change is already happening and at an alarming rate” (GoK, 2010: 30). Kenya’s ASAL 
are: “subject to recurring droughts, which when coupled with overexploitation of resources, result 
in high vulnerability to land degradation and desertification. This not only increases levels of GHG 
emissions, but simultaneously threatens livelihoods” (ibid.: 17). Drought inevitably leads to 
“massive livestock and wildlife deaths and an increase in human-human and wildlife-human 
conflicts” (ibid.: 32). The NCCRS and NCCAP frame the challenge of climate change for food 
security in the drylands in ways that are consistent with (predominantly depoliticised) global 
narratives on climate change and agriculture – namely that climate change is an externally imposed 
problem that has profound implications for food and livelihood security, particularly for small-
scale farmers and pastoralists. According to the NCCAP:  
Pastoral and marginal agricultural areas are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate 
change. Extended periods of drought erode livelihood opportunities and community resilience 
in these areas; leading to undesirable coping strategies that damage the environment and 
impair household nutritional status, further undermining long-term food-security (GoK, 
2013a: 4). 
Nonetheless, in line with the ‘modern, mobile and green pastoralism’ discourse identified earlier, 
climate change is also presented as “an opportunity for the country to develop appropriate response 
strategies and activities required to making communities safer and resilient” (ibid.: 4). The 





change, in as low-carbon a way as possible, will help Kenya achieve sustainable development and 
Vision 2030 goals…” (GoK, 2013a: 26). Similar to the Ethiopian case, technocratic policy 
solutions are reiterated. A greater role for renewable energy, including biofuels, is envisaged (GoK, 
2010; GoK, 2013a) – the implications for pastoralists of which are explored in later chapters.  
When it comes to reducing livestock emissions, there are some caveats. Whilst agriculture: 
 ...is a large and growing GHG emitter, responsible for about 30 per cent of Kenya’s 
emissions in 2010, with about 90 per cent of these emissions generated by the livestock 
sector…actions to respond to these increasing emissions will be considered and prioritised 
based on the country’s unique social, cultural, environmental and economic factors (GoK, 
2013: 31).  
According to the NCCRS: “improved livestock management has the scope to contribute to the 
ASAL’s strategy by improving the livelihoods of pastoralists and achieving climate resilience 
benefits through healthier livestock and reduced degradation of rangeland” (ibid.: 149).  
In a later document (GoK, 2015), ‘climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA) is promoted as a means to 
provide: “solutions towards increased agriculture sector productivity while addressing effects of 
changing climate and weather patterns” (ibid.: vi). Extended periods of drought have, according to 
the authors, eroded “livelihood opportunities and community resilience” in pastoral areas, “leading 
to undesirable coping strategies that damage the environment and impair household nutritional 
status” (ibid.: 9). CSA fits conveniently with a vision of agricultural modernisation, flagged as 
offering: “an excellent opportunity for agricultural growth” (ibid.: 22), as well as “leveraging 
climate finance” (ibid.: 24). The issue of unequal access to and fragmentation of critical rangeland 
resources resulting from changes in land use is clearly absent from CSA policy. Nor is there any 
suggestion as to whether socio-economic factors or political interests in the newly devolved ASAL 
counties might impede the implementation of CSA programmes. 
Subsequent climate policies – such as the 2014 NCCFP, Kenya’s INDC from 201575, the 2015 
Green Economy Strategy (GESIP) and the 2016 National Adaptation Plan (NAP) – share this 
(apolitical) vision of ‘green growth’ and include plans for the rollout of renewable energy, green 
technologies and REDD-type carbon sequestration initiatives (GoK-MENR, 2015a; GoK-MENR, 
2015b; GoK-MENR, 2016). The INDC sets out an ambitious target to reduce Kenya’s GHG 
emissions by 30% by 2030, including reiterating the aim of reducing emissions from the livestock 
sector (GoK-MENR, 2015a). Although a full picture of the role of, and consequences for, 
pastoralism within this new green economy cannot be determined from analysis of policy 
documents alone, it is evident that loss of pastoral mobility and the transition to mixed-farming or 
non-pastoralist-based activities are regarded by some policymakers as unavoidable in the face of 
                                                        





climate change or the kind of transformation being advocated, a theme explored further in Chapters 
6 and 7.  
5.3.2.2. Pastoralist rights  
As the CA revealed, one document where strong elements of the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘mobile, 
modern and green’ discourses can be found is the 2012 ‘ASAL Policy’. As we saw in Chapter 2, 
this policy marked a significant departure from historical narratives that viewed the Kenyan 
drylands as either ‘unproductive and conflict ridden’. The policy offers instead an alternative 
storyline, one that recognises the ASAL as part of Kenya, but with unique constraints and 
attributes. Policy and practice should take into account the ASAL – and pastoralists’ – unique 
characteristics, without compromising principles of good governance (GoK-MDNKOAL, 2012). 
The ASAL Policy draws on the 2010 Constitution, which attests to the common citizenship of all 
Kenyans but requires the state to recognise diversity. It is also an attempt to harmonise with the 
African Union (AU) Policy Framework for Pastoralism in Africa (AU, 2010), notable for its 
rights-based approach to pastoral development (Odhiambo, 2017). Unlike the largely technocratic, 
and mostly depoliticised, focus of the national climate policies analysed so far, the policy is upfront 
in its endorsement of pastoralism, its critique of the historical neglect of ASAL and – notably – its 
emphasis on the problems of restrictions to mobility: 
A policy focus on pastoralism is justified for two main reasons. First, pastoralists are among 
the groups most marginalised from socio-economic services and infrastructure…The second 
reason is that, until recently, most governments’ viewed pastoral areas as net consumers of 
national wealth that offered poor prospects of return on investment. Pastoralism was therefore 
less valued than other forms of land-use and less well-supported…Governments now 
recognise the strengths of pastoralism and have formed ministries or other authorities to 
enhance the contribution of pastoralism to food security, environmental stewardship, and 
economic growth (GoK-MDNKOAL, 2012: 5). 
The document continues: “Pastoralists have successfully managed climate variability for centuries. 
Their skills and indigenous knowledge will become more valuable as the impact of global climate 
change becomes more pressing” (ibid.: 12). Nonetheless, climate change is not underestimated:  
Climate change will exacerbate the challenges already facing the region. Chronic poverty and 
vulnerability in the ASAL mean that adaptive capacity is generally low. Traditional 
mechanisms for managing climate variability, such as mobility and the use of drought-reserve 
areas, are being closed off… (ibid.: 12). 
It is within the Isiolo County Government’s Livestock Strategy and Action Plan 2016–2020, where 
a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse is most pronounced. The strategy refers to the fact that “changes in 
land-use, such as the establishment of conservancies, the mushrooming of new settlements…and 
the spread of farming along the Ewaso-Nyiro River, are already driving fragmentation of 





“deprived of access…to critical grazing or water resources”, which has “undermined seasonally 
productivity and pastoralists’ resilience to extreme events” (ibid.: 23). “Poor understanding by 
government planners and livestock officers of the rationale underpinning pastoral livestock 
mobility and the maintenance of the rangelands under common-property regimes” (ibid. 24) has 
not helped. Reiterating a narrative found within the ASAL Policy: pastoralism – “if properly 
supported” – remains “the most appropriate land-use and livelihood in the ASAL” (ibid.: 15). 
While acknowledging that some youth are opting out of herding, it stresses that others are taking 
advantage of “new opportunities”, while “improvements in mobile communication and marketing 
systems have enabled a small degree of livelihood diversification, such as small businesses run by 
women” (ibid.: 14). Along with the emphasis on “drought preparedness” (ibid.: 60), “building the 
capacity of county veterinary services” (ibid.: 62), “infrastructure development” (ibid.: 65) and 
“more efficient livestock marketing systems” (ibid.: 36) – all set out in detail – policy prescriptions 
include the commitment to “legally protect rangelands and pastoral resources from alienation, 
encroachment and fragmentation” (ibid.: 58), as well as “legislate in favour of livestock mobility” 
(ibid.: 60), both fundamental to the idea of enhanced governance of pastoral areas, as promulgated 
within both the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses. The strong 
alignment towards both these discourses found within the Isiolo County Government’s Livestock 
Strategy suggests the inclusion of more County-level documents in the sample for Kenya may have 
resulted in a different set of findings.  
5.3.2.3 Ending drought emergencies  
There is a particular focus in Kenyan policies on drought, as is to be expected given the recent 
history of recurring drought. One institution set up under the MDNKOAL was the National 
Drought Management Authority (NDMA), subsequently mandated with coordinating the Common 
Programme Framework in Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) in Kenya. The focus of the ‘EDE: 
Second MTP 2013–2017’ is on building resilience to a wider set of shocks and stresses, not just 
climate risk (GoK-NDMA, 2014). Pastoral mobility is seen as a key drought-management strategy. 
Parallels can be drawn with the 2012 ‘ASAL Policy’ and the 2016 ICG Livestock Strategy, in that 
all three documents offer the kind of holistic analysis of challenges facing dryland communities 
that is lacking in the climate-specific policy documents reviewed earlier. According to the authors:  
The EDE reflects two significant changes in our understanding of drought emergencies in 
Kenya. The first is that they have their roots in poverty and vulnerability, and in the fact that 
Kenya’s drought-prone areas are also among those which have benefited least from investment 
in the past. The second is that drought emergencies are complex challenges, which can only be 
managed by strong and competent institutions, able to draw on new streams of finance as well 
as the skills and resources of all actors (GoK-NDMA, 2014: 9).  
While the plan acknowledges that “pastoralism remains the dominant production system in the 





“pastoral transformation” (ibid.: 22) is inevitable in light of climatic and other changes taking 
places in the drylands. Echoing concerns around land-alienation processes that have been discussed 
in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the EDE Plan refers to how: 
Processes of commercialisation and individualisation are widening the gap between wealthier 
and poorer households…pastoralism is also changing as a result of processes affecting the 
rangelands, including the disruption of traditional seasonal transhumance patterns, the 
expansion of community conservancies, the unchecked influx of people and livestock, and the 
spread of invasive species…new investment is beginning to drive an expansion of private-
sector activity in the region (ibid.: 22). 
While greater investment is advocated, the EDE Plan draws attention to the fact that:  
The EDE initiative is being introduced in Kenya at a time of significant change in governance 
and in the institutional arrangements for its delivery. Implementation of devolved governance 
will be lengthy and complex, particularly in arid and pastoral counties where institutional 
capacity is comparatively low and where the operating environment is more challenging (ibid.: 
42) 
A similar analysis of the complexities and uncertainties facing dryland inhabitants can be found in 
two follow-up documents – the EDE Common Programme Framework for Sustainable Livelihoods 
(GoK-MALF, 2014) and the EDE Common Programme Framework for Drought Risk Management 
(GoK-NDMA, 2014). Unlike the focus on ‘technical-fix’ type solutions that are characteristic of 
earlier climate-specific policies, greater emphasis is put on such areas as ‘improved governance of 
land tenure’; ‘development of community by-laws and reciprocal agreements between communities 
to manage access to land and water resources’; ‘programmes promoting the payment of 
environmental services’; and greater provision of ‘public goods and services’ – including ‘social 
protection for the most vulnerable’ (GoK-NDMA, 2014; GoK-MALF, 2014). Devolution, 
meanwhile, “presents significant opportunities for drought-risk management, for example in 
strengthening local voices in the design and implementation of national policies and in ensuring 
faster and more appropriate responses” (GoK-NDMA, 2014: 25). 
As with many of the Kenyan policies, there are conflicting messages on pastoralism to be found in 
the last of the documents analysed here: the National Land Use Policy (NLUP) (GoK-MLPP, 
2016). On the one hand, familiar environmental-crises narratives are reproduced: the ASAL are 
described as: “threatened by land fragmentation, resource conflicts, reduced productivity, 
desertification and sedentarisation, resulting in loss of livestock during droughts” (ibid.: 23). 
Conflict over access to resources around pastoral communities has “affected the utilization of land 
for food production in large areas raising the spectre of widespread hunger and food insecurity” 
(ibid.: 26). At the same time, the NLUP calls on the government to “recognize pastoralism as a 
legitimate land-use and production system by establishing suitable methods of defining and 
registering land-rights in pastoral areas while allowing pastoralists to maintain their unique land 





the sample that acknowledges the socio-cultural aspects of land and the relationship between 
indigenous people and their environment. The NLUP makes a number of positive recommendations 
for pastoral areas, including several that would fit within the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, 
mobile and green’ discourses described earlier.76  
In sum, the DA of Kenyan documents supports the findings of the CA: that there are mixed – and 
sometimes conflicting – messages about the sustainability of the pastoral way of life in the context 
of climatic and other changes. While crises narratives of ‘pastoralist vulnerability’, ‘resource 
conflict’ and ‘food insecurity’ are still central, and a ‘transforming pastoralism and pastoral areas’ 
discourse is still predominant overall, the analysis suggests that counternarratives, such as the need 
to protect pastoralist rights to critical resources, have begun to inform the policies and strategies of 
certain actors, notably those institutions whose mandates include pastoral area development and 
drought resilience. The higher levels of ‘interdiscursivity’ found within Kenyan policy documents 
– compared to their Ethiopian counterparts – is indicative perhaps of the more open and 
participatory nature of Kenyan policymaking in general (see Chapters 2 and 6), and the fact that a 
conducive policy space for pastoralists is considered to have opened up around the time of the 2012 
ASAL Policy (Elmi and Birch, 2013; Odhiambo, 2014). Higher interdiscursivity, as we have seen 
(Chapter 4), hints at the potential for great discursive and therefore positive socio-cultural change 
in the future (Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002). 
5.4 Conclusion 
The results of this analysis are broadly congruent with my hypothesis on selecting the two cases 
(see Section 4.3): that a ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ policy discourse would feature 
more strongly in Ethiopian policies and strategies than they do in Kenya. While there is clearly 
evidence of ‘new thinking’ around the inherent resilience and adaptive nature of pastoralism in 
both cases, the CA and DA confirm that a ‘transforming’ discourse remains dominant, if slightly 
less so in Kenya. Within this discourse, often simplistic and depoliticised crises narratives of 
‘unproductive and conflict-ridden’ drylands and ‘climate-induced pastoralist vulnerability’ remain 
to the fore. As others have noted (Scott, 1998; Roe, 1991; Krätli, 2013; Scoones. 2015), such 
simplifications are convenient for policymakers in that they help generate consensus and make 
action possible in the face of uncertainty. They also amplify the perception that some kind of 
‘intervention’ needs to take place, so opening up space for the state, or other actors, to claim 
stewardship over resources previously managed under customary institutions. If drylands are 
perceived – or deliberately framed – as somehow ‘empty’ or ‘unproductive’, then it follows that 
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conversion to other forms of land use – such as irrigated cropping, resource extraction or wildlife 
conservation – is justifiable.  
In both cases, it is apparent that the desire to ‘transform’, ‘commercialise’ and ‘integrate’ dryland 
resources and production – including the pastoralist economy – within a broader framework of 
national development, is being driven by an ideology of market-based economic growth and 
modernisation, notwithstanding a strong mediation role for the central state (especially in 
Ethiopia). The imperative of climate change, meanwhile, has provided a new language to 
policymakers to reframe growth as an opportunity to build a ‘green economy’ and to redefine the 
role of the state, as argued by Death (2016). By defining pastoralists as ‘vulnerable’ social groups 
whose ‘resilience’ needs to be enhanced – as many of the policies define them – pastoralists’ own 
agency and knowledge in how they respond to climatic and other change is somehow denied. 
From the textual analysis alone, it is not possible to determine the full extent to which discursive 
structures in Kenyan and Ethiopian policymaking “enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or 
challenge relations of power and dominance in society” (van Dijk, 2001: 353). Nevertheless, the 
analysis of certain policy documents reveals that there are indications that long-standing narratives 
of ‘fragile drylands’ and ‘pastoral vulnerability’ are being challenged (at least within certain state 
departments and agencies in Kenya), and that counternarratives built around the idea of ‘pastoralist 
resilience’ and ‘pastoralist rights’ are influencing the ways in which pastoralists are understood and 
portrayed. How long this will last, in light of the kind of rapid economic, political and demographic 
change underway in the drylands (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7), as well as recurrence of severe droughts 
affecting parts of Ethiopia and Kenya (EU/ECHO, 2017; Anyadike, 2019), remains to be seen.  
To what extent dominant discourses in the Kenyan and Ethiopian cases have contributed to positive 
pastoral outcomes, or whose interests and power has been served, cannot be determined from this 
textual analysis alone. Policies do not cause outcomes in a linear fashion. They interact with 
numerous other factors (Robinson and Crane, 2015; Scoones, 2015). There is a need therefore to 
look beyond the written texts analysed here, firstly to identify how different actor or interest groups 
form and affect policy outcomes through negotiation, bargaining and political competition (Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003) and, secondly, to look at the implications and consequences of policy outcomes 
















In the preceding chapter, I argued that a ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse remains dominant in 
both Ethiopian and Kenyan policy, although less pronounced in Kenya. Despite greater recognition 
of the inherent resilience and adaptive nature of pastoralism, crises narratives of ‘unproductive and 
conflict-ridden drylands’ and ‘climate-induced pastoralist vulnerability’ remain deeply embedded. 
These amplify the perception that some kind of intervention is necessary, or open up space for the 
state and other actors to claim stewardship over land and resources previously managed under 
customary institutions. The purpose of this chapter is to uncover which actors, actor networks and 
institutions are driving these, or different, policy discourses and narratives, and why they hold the 
positions they do. This is done through an analysis of the different discourses and narratives as 
expressed by interviewees, employing NVivo software.77  
I begin this chapter with an overview of the importance of different framings and narratives across 
different actors, before going on to examine these in more detail for each case. Table 6.1 provides a 
summary of the number of references (sentences or paragraphs coded from the interview 
transcripts) for each actor type that explicitly matches an assumption or narrative in line with one 
of the three discourses on pastoralism identified in Chapter 3 (an additional layer of coding to the 
open and axial coding described in Chapter 4), so providing a basis for analysis of actors and their 
narratives.  Figures 6.1 and 6.2 display the same data in a separate set of bar charts for each 
country, giving a clearer sense of the overall pattern. While the NVivo coding by actor type is 
limited, in that it misses important contextual background, and the results would have undoubtedly 
been different should additional informants have been interviewed (more local-government 
officials in both cases, for example) it is useful nonetheless in providing an overview of the relative 
importance of different framings and narratives across the different categories of informants who 
participated in this research. Of the original nine categories of actor identified earlier (Table 4.4), 
several are grouped together here as they share similar characteristics and, as we shall discover, 
broadly similar standpoints: INGOs and international researchers, including UN agency staff, for 
example. 
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ETHIOPIA      
State actors (7) 5 (13%) 22 (56%) 12 (31%) 39 




(13) 47 (51%) 11 (12%) 35 (37%) 93 
Local researchers (6) 9 (43%) 4 (19%) 8 (38%) 21 
Pastoralist 
organisations 
(2) 16 (73%) 4 (18%) 2 (9%) 22 
totals (32) 80  49 65 194 
KENYA      
State actors  (7) 7 (20%) 11 (31%) 17 (49%) 35 




(16) 24 (32%) 9 (12%) 41 (56%) 74 




(7) 19 (79%) 2 (8%) 3 (13%) 24 


















Figure 6.1: Breakdown of each actor categories’ discourses (Ethiopia) 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Breakdown of each actor categories’ discourses (Kenya) 
 
 
The interview findings reveal that there is a marked difference in how the state actors interviewed 
in Ethiopia and Kenya frame contemporary challenges facing pastoralists and what responses are 
needed. In Ethiopia, as Figure 6.1 illustrates, it is evident that a ‘transforming pastoralism and 
drylands’ discourse is predominant among state actors interviewed (56% of references for this 
category), matching the dominant discourse found in the CA and DA of Ethiopian policy 
























































































narratives of vulnerability and the causes of conflict, along with technocratic and managerial 
solutions, are at the fore among this group. This finding notwithstanding, Ethiopian state actors 
have clearly absorbed – or co-opted – many of the metaphors and narratives associated with a 
‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse (31% of references for this category), as they seek to 
mobilise resources around common goals of climate resilience and economic growth. Interestingly, 
the dominant narratives among state actors interviewed in Kenya (Figure 6.2) are those closer to a 
‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse (49% of references), while still retaining significant 
perspectives matching a ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse (31%). While this finding stands out 
in contrast to the findings of the CA of Kenyan policies (Chapter 5) – where a ‘transforming 
pastoralism’ was more dominant – it does match the higher levels of interdiscursivity (compared to 
Ethiopia) uncovered from the DA of Kenyan policies. It is also explained by the fact that 
government officials in Kenya who did agree to be interviewed are likely to be more favourably 
disposed towards pastoralist development. 
While there are some differences, non-state actors across both cases – particularly INGOs, 
researchers and pastoralist representatives – share many similar framings. Table 6.1 illustrates that, 
amongst these actors, the ‘pure pastoralist’ and ‘modern and mobile and green’ discourses are 
prominent: accounting, in the case of Ethiopia, for 51% and 37% respectively of the INGO and 
international researcher category references, and as high as 73% of references matching the ‘pure 
pastoralist’ discourse in the pastoralist organisation (PO) category. For the Kenyan INGO and 
international researcher category, as high as 56% of references match a ‘modern, mobile and green’ 
discourse, with a further 32% matching the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse. Unsurprisingly, 79% of 
Kenyan PO and local CSO references match a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse. Meanwhile, donor 
officials interviewed in Ethiopia hold some views that are closer to a government position – 
stressing the need for a more commercially orientated form of pastoralism, for example – matching 
the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse (accounting for 42% of references for this category), 
while at the same time recognising the value of mobility and calling for improved governance in 
pastoral areas, reflective of the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses (16% 
and 42% respectively). 
It is important, nonetheless, to acknowledge gaps in the data. In Kenya, I was unable to interview 
anyone from a donor or bilateral aid agency, despite these agencies’ importance as policy actors. 
Hence we do not get a sense of what discourses and narratives are being promulgated by donors in 
Kenya, other than what other actors have to say about them. It also proved difficult to secure 
interviews with officials from certain relevant government departments in Kenya, such as those 
responsible for irrigation or renewable energy, who may have offered a different perspective. 
Responses were likely to have been different should more regional and sub-regional (Ethiopia) and 





On the strength of these findings, I argue that the state is clearly the dominant actor driving 
national policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the 
influence of donors, of UN agencies and – to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and 
individual researchers on shaping current narratives and bringing certain elements of the ‘modern, 
mobile and green’ discourse to debates on pastoralism, is also evident. In Kenya, in contrast, the 
findings are less clearcut: while a ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse is dominant in most Kenyan 
policy documents analysed, the findings of interviews reveal that interaction between state and 
non-state actors has made a deeper impression than in Ethiopia. Local and international 
researchers, donors, certain CSOs and even certain individuals within government form a 
‘discursive coalition’ (Hajer, 2005) of like-minded actors who have evidently brought about a more 
substantive change in understandings of pastoralism (compared to Ethiopia), at least within some 
policy circles. This shift is reflected in the standpoints of those Kenyan government officials 
interviewed for this research (as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate), if not necessarily in all areas 
of written policy (as Chapter 5 reveals) or in all areas of policy implementation (as we shall 
discover in Chapter 7). The findings support the assertion that narratives shift to suit the needs of 
actors as new opportunities and contexts arise (Otto-Naess et al., 2015; Whitfield, 2016) – the 
process of devolution and the rapid development of Kenya’s ASAL counties or the promotion of a 
‘climate resilient green economy’ in Ethiopia being cases in point.  
I further argue, reiterating what has been observed in Chapter 5, that – while the language of 
‘resilience’, ‘the green economy’ and ‘climate smart’ may have moved centre stage – the 
‘transformation’ and integration of what were once peripheral areas into the national economy, and 
by default, the transformation of pastoral production towards a more commercial and diversified 
orientation, remains the primary interest of policymakers in both countries, despite differences in 
the policy and political landscapes.  
Here, as in the previous chapter, the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya are taken separately, examining 
the principle state and non-state actors, and their associated discourses, narratives and interests, in 
each case respectively. A final concluding section summarises key issues while comparing and 
contrasting the discourses and agency of actors across the two countries. 
6.2 Policy actors in Ethiopia 
This section examines the principle actors driving policy processes around climate change and 
pastoral area development in Ethiopia, and their associated discourses, narratives and interests. 
Each actor category (Table 6.1) is taken separately. The findings reveal that the state is the 
dominant actor driving national policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia, 
with a very clear policy agenda in mind – the transformation of Ethiopia’s drylands for the 





lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and individual researchers on state actors’ current 
narratives, bringing elements of the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse into debates on the 
future of pastoralism, is also evident.  
6.2.1 Ethiopian state actor discourses, narratives and interests 
As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, a ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ discourse is 
predominant among government officials interviewed (56% of references for this category), 
matching the dominant discourse found in the CA and DA of Ethiopian policy documents in 
Chapter 5. It is important to clarify that the ‘state’ in Ethiopia includes multiple ministries and 
agencies with different mandates and activities. There is often duplication in terms of concerns and 
priorities – especially with regard to pastoral development (FDRE-MoFPDA, 2018). Relevant 
ministries include: the Ministry of Environment, Forests and Climate Change (MoEFCC), which 
acts as the national focal point for the UNFCCC and which coordinate the CRGE,78 the National 
Adaptation Plan (NAP) and other climate policies; the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Cooperation (MoFEC), which hosts the national CRGE Climate Finance Facility79; the Ministry 
for Water, Irrigation and Electricity (MWIE), which holds the remit for water development and 
energy; the Ministry of Federal and Pastoralist Development Affairs (MoFPDA),80 which is the 
coordinator of development activities in the predominantly pastoral Regional States of Afar, 
Somali, Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, and which was given the mandate to develop a new 
Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy; and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), responsible for 
agricultural and livestock development and the lead national agency for the IGAD EDE programme 
in Ethiopia. As we saw in earlier chapters, policymaking in Ethiopia has, for the main part, been 
highly centralised, a view endorsed by several (non-state) interviewees.81 The situation is made 
more complex by the Regional States’ administrative structure that nominally devolves a certain 
amount of power and decision-making to the regional and sub-regional (Woreda) levels. While the 
regions are obliged to abide and follow national policy, they also have the power to formulate their 
own policies and legislation.82  
For the purposes of this research, six interviews were conducted with federal government officials 
in Ethiopia: three from the MoEFCC, two from the MoA and one from the MoFPDA. In addition, 
                                                        
78 Climate Resilient Green Economy (see Chapter 5). 
79 The MoFEC has recently sought accreditation with the global Green Climate Fund (GCF) and will be the conduit for 
channelling international climate finance into national climate investments. 
80 In late 2018, the MoFPDA was renamed the ‘Ministry for Peace’, reflective perhaps of a shift away from the special 
attention given by the GoE to pastoral areas since 2015 (when the Ministry had its mandate extended to ‘Pastoral 
Development’) towards greater focus on security at a time of political instability. 
81 Skype interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/208; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: 
INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 2, 24/05/2018; donor 
official 3, 30/05/2018. 





one interview was held with an official from the Oromia Pastoralist Area Development 
Commission, a Regional State institution.  
Reflective of the kinds of naturalistic and largely depoliticised framings of resource conflict that 
were a characteristic of most Ethiopian policies analysed in Chapter 5, state officials highlighted 
the effects of climate change,83 degradation and declining productivity of rangeland resources84, 
inter-community conflict85 and pastoralists’ cultural resistance to modernisation86 as barriers to 
pastoral development. Pastoralist mobility is essentially seen as a fixed ‘coping strategy’ that is no 
longer sufficient for dealing with the uncertainties brought about by climate change and shrinking 
rangelands,87 with pastoralists becoming “dependent on government interventions”,88 or exiting 
pastoralism altogether. Competition for natural resources such as water and pasture, within a 
context of growing numbers of people and livestock, is deemed a primary driver of conflict in 
pastoral areas,89 echoing the kinds of Malthusian narratives of population and poverty that have 
informed attitudes towards Africa’s drylands in the past (see Chapter 2). According to one official:  
Because of climate change, pastoralism is not working. It’s not working because there are 
also conflicts. The Ilemi Triangle90 is a conflict-prone area, and the conflict comes from the 
dwindling resources. Climate change is aggravating this. This restricts pastoralists’ 
movement.91  
Another spoke of the pressure put on frontier areas’ pasture and water by an influx of people from 
neighbouring countries displaced by climate change and conflict.92 Arguably, such naturalistic 
framings of the causes of conflict obscure the many and complex factors that are behind an upsurge 
in inter-group clashes in Ethiopia in 2018 and 2019 (Burke, 2017; Lefort and Tronval, 2019).93  
As we have seen in earlier chapters, ‘environmental-crises’ and ‘resource-scarcity’ narratives 
(Krätli and Enson, 2013; Scoones et al., 2019) are frequently evoked to amplify the perception that 
some kind of intervention or ‘solution’ is necessary. There was consensus amongst officials 
                                                        
83 Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian 
local government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 
22/05/2018. 
84 Interview with Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018.  
85 Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.  
86 Interviews with: Ethiopian local government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018. 
87 Interviews with: Government official 2, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian local 
government official 1, 25/05/2018.  
88 Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018. 
89 Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; donor 
official 4, 29/05/2018. 
90 The Ilemi Triangle is a predominantly pastoralist and agropastoralists territory of about 14,000 square km in the 
southeast of Ethiopia whose ownership is disputed by the neighbouring countries of Ethiopia, Kenya, South Sudan and 
Uganda. 
91 Interview with Ethiopian government official 4, 29/05/2018. 
92 Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018 
93 Despite PM Abiy Ahmed's reform process underway since 2018, ethnic-based conflicts persist in several parts of 
Ethiopia, most notably along the border between Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz regions, and across Ethiopia's 






interviewed that there is a need to “build the resilience” of pastoralists in the face of drought and 
other ‘shocks’.94 Their respective Ministries, they asserted, were working hard to provide key 
infrastructure and social services, water development, improved rangeland management and 
improved marketing of livestock.95 For these informants, such interventions are not only a means to 
develop the hitherto untapped potential of Ethiopia’s lowlands, but also a precursor to the creation 
of “climate-resilient livelihoods”.96 ‘Resilience’, according to one official, provides an integrative 
conceptual framework that allows the different sectors in Ethiopia to work towards a common 
goal.97 Referring to the new Pastoral Development Policy, one official asserted that: “The whole 
idea of the (new) policy framework and strategic thinking is to create resilient 
pastoralism…resilience in terms of diversified livelihoods.’98 
As was evident from the CA and DA of Ethiopian policies (Chapter 5), and reaffirmed by several 
officials interviewed, climate-adaptation policy puts the same discursive emphasis on natural 
hazards like drought, and the need to build ‘climate resilience’ as a means of mobilising consensus 
and the support of development partners. The assumption that pastoralist and small-farmer 
‘autonomous adaptation’ is no longer sufficient to deal with the enormity of climate change implies 
that there is a need instead for deliberate policy decisions and planned actions on the part of state 
agencies. The objectives of the latest Adaptation Plan are, according to one official: 
“building resilience and adaptive capacity, and integrating the adaptations into existing policies, 
government policies, strategies, as well as projects and programmes.”99  
The view that settlement in one place means formerly marginalised pastoralists could avail of better 
services, and avoid the worst affects of climate-induced drought (matching a similar narrative 
identified within policies analysed) was expressed by most officials100 – suggesting that 
‘transforming pastoralists’ into agropastoralists still remains the predominant discourse at the heart 
of Ethiopian government policy towards pastoral areas. While this discourse predates concerns 
about climate change, the ‘climate-resilience’ and climate-adaptation interventions described thus 
far have clearly been absorbed by the transforming discourse. This supports the thesis that 
narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities arise and new contexts unfold (Otto-
Naess et al., 2015; Whitfield, 2016).  
                                                        
94 Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian 
government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018.  
95 Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian 
government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 1, 
22/05/2018. 
96 Interviews with: Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian 
government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 1, 
22/05/2018. 
97 Interview with Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018. 
98 Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.  
99 Interview with Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018.  
100 Interviews with: Regional (AU) official 7/03/2018; Ethiopian government official 1, 22/05/2018; Ethiopian 
government officith al 3, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 6, 





The argument that pastoralists need to adopt ‘market-based approaches’, develop livestock ‘value 
chains’ and/or start to ‘diversify livelihoods’ was made by several officials101 – again matching the 
dominant ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse. According to one: 
There is a huge potential of surface and ground water there that can be used to irrigate 
drylands. Not only for diversification, but highly commercialised pastoralism…they can 
increase the production and productivity of their livestock for market, even for the 
international market.102 
As highlighted by several officials,103 the argument to reduce livestock numbers, and so reduce 
GHG emissions, is given further impetus by the strong commitment of Ethiopia to meet its Paris 
Agreement targets104 – an example of where global narratives around livestock’s contribution to 
global warming (Gerber et al., 2013; Willet et al., 2019) are being translated into policymaking at 
the national level. As we have seen in earlier chapters (Chapters 2 and 3) the new (post COP 21 
Paris Agreement) global political consensus to tackle climate change offers potential to attract 
international climate finance for ‘resilience building’ (Joseph, 2014), carbon sequestration (FAO 
2013; McGahey et al., 2014; Dabasso et al., 2014), ‘climate smart agriculture’ (FAO, 2013), 
biodiversity protection and ‘green economic growth’. Amongst African nations, Ethiopia has been 
a front-runner in embracing – and to some extent shaping - this new green agenda (Death, 2016; 
Redda and Roland, 2016).  The consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralism are 
explored in Chapter 7. 
Despite the persistence of the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse amongst officials interviewed, 
there was evidence of a shift in rhetoric. A senior official made the case: 
Ten or twenty years ago, in terms of pastoralism, the thinking was you assumed those 
pastoralist areas as a sort of a burden for the nation...whenever you talk about pastoral 
areas you think in terms of conflict, in terms of vulnerability, in terms of drought. Now we 
are at a point where the paradigm has changed...So let’s start from the potential, not from 
the problem of vulnerability.105 
For prominent state actors, such as the MoFPDA, partnership with other Ministries, with donors, 
with drylands ‘experts’, as well as with pastoralist leaders and CSOs like the Pastoralist Forum 
Ethiopia (through such fora as the Ethiopian Pastoralist Day) adds a layer of credibility to their 
policy initiatives. It is likely, furthermore, that the potential to attract substantive World Bank 
funding was a contributory factor when developing the new Pastoral Development Policy.106 
                                                        
101 Interviews with: Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018; 
Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018. 
102 Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018. 
103 Interviews with: Ethiopian local government official 1, 25/05/2018; Ethiopian government official 5, 30/05/2018; 
Ethiopian government official 6, 30/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018.  
104 Ethiopia has pledged a net GHG emissions reduction of 64% from ‘business as usual’ by 2030, as set out its NDCs 
and GES – both reviewed in Chapter 5. 
105 Interview with Ethiopian government official 3, 25/05/2018.  
106 In 2019, the World Bank approved $350 million in the form of concessional credit and grants for a major ‘Lowlands 





Stakeholder consultations satisfy the concerns of international donors, even if rarely – according to 
several non-state informants – they reach out beyond a select group.107 Policy priorities would also 
appear to be informed by what donors are keen on funding at this point in time – namely: anything 
that ‘builds resilience’. Nonetheless, for one official, the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) is not 
overly influenced by external actor priorities, even if they appear to adopt those actors’ narratives:  
Actually our government is not influenced by that one…They will take what they believe fits 
their vision…The intention is really more administrative, is it about governing the people in 
the pastoralist areas…areas bordering other countries and prone to conflict…And what they 
consider available land happens to be in the pastoral areas. The big rivers that cross the 
pastoralist areas are seen as offering irrigation potential...the government’s desire is to 
develop those areas.108 
For one non-state interviewee, while the policy rhetoric may talk of ‘resilience’ and ‘climate 
smart’, the motivations and interests of powerful actors (the state and private investors) in terms of 
accessing new funds and knowledge around the green economy remain the same.109 The pastoral 
lowlands of Ethiopia are being targeted – not for what they can bring to pastoralists, but rather as a 
‘new frontier’ for investment and as means of extending state control and security to border 
areas.110 Similarly, one INGO informant asserted that the government regards pastoral areas as: 
“potentially untapped resources. They are really looking at how they can accelerate development 
of those areas…but not necessarily with the pastoralist communities at the centre of that 
thinking.”111  
In sum, while pastoralism may no longer be considered by state actors as ‘backward’, or the 
antithesis to the modern state, to the extent it was in the past (see Chapter 2), and the language of 
‘resilience’ has clearly been adopted as a means to rationalise government-mediated development 
interventions – this research finds that ‘transforming pastoralism and the drylands’ for the purposes 
of economic growth remains the dominant discourse amongst GoE officials interviewed. This 
would suggest that state actors are the prominent force shaping the kinds of discourse and 
narratives found in Ethiopian national policies analysed. Dovetailing with the interests of donors 
and other development actors, ‘building resilience’ is a convenient means of mobilising support for 
such a vision. 
                                                                                                                                                                        
MoFPDA). See: http://www.mofed.gov.et/hi/web/guest/-/ethiopia-signs-financing-agreement-with-the-world-bank 
(Accessed, 07/07/2020).  
107 Interviews with: Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; INGO staff member 3, 17/05/2018; Skype interview with 
international researcher 2, 11/05/2018. 
108 Interview with Ethiopian government official 2, 22/05/2018 
109 Skype Interview with international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.  
110 Skype Interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018.  





6.2.2 Donors’ discourses, narratives and interests (Ethiopia) 
As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, donor officials interviewed in Ethiopia hold some views that 
are closer to a government position – arguing, for example, for more commercially orientated 
pastoralism – matching the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse (42% of references for this 
category), while at the same time recognising the value of mobility and calling for security of land 
tenure in pastoral areas – reflective of the ‘modern, mobile and green’ and ‘pure pastoralism’ 
discourses (16% and 42% respectively).  
Multiple multilateral and bilateral donors have invested heavily in pastoral development, climate 
resilience and agricultural programmes and projects in Ethiopia’s lowlands (Gebremeskel et al., 
2019). Appendix G provides an indicative list of recent and/or current donor programmes and 
initiatives in Ethiopia that have a strong resilience focus. Funding is channelled through federal 
government ministries, or through various state-INGO partnerships and consortiums, such as 
PRIME112 or BRACED113, which in turn implement projects in collaboration with local 
government.114 Funding is also sourced from multilateral climate-finance mechanisms such as the 
UNFCCC AF, the GCF or through regional (IGAD) ‘drought resilience’ type initiatives. As part of 
the fieldwork, interviews were conducted with four donor and/or bilateral aid organisation staff in 
Ethiopia, one from USAID, one from GIZ and two from the World Bank. 
Asked about the kinds of challenges facing pastoralism, donor informants generally shared the 
same kinds of basic assumptions about cause and effect relationships as government officials. 
According to one donor staff: “the more the resources are shrinking, the more people will get into 
conflict because of resource scarcity.”115 Pastoralists’ “coping capacity was diminishing” in the 
face of climate change.116 Apportioning some share of blame for pastoralist vulnerability to 
pastoralists themselves, one donor official asserted that rangeland resources are under pressure, not 
only because of drought, but because: “People do not really give attention to resource management 
or take care of resources such as water and pastures.”117 
There were, nonetheless, some differences in how issues were framed. Donor representatives were 
more likely than government officials to acknowledge gaps in policy coherence and policy 
implementation. Several drew attention to the increased trend of privatisation, and subsequent 
fragmentation of formerly communal lands, and the lack of clear land-use policies, either at federal 
                                                        
112 PRIME (Pastoralist Areas Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion), a USAID-funded, $US70 million, 
five-year project led by Mercy Corps and Care Ethiopia. See: https://www.prime-ethiopia.org/ (Accessed, 07/07/2020). 
113 BRACED (Building Resilience to Climate Extremes and Disasters). See: http://www.braced.org/news/i/in-ethiopia-
climate-change-leads-herders-to-retrain-as-farmers/ (Accessed, 07/07/2020). 
114 Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018. 
115 Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018. 
116 Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.  





or regional level.118 Reflective of the kind of narratives found in the ‘pure pastoralism’, and 
‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses that emphasise restrictions on mobility as a key constraint, 
and improved governance of pastoral rangelands as a solution, one official asserted: 
(X: name of agency withheld) aims to influence government to understand the importance of 
mobile pastoralism – for many years considered unproductive and backward…the 
Government needs to recognise the importance of mobility and customary institutions and 
move away from any enforced villagisation. Local land-use plans would help, as would an 
overarching land-use policy.119  
The challenge was how to make ‘mega-projects’ (dams and irrigation schemes) “more pastoralist 
friendly.”120 According to one official, pastoralists could benefit from irrigated land “set aside for 
growing pasture” and from “out-grower schemes.”121 There is an assumption – shared with 
government officials – that incorporating pastoralists into the market economy and generating cash 
income were necessary for pastoralists to adapt to climate change: 
Transformation is not just changing pastoralists to agrarians. But improving their 
production system…The two (mobility and commercialisation) are actually compatible. 
Those people who stay in the system are going to benefit from the market, from the demand 
for livestock. So the system will continue to grow, but with commercialisation.”122 
Donors interviewed see their role as an enabling one, building capacity and facilitating progressive 
policy change, primarily working through various inter-governmental and inter-agency working 
groups and technical committees.123 According to one donor official: 
Building resilience is our primary goal – creating more self-sufficiency in pastoral areas, 
economic empowerment, equitable development, gender equality.124  
While not claiming to have any direct input to state policy, the influence of donors on shaping the 
current resilience narrative, and bringing elements of a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse to 
debates on the future of pastoralism in Ethiopia, is significant. From interviews with donor 
officials, it is evident that they, in turn, have been informed by the work of research organisations 
and drylands scholars. The myriad of resilience-building initiatives and programmes currently 
being rolled out in Ethiopia (Appendix G) suggests something of a paradigm shift in terms of the 
thinking around pastoralism amongst donors and their allies (within and outside government) – 
away from an earlier narrative (see Chapter 2) that views pastoralists ‘as part of the problem’ to 
one instead that regards pastoralism, and pastoral areas, as ‘part of the solution’.  
                                                        
118 Interviews with: donor official 1, 29/05/2018; donor official 4, 26/05/2018; donor official 3, 30/05/2018. 
119 Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018. 
120 Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018. 
121 Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018.  
122 Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018. 
123 Interview with donor official 1, 29/05/2018. 





Basically, the biggest policy agenda that’s being pushed by almost all development partners is 
the issue of accepting pastoralism as a livelihood strategy. To exploit the potential in the 
drylands.125 
It was noted that the World Bank and USAID have been strong supporters of the Pastoral 
Development Policy and Strategy and in bringing different stakeholders together.126 Arguably, by 
exerting their authority, financial leverage and influence over government policies in subtle ways – 
through, for example, various ‘working groups’ and ‘technical committees’ - absolves them from 
any responsibility for interventions in pastoral areas that do not work out as planned.  
In sum, we find mixed messages emanating from donors. While making calls for smaller herd size, 
further commercialisation and adoption of ‘climate-smart’ solutions, there is also recognition of 
pastoralism as a proven adaptive strategy suited to dryland areas, and of the need to protect 
mobility and improve rangeland governance. Undoubtedly, as keen advocates of resilience 
frameworks and market-led approaches, and with the kind of power and influence that substantial 
resources can bring, it is reasonable to infer that donors are a significant actor shaping Ethiopian 
policy narratives. Alongside the desire for greater market liberalisation and climate resilience, 
donors’ interests in Ethiopia would appear to be primarily one of promoting ‘good governance’ – in 
terms of not only land-use policy and the administration of development assistance, as we have 
seen above, but also greater accountability of the Ethiopian political system more generally. This is 
done primarily through providing funding and expertise through various public–private 
partnerships and consortia, capacity building and technical support – all forms of ‘soft power’ or 
‘governmentality at a distance’ (Joseph, 2014: 287). 
6.2.3 INGOs’ and international researchers’ discourses, narratives and interests (Ethiopia) 
As there was a great deal of discursive commonality within the views of INGO staff and 
international researchers interviewed, I have grouped them together as one actor category here. A 
number of prominent INGOs are working on pastoralist development projects and programmes in 
Ethiopia – usually in partnership with government agencies, or through consortiums such as 
PRIME or BRACED. There are also several international multilateral agencies focused on 
agriculture who have strong presence in Ethiopia, including the International Fund for African 
Development (IFAD), the FAO and the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI).  
Table 6.1 reveals that INGO staff and international researchers interviewed in Ethiopia – 
accounting for the highest number of references coded for any category – generally held views that 
are best interpreted as matching the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses 
(51%, and 37% respectively). When compared to the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse that is 
                                                        
125 Interview with donor official 2, 23/05/2018. 
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dominant in the written policy (Chapter 5), this would appear to indicate that INGOs and 
international researchers, while having some input, have nowhere near the level of influence the 
state, or even donors, do in shaping policy narratives. This is no surprise when we consider that, for 
many years, INGOs and CSOs were severely restricted from engaging in rights-based or advocacy 
work under the Charities and Civil Society Proclamation127 and, as a consequence, have been 
reluctant to challenge mainstream narratives (around, for example, villagisation) for fear of 
government reprobation.128 INGO and CSOs that support pastoralists, have nonetheless sought to 
influence policy discourse by other means – by cultivating contacts with key individuals within 
government ministries and state agencies,129 by using their wider contacts to influence policy at 
regional (HoA and the AU) level130 or as members of international pastoralist advocacy networks 
such as CELEP.  
For the purposes of this research, interviews were conducted with seven INGO staff: two from 
Mercy Corps and one from each of: Care Ethiopia, SOS Sahel, Danish Church Aid, Misereor and 
Christian Aid. In addition, interviews were held with six international researchers whose work is 
closely focused on pastoral area development: one working with ILRI, one with Tufts University, 
one with the AU, one currently freelance and two with the FAO-UN. 
INGO staff and international researchers interviewed were cognisant of the hardships caused by 
recurrent drought, but several felt there is still too much uncertainty around how rainfall patterns 
are changing to reach definitive conclusions about future impacts.131 While climate change brings 
another layer of uncertainty, there are equally pressing challenges facing the drylands, notably 
inappropriate government policy and poor governance of pastoral areas.132 State institutions were 
portrayed as ‘lacking capacity’133 or as facilitating land-grabs and ‘mega projects’ that restrict 
mobility and access to seasonal resources,134 while pastoralists’ adaptive capacity and way of life is 
being steadily undermined135 – narratives generally not found within the official policy documents 
analysed in Chapter 5, but prominent in the relevant academic literature (Chapter 2). In line with 
the kind of critical perspectives of government policy found in a ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse, 
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128 Interviews with: INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; PO representative 1, 17/05/2018;  
129 Interviews with: INGO staff member 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 8, 31/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; 
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130 Interview with INGO staff 5, 21/05/2018. 
131 Interviews with: international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; international 
researcher 3, 14/05/2018.  
132 Interviews with: international researcher 1, 1/04/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 
17/05/2018. 
133 Interviews with: INGO staff, 1, 15/05/2018; UN agency official 1, 16/05/2018. 
134 Interview with INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018. 
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15/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 31/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; UN agency official 2, 16/05/2018; 






described in earlier chapters, one INGO staff member asserted that, within policymaking, there was 
little “understanding of how pastoralist area dryland systems and ecologies work.”136 In contrast, 
one international researcher felt that the development of the new Pastoral Development Policy had 
opened up a space for the GoE to “think more positively, more rationally, about pastoralism and 
development.”137  
According to these informants, pastoralists have shown that they are capable of adapting and 
innovating in the face of change. Pastoralists are taking advantage of new market opportunities and 
technologies, such as the use of mobile phones, mobile money and trucks to transport livestock.138 
Instead of calling for reduced livestock emissions, these actors advocate instead for recognition of 
the critical role pastoral systems play in maintaining rangeland ecosystems, meeting food security 
needs and offering an adaptive land-use system in the face of climate uncertainty.139 A number of 
INGO informants and researchers believe responses to climate change offer the potential for 
pastoralists and pastoral areas to benefit from ‘carbon sequestration’ and ‘payment for ecosystem 
services’ (PES) type schemes140 and ‘climate-smart’ livestock production141, a similar narrative 
thread to that promulgated by several donor informants.  
In sum, there is a great deal of discursive commonality amongst INGO staff and international 
researchers interviewed: rejecting apolitical ‘environmental-crises’ framings and recognising 
instead the broader context of change in pastoral areas. They are calling for stronger resource rights 
and less restrictions on mobility, and highlighting that pastoralists are already innovating and 
engaged in markets – all narratives closer to the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ 
discourses, identified earlier. The extent, however, to which these actors’ narratives have informed 
actual policy still remains limited, as Chapter 5 has revealed. The reasons for this evidently lie in 
the top-down nature or Ethiopian policymaking in general, and the aforementioned Charities and 
Civil Society Proclamation. According to one INGO interviewee: “…it’s ok to talk about 
delivering services in pastoral areas, but not rights.”142 For another:  
 I would say we are rarely invited to give our view. It is more a matter of…trying to 
facilitate…point out something that you could assist them with. And then trying to work it out 
from that angle…These are very sensitive topics. These are not freely discussed 
areas….land-use, especially.143  
                                                        
136 Interview with INGO staff 3, 17/05/2018. 
137 Interview with international researcher 3, 14/05/2018. 
138 Interviews with: international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; UN agency official 2, 16/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018. 
139 Interviews with: international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; international researcher 3, 14/05/2018; Ethiopian PO 
representative 1, 7/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; INGO staff 4, 17/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 
23/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018. 
140 Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 5, 30/05/2018.  
141 Interviews with: UN agency official 1, 16/05/2018; INGO staff 5, 21/05/2018. 
142 Interviews with: INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018 





Regarding INGO and international researchers’ interests in Ethiopia, interviewees were reticent 
about their own organisations’ agendas, beyond stating that they were motivated by the desire to 
improve the status and livelihoods of the pastoralist communities with whom they work, and to 
bring about greater recognition of pastoralism as a legitimate land-use system.144 Several INGO 
respondents expressed enthusiasm to be included in donor-funded partnerships and consortia, such 
as the aforementioned PRIME and BRACED programmes.145 This appears to offer them the 
necessary legitimacy to operate within the constraints set by the Charities and Civil Society 
Proclamation, and perhaps to have some influence over policy discourse through non-adversarial 
means, as well as to secure necessary funds for their programmes. Speaking about his 
organisation’s involvement with BRACED, one INGO interviewee stressed: “what we are doing as 
a strategy is to engage positively with government sectors so that government sectors themselves 
can really understand the benefit of what we are saying, and then they make it their own 
agenda.”146 For another: “relationships between government and NGOs are under quite a lot of 
strain at the moment, but ultimately, as an INGO, we are here to support the government’s 
vision.”147 
6.2.4 Ethiopian local researchers’ discourses, narratives and interests  
The perspectives of local researchers interviewed in Ethiopia were similar to those of INGO and 
international researchers above, indicating that – along with several pastoralist organisations – 
there exists a loose (and fluid) coalition of like-minded actors in Ethiopia, who endeavour to bring 
‘new thinking’ on pastoralism into policymaking processes. Yet, as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 
illustrate, where a high percentage of references for this actor category are coded as matching either 
the ‘pure pastoralism’ (43%) or ‘modern, mobile and green’ (38%) discourses, it is evident that 
local researchers are among those actors with only limited influence over the kinds of discourses 
and narratives that appear in written policy – where the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse is 
dominant – or in turn, the kinds of interventions being prioritised by the state. 
It is beyond the scope of this study to document the full spectrum of individuals and institutions 
producing research on climate change, drylands agriculture, livestock and/or pastoral development 
issues in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning research institutions such as the Institute of 
Pastoral and Agropastoral Studies, Haramaya University (HU), and the College of Drylands 
Agriculture, Mekelle University (MU), both of which have close links with key government 
ministries such as the MoFPDA and the MoA, as well as international research partnerships. 
Another prominent institution is the Drylands Research Directorate within the Ethiopian Institute 
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145 Interviews with: INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; INGO staff, 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 31/05/2018. 
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for Agricultural Research (EIAR). For the purposes of this research, six local researchers and/or 
consultants with expertise in drylands development and/or pastoralism were interviewed. Of these: 
one worked for the EIAR, one for the International Centre of Insect Physiology and 
Ecology (ICIPE)148, one for Tufts University, one for ILRI and two who are freelance.  
Local researchers highlighted similar challenges facing pastoral areas to their international 
researcher colleagues above: Pastoral resources are being lost, they asserted, as former rangelands 
are converted to other forms of land use.149 There is growing disparity between rich and poor 
livestock owners.150 As natural hazards become more frequent, pastoralists have little time to 
recover and face destitution as a result151. Those who ‘drop out’ were “contributing in some ways 
to the destruction of the ecology, because they have to produce charcoal, firewood, whatever, in 
order to make a living.”152 For some, the scale of change taking place was such that it is 
questionable whether a ‘traditional form of pastoralism’ would remain viable in the future.153 For 
several local researchers, pastoralists’ customary resource management systems have been eroded 
by the government’s strict administrative delineation of pastoral areas, based on the Woreda and 
Kebele type of division.154 Local researchers – like their international counterparts – were also 
critical of sedentarisation and infrastructure development in critical agroecological zones: 
 …settlement, those big projects, they are taking away the prime grazing and watering 
sources…if you take away that key resource, there is no way you can utilise the marginal 
resource efficiently...155  
Contradicting the government view that livestock emissions are a problem, one researcher asserted 
that: “Recent research indicates that extensive livestock keeping on rangelands is good for helping 
to store carbon emissions into the soil.”156 By assuming cattle are responsible for degradation and 
GHG emissions, the CRGE, according to another, failed to take account of the “food-security 
contribution of livestock…poultry may not be an appropriate for everybody, especially in the arid 
areas. Camels, smaller livestock, such as sheep and goats are more suitable for dry areas.”157  
Ethiopian researchers’ standpoints are likely to be shaped not only by their personal research 
interests and the particular focus of their institutions, but also by their exposure to other research 
from local and international sources, and from the collaborative nature of their work (often with 
international partners). Such collaborations are likely to add status and legitimacy to their research, 
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as well as offer an important source of funding. Several university departments, as we saw above, 
have close links with the MoFPDA and the MoA, in which case, certain research projects are likely 
to be driven by those Ministries’ interests and priorities. Like their CSO colleagues, Ethiopian local 
researchers are also likely to have been circumspect in what they write or say in recent years, 
fearing state censure and/or loss of state support. One international researcher, nonetheless, felt that 
certain: 
…senior, experienced, Ethiopian individuals, who may be academics, may be private 
consultants, who are consulted by governments to advise them on what the policies and 
strategies should be… are more influential in shifting policy than the kind of international 
presence in Ethiopia, particularly that of NGOs and donors.158 
In sum, we can detect some level of interdiscursivity within the findings of interviews with local 
researchers in Ethiopia: sharing many of the concerns around the longer-term viability of nomadic 
pastoralism, but also highlighting the broader context for pastoralists’ predicaments and the 
government’s failure to recognise and protect pastoral systems. It would appear from the findings, 
however, (and as Table 6.1 illustrates) that, while the influence of local researchers on shaping 
mainstream policy discourse should not be discounted, it is not as strong as that of the state or even 
donors.  
6.2.5 Ethiopian pastoralist organisations’ discourses, narratives and interests 
It would be presumptive to make inferences on the strength of interviews with just two Ethiopian 
pastoralist organisations (POs). Nonetheless, these interviews do provide some insight into the 
kinds of discourses and narratives being promulgated by actors who represent pastoralists’ 
interests, and the level of influence these organisations have on wider debates around pastoral 
development in Ethiopia. As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate – not surprisingly – references 
matching the ‘pure pastoralist’ discourses account for 73% of all coded references under this actor 
category, indicating that POs’ positioning remains marginal within the predominant discourses 
found within policy itself. 
POs in Ethiopia are by no means as numerous or institutionally strong as their counterparts in 
Kenya. Nor, as we saw, has the same ‘democratic space’ existed for local CSOs in Ethiopia to 
voice opposition to large development investments damaging to pastoralists’ interests, as in Kenya. 
The most prominent national organisation in recent years is the Pastoralist Forum Ethiopia (PFE), a 
network of more than 20 different organisations. The PFE provides training to local pastoralist 
groups and local and regional government officials on relevant policy processes, with the aim of 
enabling pastoralists to “decide and speak for themselves.”159 PFE collaborates with the MoFPDA 
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in organising an annual Ethiopian Pastoralist Day (EPD) – a ‘pastoral gathering’ (Morton, 2010) 
that (in theory) allows pastoralist groups from different regions to feed their own narratives and 
perspectives into government discourse. POs also exist at regional level, such as the Oromia 
Pastoralist Association (OPA). For the purposes of this research, interviews were held with 
representatives from each of these POs – the PFE and the OPA.  
A Pastoral Affairs Standing Committee (PASC), composed largely of Members of Parliament 
(MPs) from pastoral areas, whose role is to review and revise policies and legislation pertinent to 
pastoral areas before putting such legislation to Parliament for ratification,160 also exists in 
Ethiopia. However, as I was unable to meet any members, the extent of its influence on policy 
narratives is unknown. 
PO informants shared many similar concerns and understandings to other actors above, especially 
INGO informants and researchers both local and international. Climate change for them was a 
reality, “because pastoral livelihoods are heavily dependent on climate…this is heavily related with 
grazing land, natural resource.”161 Another challenge was “conflict between the different pastoral 
groups…such as between pastoralists in Oromia and in Somali region.”162 Reflecting thinking in 
line with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse, pastoralist mobility was viewed by these informants as 
central to the pastoralist livelihood system and the best way to make use of harsh and variable 
environments.163 Such mobility is, however, increasingly restricted,164 and pastoralists are “forced 
to keep their animals for a long period of time in a very limited area. When you do that, it directly 
affects the natural environment, degradation of the natural environment, soil erosion.”165 
PO representatives were eager to counter the perception that pastoralists were culturally resistant to 
change or reluctant to sell livestock before a drought. For one informant, pastoralists have good 
reason for maintaining large herds:  
If drought is there, then how else are we going to reduce that risk? It is compensating by 
numbers. And you know the number of animals, and the composition of livestock in a 
herd…they have purpose in terms of rangeland management…166  
For another PO informant: “traditional local markets, run by pastoralists themselves…you don’t 
see any initiative from the government to support that.”167  
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One PO informant had doubts as to what the ‘green economy’ could bring to pastoralism: “The 
CRGE, to me, it’s more of a political, rather than, you know, an on-the-ground policy, with not 
much to offer pastoralists. It is like Ethiopia attaching with the global movement…what is 
important, if you are working on the green economy, is not to harm livelihoods.”168 The value of 
rangelands, he continued, is not recognised for its carbon-sequestration potential, “…in the way 
forests are.” Pastoralists need to be “made aware of climate change”, but “they may not 
understand the climate science we are talking about.” Instead, there is a need to “link it to their 
traditional climate forecasting…”169 This is indicative of the kinds of ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse 
that rejects top-down technocratic solutions and places value instead on indigenous knowledge and 
customary institutions.  
Both interviewees stressed that the primary role of their respective organisations is to serve the 
interests and promote the welfare of the communities and constituencies they represent.170 This is, 
in effect, where they draw their legitimacy as political actors. They also draw strength from their 
connections and networks at local, national, and even international level.171 Although the data 
would suggest otherwise (see Table 6.1 – where the majority of references for this actor clearly 
match a discourse that is less prominent in most written policy), several informants from other 
categories were of the view that POs have worked hard to cultivate close relationships with key 
ministries and individuals in government and with other actors (donors, researchers, INGOs), thus 
allowing them some agency, albeit a limited one, within policymaking.172 According to one 
informant, the PFE chooses to “work within the government processes, rather from outside, as 
that’s where these decisions are made.”173 Nonetheless – as the CA and DA in Chapter 5 reveal – 
the kinds of ‘pure pastoralism’ narratives associated with POs, as identified above, are rarely 
reflected in the predominant discourses found within government policies and strategies. This 
suggests that POs are at the margins in terms of shaping mainstream policy narratives in Ethiopia.  
6.2.6 Ethiopian policy actors: conclusions 
In sum, what emerges from the findings is that the state remains the dominant actor driving 
national policy narratives and priorities around pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia, and 
that its primary interest is the ‘transformation’ and accelerated development – and greater control – 
of what were once considered ‘unproductive’ and peripheral pastoral areas. While pastoralism may 
no longer be considered by state officials as ‘backward’ or the antithesis to the modern state to the 
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extent it was in the past (see Chapter 2), and the language of ‘resilience’ has evidently been 
absorbed by the state as a means to rationalise government-mediated development interventions 
(another form of governmentality, in a Foucauldian sense), the findings show that ‘transforming 
pastoralism and the drylands’ remains the dominant discourse around pastoralist development 
among government officials interviewed, matching what appeared in the analysis of policies. There 
is also a sense that the state is using concerns over climate change to legitimise the re-emergence, 
or continuation, of past unpopular policies and programmes – sedentarisation, large infrastructure 
development, and the associated displacement of pastoralists from key resources, all of which may 
actually exacerbate vulnerability of some groups (see Chapter 7). The influence of donors (who 
clearly have the financial resources, knowledge base and close links to government departments to 
be able to influence some policies, especially those focused on ‘resilience building’ and rangeland 
management), of UN agencies – and to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and individual 
drylands researchers on shaping current narratives and bringing elements of the ‘modern, mobile 
and green’ discourse to policy discussions and debates on the future of pastoralism is, nonetheless, 
gaining some momentum, notably, around the formulation of a new Pastoral Development Policy. 
Whether these new understandings are bringing any corresponding change in the kinds of 
interventions and programming taking place in the pastoral lowlands, is debatable, as Chapter 7 
investigates. It is possible, nonetheless, that a more consensus-based policy environment (such as 
that found in Kenya) may eventually emerge out of the current political reform process in Ethiopia. 
The dominant interest of the state (and, to some extent, donors) – transforming pastoral areas for 
the benefit of the national economy – would appear at first glance to compete with the interests of 
other actors (INGOs, researchers and POs), who are anxious to defend pastoralist mobility and 
customary institutions. However, there is evidently also some discursive commonality across all 
actors in that they all express the desire to strengthen livelihoods and ‘build resilience’ of 
pastoralists in the face of climate change and other uncertainties. Some differences remain, 
nonetheless, in allocating causality for pastoralist predicaments and in the kinds of responses being 
advocated for.  
6.3 Kenyan policy actors  
This section examines the state and non-state actors driving policy processes around climate 
change and pastoral area development in Kenya, and their associated discourses, narratives and 
interests. Each actor category (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2) is taken in turn. While a ‘transforming 
pastoralism’ discourse was found to be dominant in the CA and DA of Kenyan policy documents, 
the findings of interviews reveal that alternative discourses are prominent across all actor groups in 
this case. Local and international researchers, donors, certain CSOs and even certain individuals 
within government form a discursive coalition of like-minded actors who have brought about a 





is the case in Ethiopia. This shift is reflected in the language of those Kenyan government officials 
interviewed, if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as Chapter 5 reveals), or in what kinds 
of programmes and interventions are being implemented. 
6.3.1 Kenyan state actors’ discourses, narratives and interests 
As is evident from Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2, the dominant narratives among state actors 
interviewed in Kenya are those closer to a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse (49% of state 
actors’ references), while still retaining significant perspectives matching a ‘transforming 
pastoralism’ discourse (31%). While this finding stands out in contrast to the findings of the CA of 
Kenyan policies (Chapter 5), where a ‘transforming pastoralism’ was more dominant (an anomaly 
explained by the fact that those government officials who agreed to be interviewed were more 
likely to be more favourably disposed towards pastoralist development than colleagues elsewhere), 
it does match the higher levels of interdiscursivity (compared to Ethiopia) uncovered from the DA 
of Kenyan policies.  
Before examining state actors’ narratives and interests, it is worth distinguishing between the 
multiple ministries and other state bodies that are relevant to this study. The Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry (MEF)174 is the lead institution with regard to climate-change planning 
and policy, although all government ministries, departments and institutions have an obligation 
under the 2016 Climate Change Act (the legislative and institutional framework for climate policy 
implementation) to mainstream climate change across their functions (Kiboi, 2017). A Climate 
Change Steering Group, chaired by the MEF, brings together government officials, donors, UN 
agencies and other stakeholders.175 The Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries 
(MALF)176 is (among other things) responsible for implementing the IGAD Regional Pastoral 
Livelihood Resilience Project (RPLRP) and was instrumental in developing the Ending Drought 
Emergencies (EDE) initiative (see Chapter 5).177 At the time of fieldwork (June 2018), MALF was 
preparing a new Rangelands and Pastoralism Strategy.178 This Ministry is also working with 
various development partners, including the private sector, to implement a new Climate Smart 
Agriculture Strategy (GoK-MALF, 2017). 
Reiterating what has been highlighted elsewhere (see Chapters 2 and 5), informants acknowledged 
the creation of the Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and Other Arid Lands 
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(MDNKOAL) in 2008 (and the subsequent ‘ASAL Policy’ 2012) as opening a discursive space for 
alternative perspectives towards pastoralism to counter more entrenched views.179 Decommissioned 
in 2013, the MDNKOAL’s brief was subsumed temporarily by the ASAL Secretariat and 
subsequently, in 2018, by a State Department for ASAL located within a new Ministry for 
Devolution and ASAL. A cross-section of informants stressed that this State Department no longer 
had the same authority and agency as it did when a designated Ministry.180 The MDNKOAL, 
nonetheless, left behind a number of important legacy institutions, notably the National Drought 
Management Authority (NDMA), praised as an effective state agency by informants across all 
actor groups.181 Another influential (state-affiliated) actor is the ASAL Stakeholder Forum (ASF), a 
multi-stakeholder platform set up in 2012.182 The ASF works closely with the Pastoralist 
Parliamentary Group (PPG), an important cross-party caucus of ASAL elected representatives 
formed in 1998. 
Following on from the 2010 Constitution and the 2012 County Governments Act, government 
administration and resources, including finance for climate adaptation, are in the process of being 
devolved to the county level.183 A number of ASAL counties are developing their own county-level 
Climate Adaptation Plans, with technical support from the Adaptation Consortium (ADA) – a 
partnership of state agencies (such as the NDMA), and several INGOs that work with local partners 
in five ASAL counties.184 The implications and consequences of devolved climate policies are 
explored further in Chapter 7. For this research, interviews were held with officials from: the 
Ministry of Planning (one), the MEF (one), MALF (one) and NDMA (one). In addition, interviews 
were held with one county government official, a representative from the ASF and one pastoralist 
MP. 
‘Environmental-crises’ narratives – that link climate disasters and environmental change to 
resource scarcity and conflict – were identifiable from interviews with Kenyan government 
informants, usually qualified with the caveat that climate change is just one of a number of 
uncertainties facing pastoral areas. Increased frequency and intensity of droughts and flooding was 
held up as evidence of climate change.185 Higher temperatures and heavy rainfall were leading to 
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outbreaks of livestock diseases, such as Rift Valley Fever in 2018.186 For several informants, what 
they perceive as traditional pastoralist ‘coping strategies’ were no longer effective.187 Population 
growth and the spread of unplanned settlements were restricting mobility and resulting in 
degradation of rangelands.188 For one official – resonating more with the ‘pure pastoralism’ and 
‘modern and mobile’ discourses highlighted in earlier chapters – pastoralist vulnerability was 
compounded by “competition between pastoralists and other land users…with the bigger ranches, 
irrigation schemes, conservancies, wildlife parks…”189 These encroach into important grazing 
areas and migratory routes used by pastoralists, allowing for less options during periods of 
drought.190  
One official defended irrigation: asserting it as a means of moving beyond providing emergency 
relief to drought-affected communities:  
 A lot of our agencies are moving from giving handouts to ‘how can we build resilience?’. 
You will find a very good project in Turkana where the Red Cross has supported a 
community to come up with irrigation for their livelihoods and also for fodder. Not only 
during those periods of drought, but also pushing the communities to have to strengthen 
livelihoods in advance of such drought… so it’s not necessarily that irrigation is competing 
with other forms of land use.191  
While less pronounced than in Ethiopia, Kenyan state actors interviewed generally focused on 
predominantly technocratic responses to climate change, rather than addressing the socio-political 
causes of pastoralist vulnerability. Typically: 
First of all we are trying to develop key feed storage facilities as a strategy, livestock feed 
has been a key thing… And then we are also trying to enhance the germplasm in the 
rangelands. Much of the rangelands are actually degraded or of low-value. The other thing 
is appropriate water harvesting…so to be able to maintain the health of the rangelands.192  
For another official, Kenya is committed to reducing its GHG emissions, as well as to ensuring 
greater food security. Its mitigation targets under the current NCCAP are “based on efficiency. Not 
creating more change of land use, but using the land more efficiently...in energy, in land-use 
management, in agriculture, livestock, transport …”193 There was potential, furthermore, for 
pastoral areas to benefit from land-based carbon-credit and ‘payments for environmental services’ 
(PES) schemes194 – resonating with what has been argued in the literature on pastoralism and the 
green economy (see McGahey et al., 2014).  
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Despite the challenges, one official stressed that pastoralism remains the most appropriate form of 
land use for the more arid ASAL counties: 
There is nothing else you can do in the arid lands…let the national policy talk about 
agriculture, crop production, but in Wajir, which is 80% pastoralist, you focus on 
livestock.195 
A pastoralist MP reiterated a similar narrative: 
Pastoralists are made vulnerable by the virtue of just living in the ASAL... But that's part of 
their life…and they are adapted to it over years. They have built resilience in very many 
ways. You can see in the type of livestock they keep. They keep camels, which can sustain in 
severe weather conditions, even a drought. And the same time they keep small livestock, you 
know goats and sheep, because they can easily slaughter them…196  
For these state actors, the argument that ASAL counties were somehow at a disadvantage in 
national development processes was no longer tenable. Echoing the kind of ‘new frontier’ thinking 
that was identified as driving policy change towards northern Kenyan counties since 2010 (see 
Chapter 2), the same MP asserted “that new outlook of investment in ASAL is because of 
devolution…Unlike in the past where they planned everything for us from Nairobi, now they are 
forced to plan with us.” ASAL counties are, furthermore, now assured of core funds and can apply 
for additional funds through the Equalization Fund,197 designed for climate sensitive (and 
predominantly pastoralist) counties considered “marginalised in the past.”198  
While not explicit in the interviews with these officials, it appears – from the extensive literature, 
from national policy documents analysed in Chapter 5 (notably Vision 2030, and associated 
Medium Term Plans) and from interviews with other non-state actors – that the dominant interest 
of the Kenyan Government (as with its Ethiopian counterpart) is the desire to transform and 
integrate dryland resources and production within a broader vision of national economic 
development. There was a strong sense from many non-state actors that the recent push to establish 
irrigation, to construct pipelines, roads, airports, wind farms, abattoirs – even turn Isiolo town into 
a ‘resort city’ under LAPSSET (see Chapter 2) – are part of the state’s ambitions to ‘open up’ the 
so-called ‘frontier counties’.199 All part of what Lind (2018: 1) refers to as “a new spatial politics 
than binds pastoral margins ever closer to state power and global capital.” According to a cross-
section of informants, the work and policies of all Ministries now need to be aligned with President 
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Kenyatta’s ‘Big Four agenda’.200 However: “If you look at the food security in the Big Four, 
there’s nothing there whatsoever about pastoralism.”201 Notwithstanding this primary aim of 
transform and integrate Kenya’s dryland resources and production into the national economy, 
recent policies and legislation, notably the 2016 NLUP (Chapter 5), and the passing of the 2016 
Community Land Act (see Chapter and 5), suggests that state actors and policy makers are 
cogniscant of the need for a legislative framework that protects the land rights of communities in 
those areas Kenya classified as ‘community lands’ (GoK-NLC, 2016) (see Chapter 2).  The extent 
to which this rhetoric has been translated into practice is discussed in Chapter 7 (7.3.3). 
In sum, just as with the narratives that emerged from the CA and DA of Kenyan policy documents 
(Chapter 5), a high level of interdiscursivity can be identified in the positions of Kenyan state 
actors interviewed. These actors show genuine concern for pastoralist predicaments in the face of 
climatic and other challenges. They also recognise the role of pastoral production, combined with a 
strong belief in the positive benefits that devolution, ‘green growth’ and new investments can bring 
to ASAL counties. Ultimately, the Kenyan Government’s primary interest lies in its desire to 
transform and integrate Kenya’s drylands resources and production within a broader vision of 
national economic development, as set out in Vision 2030 and subsequent MTPs (see Chapter 5). 
While no longer reliant on external sources of funding (see 6.3.2. below), leveraging new sources 
of finance from donor funding, private capital and multilateral climate funds to pursue such 
ambitions is an added incentive.202 It is reasonable to infer that the state is a significant actor 
driving the kinds of national policy narratives identified in Chapter 5.  
 6.3.2 Donors’ discourses, narratives and interests (Kenya) 
Numerous multilateral and bilateral donors have invested heavily in ‘climate resilience’, ‘green 
energy’ and pastoral development projects and initiatives in Kenya in recent years. An indicative 
list of some of these projects is included in Appendix G. Kenya also receives substantive 
international climate finance through the Green Climate Fund (GCF).203  
It was not possible to interview any donor representatives during fieldwork in Kenya. Hence I am 
unable to make any direct inferences on the kinds of discourses and narratives on climate change 
and pastoralism being promoted by donors, or the full extent to which donors are shaping the kinds 
of national policy narratives identified in Chapter 5, other than drawing on analysis of what these 
donors project reports and briefings say, or from what others actors say about donors. Among these 
other informants, there were differences of opinion as to how influential, or otherwise, donors 
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were. According to one INGO informant, donors have “a lot of influence behind the scenes. They 
influence the thinking of the government…in terms of the programmes that they design, that 
directly support the government, or support civil society.”204 Donors, in turn, were influenced by: 
…the corporate sector in their own countries…who have their own interests…particularly 
where it’s more about commercialisation, privatisation… When you look at the current 
emphasis around competitiveness, the value chain approach, in agriculture and in the 
livestock sector, these are all coming from over there.205  
Others observed that Kenya no longer relies on donor support to the extent it had in the past. ODA 
as a proportion of government spending has fallen considerably.206 Kenya is increasingly looking to 
China as a source of foreign investment.207 Some traditional donors, furthermore, are “shying away 
from directly to be seen to be influencing policy. They are happy to support climate-change 
adaptation but they’re not really going into the depths of using their clout to push for certain 
positions, as it was before.”208  
6.3.3 INGOs’, UN agencies’ and international researchers’ discourses, narratives and interests 
(Kenya) 
As for Ethiopia, I have grouped the responses of INGO staff, UN agency staff and international 
researchers as one actor category. As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 display, 56% of references for this 
category match a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, with a further 32% matching the ‘pure 
pastoralism’ discourse. When compared to the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse that is 
dominant in (the majority of) Kenyan policy documents analysed (Chapter 5), this would appear to 
show that INGOs and international researchers have less agency in shaping policy narratives in 
Kenya than the state or even donors. Nonetheless, what is significant – as is evident from Figure 
6.2 – is the fact that both this actor category and state actors share very similar percentages of 
references matching a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse (49% of all references for state actors, 
56% for INGOs), suggesting that INGOs – as one part of a like-minded network (along with local 
researchers, CSOs and possibly donors) – have clearly brought ‘new thinking’ around pastoralism 
to the heart of certain policymaking circles in Kenya. 
Interviews were held with Kenyan personnel from the following agencies: Trócaire (two), Action 
Aid (one), Cordaid (one), Christensen Fund (one) and the Adaptation Consortium (one).209 In 
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addition, interviews were conducted with an international researcher working for IIED, one from 
the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Research Program on 
Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) East Africa, one from the International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), two from ILRI and two freelance researchers (one a 
former advisor to the MDNKOAL). Three dryland experts working with FAO in Nairobi were also 
interviewed. 
INGO informants and international researchers interviewed generally share similar 
understandings of pastoralism, reflecting the kind of ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and 
green’ discourses identified earlier. According to a UN agency official:  
To me pastoralism has adapted and evolved...And is adapting to those variabilities of 
climate, and it is probably one of the more climate resilient livelihoods if it’s allowed to 
operate as it evolved originally. But everything that we are doing at the moment is 
hamstringing those extensive areas.210  
Matching the kind of holistic analysis found in several of the more ‘ASAL-specific’ Kenyan 
policy documents examined in Chapter 5 (notably, the 2012 ASAL Policy, the two EDE strategies 
and the ICG Livestock Strategy), a common refrain was that localised climate impacts need to be 
considered within a broader context. As one informant explained:  
…what affects pastoral production a lot more than biophysical factors are policies and 
decisions that affect their flexibility, their movement…Climate change impacts will be felt, 
not only because of the change in rainfall patterns, but because of other factors…including 
ability to move flexibly across space and time...211 
Similarly, for one international researcher: “climate change is an exacerbator. I don’t see it as the 
main driver. Climate variability has always been there.”212  
Reflective of a ‘pure pastoralist’ discourse that places culpability for pastoralist predicaments on 
the state and their supporters (such as private investors) who do not understand pastoral systems, 
rather than on pastoralists themselves, one INGO informant asserted that the current government’s 
plans to establish “land banks to ensure future food security” were likely to be located in 
“…ecotone zones that are conducive for adaptation. It will take away water and pasture from the 
pastoralists.’213 Corroborating recent research (Schilling et al. 2015; 2016), several informants 
highlighted that pastoralists’ access to critical resources in drought-affected Turkana County has 
been restricted by the discovery and extraction of oil.214 Elsewhere, large dam projects in northern 
counties, driven by Kenya’s ambitions to meet its Vision 2030 and NDC targets, are costing: 
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“billions of shillings” and “benefit only the investors, not the local people.”215 Similarly, Lake 
Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) was mentioned by as an example of a ‘green-energy’ project where 
“communities were not consulted”216 and where benefits are not being shared equitably217 (see also 
Chapter 7).  
Resonating with the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse (and matching narratives found in later-
period Kenyan policies), these informants were keen to highlight pastoralist innovation. Pastoralists 
are taking advantage of new technologies and ‘niche markets’ – such as the growing urban demand 
for nyama choma (roast meat) and camel milk.218 Some “educated pastoralists” were “trying to 
modernise, trying to engage more in markets, make use of technologies, do some things differently, 
while still maintaining some aspect of extensive livestock keeping.”219 Pastoralist households 
typically ‘spread risk’ by sending some children to school in the hope of gaining from livelihood 
diversification and/or remittances in the future, while others remain to look after livestock.220 For 
these actors, pastoralism was an inherently “low-external-input” and “natural” form of production, 
but has yet to be fully appeciated as such.221  
Echoing a narrative uncovered in several of the EDE-specific strategies analysed in Chapter 5, 
most informants believe Kenya’s climate-change policies, in the context of devolution, offered 
potential for pastoralists. According to one: “with devolved government the view that pastoralism is 
backward is changing.”222 The work of the ADA Consortium was held up as an effective 
programme that could be replicated in other ASAL counties.223 One informant also welcomed the 
2016 Community Land Act (CLA) as legislation that had the potential to bring benefits to 
pastoralist communities and a good example of how “the narratives around pastoralism had 
evolved” in Kenya.224  
INGO and UN agency officials in Kenya stated that their primary interest is not only “supporting 
livelihoods”225 in pastoral areas, but playing a facilitative and advocacy role to bring about change 
for the better through, for example, building the capacity of local government and local 
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communities to engage in policymaking processes.226 Collaboration and networking with others is 
clearly important for these actors to achieve these interests: “Your networks…good relationship 
with the members of County assemblies, or with their leader” can make a difference, according to 
one informant.227 Several INGOs also support local communities to mobilise to defend their land 
rights in the face of new investments, such as the proposed dam on the Ewaso-Ngiro River and oil 
extraction in Turkana.228 Securing and maintaining the support of various constituencies (the state, 
donors, host communities and County governments, supporters in home countries), which enables 
them to continue their work in Kenya, is undoubtedly an important additional motivating factor. 
In sum, the predominantly ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse that emerges from interviews 
with these actors (see Table 6.1) matches a similar discourse uncovered in several ‘ASAL-focused’ 
Kenyan policy documents analysed in Chapter 5. Thus we can infer that INGOs, UN officials and 
international researchers are part of a ‘discursive coalition’ of like-minded actors, who have (to 
some extent) brought about something of a paradigm shift in thinking around pastoralism – a shift 
that is partially reflected in the language of Kenyan policymaking, if not necessarily in all areas of 
policy implementation, as we discover in Chapter 7. These actors are motivated, furthermore, by 
what they claim is a desire to improve the welfare and rights of the communities with whom they 
work, so giving them legitimacy as political actors. 
6.3.4 Kenyan local researchers’ discourses, narratives and interests  
Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 reveal that there were high levels of interdiscursivity among Kenyan local 
researchers interviewed, with 42% of references for this category matching a ‘pure pastoralism’ 
discourse, 33% matching a ‘transforming’ discourse and 25% closer to a ‘modern, mobile and 
green’ discourse. As local researchers, along with their international counterparts, are continually 
producing new research on the drylands and pastoralism (a great deal of which provides arguments 
about the value of pastoral systems – see Chapter 2), it is reasonable to infer that these actors have 
– as part of the same discursive coalition referred to above – also brought new kinds of thinking 
around pastoralism into mainstream policymaking in Kenya. 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to document the many Kenyan individuals and institutions 
engaged in research on climate change, livestock and/or pastoral development issues in Kenya. 
Interviews were, nonetheless, held with six local researchers from a range of relevant research 
organisations, namely: the Kenyan Agricultural and Livestock Research Organisation (KALRO) 
(one); the Department of Land and Natural Resources, University of Nairobi (one); the Center for 
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Sustainable Dryland Ecosystems and Societies, University of Nairobi (one); LTS Africa229 (one) 
and two freelance consultants. 
There were mixed messages emanating from local researchers: reiterating the kinds of 
environmental-crises narratives expressed elsewhere, that traditional nomadic pastoralism was 
being overwhelmed by the extent of climatic and other changes, while simultaneously pointing to 
restrictions on mobility and inappropriate policies and investments. For one local researcher: “the 
scale of climate change of what we have today exceeds the capacity of traditional systems that used 
to cope with what we call climate change in the past.”230  
For these researchers, the growing numbers of people and settlements in ASAL counties was 
putting pressure on resources and driving social and economic change. Unplanned settlements and 
“competing land uses” were restricting pastoralist mobility and resulting in degradation of 
rangelands.231 For another researcher: “the formerly dry-season grazing areas become increasingly 
contested. And the winners of that contest are usually people who are armed...”232 Population was 
increasing, not only amongst pastoralists themselves, “but also amongst competing land users... 
people who are not pastoralists move into land that is seen as ‘empty land.’”233 Several informants 
highlighted urban expansion in the southern counties of Kajaido and Narok as a threat to once 
extensive community grazing lands.234  
Consistent with what has been documented in the literature (Little, 2013; Catley, 2017; Lind et al., 
2016), all of these informants reiterated that there is a trend of growing inequality in pastoral areas. 
While wealthier livestock owners were taking advantage of new market opportunities, others were 
being forced by circumstances, or opting, out of pastoralism altogether. For one local researcher, 
current trends will ultimately “favour the big players who will take advantage of county 
resources…the key players will be the bigger commercial interests.” 235  
Local researchers, as with most INGO and PO informants, also questioned the predominant 
national food security narrative, which places little value on the contribution of livestock to food 
and nutrition security. Critical dry-season grazing reserves are being allocated for large-scale 
irrigated crop farming at the expense of livestock production.236 Ambitious plans to transform 
Kenya into a ‘green economy’, according to one informant, are part of an agenda to “transform the 
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drylands...all driven because there is a lot of land in pastoralist areas…but there is no 
conversation about what happens to pastoralist livelihoods.”237 Nonetheless, local researchers 
generally welcome the possibilities for pastoralists opened by the process of devolution and the 
2016 CLA.238  
In sum, just as in Kenyan policy documents reviewed, there were mixed and often overlapping 
narratives being iterated by local researchers. On the one hand, their insights match the kind of neo-
Malthusian ‘overpopulation’ and ‘environmental-crises’ narratives found, for example, in the 2008 
GoK NLP,239 the 2010 ASDS240 and in several national climate-adaptation strategies. At the same 
time, a parallel discursive emphasis – one that recognises the broader and often-politicised context 
of pastoralist vulnerability, and is closer to the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ 
discourses, prominent in later-period Kenyan policy documents, is also apparent. Just as in 
Ethiopia, local researchers and consultants derive their legitimacy from their status as researchers 
working with academic or other institutions and from their national and international networks. 
Nonetheless, for one local researcher, whose organisation was dependent on state funding, the 
research agenda is carefully monitored: “We have to get approval (from NACOSTI)241 for a 
particular research to see if it fits government priorities…if something comes up that is different 
from the government agenda, they may not take it.”242  
While certain academics and researchers will invariably be invited to share their views when a new 
policy is being developed,243 and consultants are frequently recruited to assist in the writing of 
certain policies,244 the interests of, and the extent to which local researchers have informed the 
kinds of Kenyan policy narratives uncovered in Chapter 5, remains unclear. But undoubtedly, they 
too form part of that broader discursive coalition of like-minded actors, who – as we have seen – 
are in some way pushing for greater value to be placed on pastoralism as a viable livelihood and 
production strategy. The state, in turn, relies on these researchers and other non-state actors 
(INGOs, UN agencies and donors) to add legitimacy to their policy prescriptions (Weisser at al., 
2014).  
6.3.5 Kenyan pastoralist organisations’ and local CSOs’ discourses, narratives and interests 
As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate – not surprisingly – references matching the ‘pure pastoralist’ 
discourses account for as high as 79% of all coded references under this actor category, indicating 
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that POs’ positioning remains largely marginal within the predominant discourses and narratives 
found within most policies reviewed in Chapter 5 (excluding some notable exceptions, such as the 
2012 ASAL Policy or the KoG-ICG Livestock Strategy). Nonetheless, these organisations must also 
be considered as part of the same discursive coalition referred to above – in terms of influencing 
debates around and informing attitudes towards pastoralism in Kenya. 
Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya is considered to have an active and well-connected civil society. Dedicated 
Kenyan CSOs – such as DLCI245 and RECONCILE – have been at the forefront of providing 
research and advocating on behalf of pastoralism for many years. In 2012, CSOs were invited by 
the MDNKOAL to engage in the ASAL Policy process (Birch and Elmi, 2013). Many small locally 
based POs and community-based organisations are also working at community and county levels 
on pastoralist-related issues and/or to defend pastoralist land rights, even in formerly remote 
areas.246 For one informant, these local POs remain, nonetheless, on the “margins of national policy 
processes.”247 At national level, several pastoralist advocacy platforms exist, notably the Pastoralist 
Development Network of Kenya (PDNK) and the Centre for Minority Rights Development 
(CEMIRIDE). These networks continue to research, lobby and engage in civic education on 
pastoral-related policies, such as the 2016 CLA.248 PDNK and CEMIRIDE have been active in 
organising an annual ‘Kenya Pastoralist Week’ (KPW). CEMIRIDE has worked with several 
ASAL county governments to organise fora related to climate policy.249 It is worth noting that 
pastoralist gatherings, such as Kenya Pastoralist Week or Ethiopian Pastoralist Day (see above), 
can also be considered a 'technology of rule' in the Foucauldian sense – ways in which pastoralists 
across ethnic and county/regional boundaries (usually facilitated by INGOs, but also, increasingly, 
with the support and ‘buy-in’ of government and MPs) are given space to present and discuss their 
concerns and issues. This, in theory, produces a discourse about what pastoralists want (labelled by 
NGOs and advocates as ‘the voice of pastoralists’), that can be fed back to policymakers (Morton, 
2010).  
For the purposes of this research, interviews were held with representative from the following 
organisations: DLCI (two), RECONCILE (one), PDNK (one), CEMIRIDE (one), IMPACT (one) 
and Friends of Lake Turkana (one). 
While also concerned about climate change and increased inter-community conflicts, the primary 
discursive focus of PO and local CSO informants was on the state’s culpability for pastoralists’ 
problems, a narrative in line with the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourse that looks to allocate blame for 
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246 Skype interview with Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 2, 
09/06/2018; INGO staff 9, 04/06/2018; INGO staff 11, 08/06/2018. 
247 Interview with Kenyan local NGO staff 1, 07/03/2018.  
248 Skype interviews with: Kenyan PO representative 3, 11/06/2018; Kenyan local NGO staff 2, 07/06/2018; Interviews 
with: Kenyan PO representative 1, 06/06/2018; Kenyan PO representative 2, 09/06/2018.  





pastoralists’ predicaments on external factors. For these actors, government policy is facilitating 
changes in land use:  
Because of demand for land space…huge national mega projects – roads, 
electricity, railway lines, oil pipeline, airports – all these are competing for land and 
sometimes they even obstruct traditional routes to rangeland resources like water.250  
The government’s primary motive for being interested in the ASALs, according to another 
informant, is that they consider them to be “available land…in terms of space, size, unoccupied” 
and thus suitable for irrigation and other investments.251 Another PO representative elaborated:  
Food security in Kenya is crop production…even at the county level we see the same thing. 
The County Governor talks always of irrigation…I have always said pastoralism is 
neglected by the national government, and so perhaps with devolution we will see a change. 
But with devolution it’s not any different. 252  
PO representatives253 also raised concerns about the ‘community conservancies’ model of wildlife 
conservation.254 For one informant, the government views wildlife conservation “as the alternative 
to pastoralism in northern Kenya, despite the fact that pastoralism is the main livelihood. For 
them, conservation is not something that can complement pastoralism.”255  
For these organisations, the needs of pastoralists are not adequately addressed in national 
development frameworks, such as Vision 2030 and the second MTP, despite the fact these policies 
do now recognise “the different dynamics and opportunities that the ASALs bring.”256 Ultimately, 
pastoralism as a livelihood system has been “misunderstood…and for that reason, not really 
supported in terms of development.”257  
While POs are also part of a discursive coalition of like-minded actors that has undoubtedly 
helped shape pastoralist discourse and narratives in Kenya, pastoralist ‘voice’ in policymaking 
remains, according to one PO representative, peripheral: “In terms of climate change, the green 
economy, my thinking is...that we have yet to reach to where we want to be, as indigenous peoples 
and pastoralists.”258 
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Like their colleagues in Ethiopia, but clearly operating in a more open political space, Kenyan 
CSOs and POs claim to serve the interests of the pastoralist communities and constituencies they 
represent. From this, they derive their legitimacy, as well as from their connections and networks, 
and the growing body of research that generally substantiates their claims (see Chapters 2 and 7). 
CSOs and POs continue to work closely with multiple partners, both within and outside of 
government, as new opportunities arise and funding becomes available. Several individuals from 
within these CSOs, along with members of the PPG, were influential in the formulation of the 
2012 ASAL Policy259 and cultivated close relationships within the MDNKOAL, at a critical time 
for pastoralist policy. This provides evidence that, in ‘non-linear policy processes’, the boundaries 
between different ‘actor categories’ are often blurred (Keely and Scoones, 2003) and disproves 
the conventional wisdom that pastoralists lack the ability to organise themselves or exert political 
leverage to bring about policy change (Pavenello, 2010). Nevertheless, Kenyan POs and CSOs 
rely on financial support from a relatively small pool of INGOs, and long-term funding is 
increasingly difficult to secure.260 For one informant, national CSO or PO public engagement with 
the Kenyan Government is less visible now than it was in the past. Instead: 
What you see are a lot of very effective, more localised, NGOs working at county level... 
They have much more legitimacy because they are from those communities and they are 
voters as well. People’s focus has shifted, rightly so, to the counties.261 
According to another informant, under the current administration, the private sector has in effect 
“replaced civil society…because of the interest in trade and investment, and away from issues that 
used to drive policy before.”262  
6.3.6 Kenyan policy actors: conclusions  
In Kenya, as is evident from Table 6.1, and from the above discussion, we find considerable 
discursive commonality within the responses of informants. While there is consensus that climate 
change is just one of a number of stressors currently driving pastoralist vulnerability, there are 
nonetheless some differences in where causality for these challenges lies, and the extent to which 
pastoralists are either taking advantage of, or being pushed aside by, the changes taking place (see 
Chapter 7). Here too, government officials have clearly absorbed – but not necessarily diluted, as 
their Ethiopian counterparts appear to have done – the kind of narratives associated with a ‘modern, 
mobile and green’ discourse, while also retaining certain perspectives in line with the 
‘transforming’ discourse, that was to the fore in most policies analysed. Ultimately, the Kenyan 
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Government is motivated by the desire to transform and integrate Kenya’s dryland resources and 
production within a broader vision of national economic development. This includes, as we have 
seen above, ambitious plans for infrastructure development (including renewable energy), resource 
extraction and commercialisation of agriculture (including the livestock sector) – the consequences 
if which are explored in Chapter 7. It is reasonable to infer that, while the state is the dominant 
actor driving the kinds of national policy narratives identified in Chapter 5, it is by no means the 
only actor with influence. INGOs, researchers, UN agencies, certain CSOs (and even individuals 
within government), all form part of a discursive coalition of like-minded actors who have brought 
about a noticeable paradigm shift in thinking around pastoralism – a shift that is beginning to be 
reflected in the language of some Kenyan policymaking (as revealed in Chapter 5) and some state 
actors (this chapter), if not necessarily in all areas of policy implementation. 
6.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the agency and interests of different state and non-state actors within 
Ethiopian and Kenyan policy. It has done so by identifying and analysing their differing discourses 
and narratives around pastoralism and climate change. The findings reveal that there is a marked 
difference in how state actors in Ethiopia and Kenya frame contemporary challenges facing 
pastoralists and what responses are needed. In Ethiopia, as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 illustrate, it is 
evident that a ‘transforming pastoralism and drylands’ discourse is predominant among state actors 
interviewed (accounting for 56% of references for this category), broadly matching the dominant 
discourse found in the CA and DA of Ethiopian policy documents in Chapter 5. This finding 
notwithstanding, Ethiopian state actors have clearly co-opted – and possibly diluted – many of the 
narratives associated with a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse (31% of references) as they seek 
to mobilise resources around common goals of climate resilience, food security and economic 
growth. The extent to which these new understandings are actually manifest in the way 
development is taking place in pastoral areas of Ethiopia, or whether similar modernising and 
‘technocratic’ solutions that were characteristic of drylands development in the past (see Chapter 
2), are still prevalent, is debatable, as Chapter 7 explores further. Either way, the state is clearly the 
dominant actor driving policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change in Ethiopia, as it seeks 
to maximise opportunities for resource exploitation in dryland areas long considered peripheral. 
In Kenya, in contrast, the findings are less clearcut – while a ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse 
is dominant in the CA and DA of policy documents, the findings of interviews reveal that 
interaction between state and non-state actors has made a deeper impression. Interestingly, the 
dominant narratives among state actors interviewed in Kenya are those closer to a ‘modern, mobile 
and green’ discourse (49% of references for this category in Table 6.1), while still retaining 





local and international researchers, donors, key CSOs and even certain individuals within 
government form a discursive coalition of like-minded actors who have brought about a more 
substantive change in attitudes towards pastoralism (at least within some policy circles) – a shift 
that is reflected in the standpoints of those Kenyan government officials interviewed for this 
research (as Table 6.1 and Figure 6.2 illustrate), if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as 
Chapter 5 reveals) or in all policy interventions (Chapter 7). Just as with its Ethiopian counterparts, 
the Kenyan Government is, nonetheless, primarily driven by an ambition to transform and integrate 
Kenya’s drylands resources and production within a broader vision of national economic 
development. 
 The findings support the assertion that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new 
opportunities and contexts arise (Otto-Naess et al., 2015 Death, 2016; Whitfield, 2016) – the 
process of devolution and the rapid development of Kenya’s ASAL counties or the promotion of a 
‘climate-resilient green economy’ in Ethiopia being cases in point. Policy processes that allow 
alternative perspectives to mainstream discourse to be heard and/or enable pastoralists to engage as 
citizens in decision-making that affects them, have thus far been contingent on certain political 
'policy spaces' opening up at particular times, most notably in Kenya during the period of the 
MDNKOAL between 2009 and 2013.  In Kenya, such an opportunity has arisen again in the 
context of political devolution, and in light of the recognition of community land-rights clearly 
framed within the 2016 Community Land Act.  As we have seen, where systems of political 
governance are open and inclusive (a theme explored further in Chapter 8), policy-windows can be 
used by particular actors in a policy sub-system  - CSOs at the county level in Kenya for example - 
in order to advance the engagement of issues they care about (Beland & Howlett, 2016). The extent 
to which the new Pastoral Development Policy and tentative moves towards developing a national 
Land Use Policy open up a similar policy space for pastoralist engagement in Ethiopia, however, 
remains to be seen, and ultimately depends on the outcomes of the broader political reform process 
initiated under PM Abiy Ahmed.  
Finally, this chapter argues that, while the language of ‘resilience’, ‘the green economy’ and 
‘climate-smart’ innovations may have become more prominent in discourse around pastoral 
development, ultimately the ‘transformation’ and accelerated development of what were once 
considered ‘unproductive’ and peripheral pastoral areas and, by default, the modernisation of 
pastoral production towards a more commercialised and diversified orientation, remains the 
primary interest of the state and its supporters in both Ethiopia and Kenya. Who exactly is 
benefitting and who loses out, and whose interests are being privileged over others in this process 












Chapter 7: The Consequences of Policy Narratives for 
Pastoralism  
 
7.1 Introduction  
As this thesis has argued thus far, despite evidence of new discourses and narratives around the 
inherent resilience and adaptive nature of pastoralism, environmental-crises narratives of ‘resource 
scarcity’, ‘conflict-ridden drylands’, and ‘pastoral vulnerability’ remain deeply embedded in 
Ethiopian and Kenyan policymaking. There are, however, some differences between the two cases 
in where the discursive emphasis lies (Chapters 5 and 6). Such narratives amplify the perception 
that some kind of ‘intervention’ needs to take place, so opening up space for the state, and other 
powerful actors (private investors, local elites, conservation organisations), to claim stewardship 
over resources previously managed under customary institutions. While the language of 
‘resilience’, ‘the green economy’, and ‘climate-smart’ innovations may have moved centre stage – 
driven by climate-change arguments – the economic ‘transformation’ and modernisation of areas 
long neglected by the state and private capital and, by default, the transformation of pastoral 
production towards a more market-led and diversified orientation remain the primary ambitions of 
national policymakers in both countries, despite differences in their policy and political landscapes.  
Policies, nonetheless, do not cause outcomes in a linear fashion. They interact with other factors. 
The kinds of changes underway in pastoral drylands are driven as much by demographic growth, 
changes in market supply and demand, and regional security concerns, as they are by policymaking 
and political processes. The growth of small towns, infrastructure projects, oil and mineral 
extraction – even wildlife conservancies – are increasingly linked in a modernist vision of 
economic and social transformation (Mosley and Watson, 2016; Lind, 2018; Cormack and Kurewa, 
2018; Lind et al., 2020). The uncertainty brought about by climate change is another variable. 
Combined, these policies and factors have far-reaching implications for pastoralist livelihoods, as 
this chapter uncovers. 
Drawing on findings from interviews with the same sample of informants (Appendix A), as well as 
the literature reviewed earlier, this chapter examines the consequences of national climate-change 
and drylands-development policy narratives for pastoralist livelihoods. In doing so, I address the 
fourth element of my analytical framework (see Chapter 3), which is interested in uncovering the 
political economy of ‘winners and losers’ from policy processes (Adger et al., 2001; Robbins, 
2012) that might otherwise be obscured by the kinds of depoliticised policy narratives that are 





The findings reveal that some differences exist between the two countries – notably more political 
space for pastoralist communities and CSOs to engage in decision-making processes and/or to 
resist unwelcome forms of development in Kenya, in contrast to Ethiopia. In both cases, 
nonetheless, actions to address climate change or build ‘climate resilience’ and ‘green growth’ in 
pastoral areas are, in themselves, creating new social disparities and differentiated patterns of 
climate risk, as well as accentuating existing ones. I argue that different actors and interests (the 
state, private investors, wealthier herders / ‘pastoralist elites’) are seeking to take advantage of the 
kinds of investment opportunities and political/policy spaces that have emerged, particularly as 
they relate to critical issues of land and other resources. This poses challenges for pastoral area 
governance, and the future of pastoralism more generally.  
As in previous chapters, the cases of Ethiopia and Kenya are presented separately, before providing 
a synthesis of key findings in a concluding section. While the interview data relevant to policy 
outcomes and consequences were initially coded under the following themes: ‘Rhetoric or 
Reality?’; ‘Winners and Losers’; ‘Adaptive Capacity’; Future of Pastoralism’; and ‘Pastoralist 
Governance’ (see Appendix E), I have chosen – for reasons of brevity and argument – to present 
my interpretation of the coded data under three sub-headings, which are applied in each case. 
Firstly: ‘Strategies, Plans and Programmes’ – so allowing a brief recap of the key climate-change 
and pastoral-area-development policies and strategies for that country. Secondly: ‘Winners and 
Losers from policy narratives’, enabling me to apply (as I have done throughout) a political 
ecology lens to my analysis of policy narratives. Finally, for each case, I examine: ‘What future for 
pastoralism?’, mapping possible future pastoralist development pathways, as well as drawing some 
tentative policy lessons for pastoral area governance – conclusions that are elaborated on in 
Chapter 8. Throughout this chapter, I continue to highlight – and analyse – similarities and 
differences between the two cases, as I have done in earlier chapters  
7.2. Consequences of policy narratives and solutions for pastoralism in Ethiopia 
While Ethiopian government officials (and donor staff) interviewed were keen – as we shall see – 
to stress the benefits of policies and (donor-supported) programmes and investments designed to 
strengthen resilience in the face of climate change (especially those purported to provide a new 
level of public-service delivery and social protection to pastoralists in dryland areas that was not 
there before), other (non-state) informants expressed concern that many of these same policies and 
investments were giving rise to complex and unpredictable effects at the local level – including the 
appropriation of key pastoral resources. This ultimately serves to undermine pastoralists’ ability to 
respond to climatic and other uncertainties. More broadly, the findings point to the fact that 
development planning and policy prescriptions that flow from dominant narratives surrounding 





predominantly serving the interests of those who have most to gain from greater commercialisation 
and the privatisation of formerly customarily managed resources. Not least the state itself, but also 
a growing elite within pastoralism, notably those with the ability to take advantage of new markets 
and business opportunities.  
7.2.1 Strategies, plans and programmes: Ethiopia  
It is useful here to briefly distinguish between what is meant by a policy, a strategy, a plan and a 
programme. A policy outlines the issues of concern, and the principles and goals required to guide 
decision-making around that issue. A strategy in turn sets out how those goals will be achieved and 
what actions and measures are required. Short- and mid-term plans and programmes are used for 
more detailed planning of the goals and objectives defined in the strategy. While a plan sets out a 
course of action, a programme is a longer-term portfolio of (usually) multiple projects designed to 
produce specific outcomes (Aragrande and Argenti, 2001). Throughout this thesis, I use the term 
‘policy documents’ as an umbrella term to describe all government-formulated policies, strategies 
and plans. Programmes refer to specific time-bound development initiatives to meet the goals of 
those plans or strategies (although some INGO programmes may be independent of national 
policies and strategies). In most cases, these are funded by bilateral or multilateral donors and are 
undertaken by a partnership, or consortium, of agencies – a specific Ministry or Regional State 
authority together with one or more research institutes and/or NGOs. PRIME in Ethiopia, is one 
example (see Chapter 6). 
Ethiopia is in the process of implementing a number of climate-change and pastoral-area-
development policies and strategies – driven primarily by national development priorities, but also, 
as I have outlined in Chapters 2 and 6, incentivised by the availability of international climate 
finance and donor funding. All policies are designed to align with broader national development 
policy frameworks such as the 2015–2020 Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II) and the 2011 
Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) Strategy. More recently, Ethiopia has set out its 
mitigation targets in its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), has prepared a new (2017) 
National Adaptation Plan, alongside working on the Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) and 
other sector-specific resilience strategies (all linked to the CRGE). Ethiopia’s flagship Productive 
Safety Net Programme (PSNP) – and its offshoot, the Household Asset Building Programme 
(HABP) – have been extended to pastoral regions, such as Afar, and reframed by policymakers as a 
central component of Ethiopia’s climate-change adaptation efforts (FDRE/WB, 2013 – see Chapter 
5). The MoFPDA, meanwhile, set out a new Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy in 2019, 
designed to guide the future development of pastoral areas. The discourses and narratives found 
within these, and associated, policy documents have been analysed in Chapter 5, as have the actors 





donors, UN agencies and – to a lesser extent – a select group of INGOs, POs and individual 
researchers on shaping narratives and understandings of pastoralism is significant, amongst 
government officials interviewed (with some exceptions) a ‘transforming pastoralism and the 
drylands’ discourse remains dominant. These officials have nonetheless adopted many of the 
narratives associated with a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse, as they endeavour to mobilise 
support around a common set of goals – economic growth, food security and resilience to drought. 
Even if these policies may not all be (or are poorly) implemented – as a number of non-state actors 
interviewed report (Chapter 6) – the prescriptions and plans that flow from them still have the 
potential to influence the lived spaces, livelihoods and climate responses of pastoralist communities 
(Goldman et al., 2018), particularly when they inform decision-making around changes in land use 
and rights of access to critical resources. 
7.2.2 ‘Winners and losers’ from Ethiopian policy narratives 
As outlined in Chapter 2, successive regimes in Ethiopia have undertaken policy actions in favour 
of non-pastoralist forms of land use, irrigated agriculture in particular (Dyer et al., 2008; Lavers 
2012; Behnke & Kerven, 2013; Yimer 2015; Regassa et al., 2019). There is a long history of 
attempts to transform the pastoralist way of life into a sedentary one (Catley et al., 2013; Gebeye, 
2016) with settled pastoralists usually ending up poorer and more marginalised as a result (Little et 
al., 2010; Fratkin, 2014). In recent years, the state had been planning to resettle a further 1.5 
million pastoralists from their customary lands, ostensibly intended to improve access to basic 
services and build resilience to drought, despite the reluctance and often outright opposition of 
many communities to engage (Flintan, 2011; Fratkin, 2013; Addis 2015, Oakland Institute, 
2019).263 Customary claims to communal grazing land are not officially recognised and the best 
land is being progressively taken over for irrigated cultivation as the agricultural sector becomes 
more commercialised (Dyer et al., 2008; Headey et al., 2014; Yimer, 2015; Rettberg, 2020). Lands 
that may appear to some as ‘empty’ or ‘underutilised’ – or are claimed as such264 – are targeted for 
private and state investment, ignoring their function as critical dry-season grazing reserves for 
pastoralists – along the Awash River in Afar, for example (Lavers, 2016; Galaty, 2013; Mulatu and 
Bekure, 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Rettberg, 2020) – a view endorsed by many INGO staff, 
researchers and PO representatives interviewed for this research.265  
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Ethiopian PO representative 1, 17/05/2018; Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018; Ethiopian local researcher 
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As we saw in Chapter 6, there is a strong view among certain officials that commercialisation of 
agriculture (including pastoral production), settlement, and ‘diversified livelihoods’ are necessary 
precursors for resilience and development – narratives central to the ‘transforming pastoralism’ 
discourse. Unsurprisingly, the views of government informants interviewed for this research were 
largely positive about Ethiopia’s climate-change, green-economy and broader pastoral-area-
development policies and programmes. Without giving specific examples, these officials asserted 
that new policies, and support towards formerly peripheral pastoral areas in general, are bringing 
benefits, especially in terms of improved services and infrastructure, and are part of a wider 
dynamic of economic growth and state-mediated commercialisation.266 According to one official, 
pastoral development programmes are now “linking the pastoralist economy to the agricultural 
economy…this is a positive engagement, an economic link, rather than pastoralists feeling 
themselves as marginalised, or as out of the economy.”267 Similarly, for an official in the 
MoEFCC, the latest NAP:  
…brings positive change…there are measures for example, early warning systems will help 
them (pastoralists) to prepare before they are affected by droughts and floods. Irrigation may 
help them minimise the effect of drought. Infrastructure helps to protect against the impact 
of floods.268  
According to another official, Ethiopia’s PSNP has taken on board the kind of integrated drylands 
development thinking found in such regional (HoA) initiatives as the RPLP269 and is now: “very 
supportive (of pastoralism)…now the future is in drought resilience.”270  
Nevertheless, for one international researcher, while the “language of resilience and climate 
change”271 is now predominant, little has changed in terms of the kinds of interventions and 
programming being implemented by government, donors and even INGOs: 
…they are still doing market development…rangeland development…water development, 
and probably still doing local institutional development and capacity building…there’s been 
no fundamental shift towards really addressing some of the core issues that pastoralists face, 
which is really about securing access to rangelands resources and land tenure….272  
As we have seen in earlier chapters, ‘green-growth’ and ‘climate-resilience’ narratives have been 
evoked by the state to legitimise a new era of modernisation projects in the agriculture and energy 
sectors. Many non-state actors interviewed for this research were nonetheless sceptical about the 
extent pastoralists and pastoral areas were benefitting from strategies such as the Climate Resilient 
Green Economy (CRGE). According to one informant:  
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The green economy is more concerned with taking primary resources from pastoral areas, 
such as livestock, while processing or value addition is at the highlands, or at the market 
centres, where they have good infrastructure, to export or to distribute for the potential 
demand side…Maybe if we can see that the contribution livestock makes to GDP is high, 
there will be more support.273 
Consistent with what has been reported elsewhere (Jones and Carabine, 2013; Wondemagegnehu, 
2016), several informants felt that the CRGE in its initial phase was overly focused on mitigation, 
at the expense of adaptation, despite what they perceived as compelling evidence for Ethiopia to 
concentrate on adaptation.274 As Chapter 5 reveals, plans to expand forest cover, exploit renewable 
energy potential and reduce emissions from livestock are at the heart of Ethiopia’s NDC targets 
(FDRE, 2015). While rural electrification is considered a priority for pastoral areas, hydropower 
schemes – such as the controversial Gibe III dam on the Omo River – have been constructed 
primarily with agricultural intensification and energy exports in mind.275 While government and 
donor officials were reticent about discussing the negative consequences of infrastructure 
development (and associated ‘villagisation’ schemes) – several non-state informants spoke of how 
‘mega-projects’ have led to the human-rights violations among indigenous agropastoralists in the 
Lower Omo Valley.276 Thousands have been displaced by the conversion of former grazing land to 
irrigated sugar plantations and by associated resettlement,277 affirming what has been documented 
in the literature (Abbink et al., 2014; Fratkin, 2014; Kefale and Gebresenet, 2014; Hodbod et al., 
2018; Mosely and Watson, 2016; Oakland Institute, 2019; Regassa et al., 2019) and media 
reports.278 Only recently, has such displacement been acknowledged by senior officials in 
government.279 Interviews with a cross-section of non-state actors reveal, furthermore, that national 
or regional climate policies that drive large-scale transformative change – the development of 
hydropower, for example, or the conversion of pastoral lowlands into other forms of land use, as 
described above – are effectively giving rise to complex and unpredictable effects at the local level, 
such as the dispossession of pastoralists’ key resources – ultimately undermining pastoralists’ 
means of responding to climatic and resource variability.280 One INGO informant explained: 
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Pastoralism exists by exploiting temporal and spatial variation…It’s all about mobility. The 
moment the pastoral lands are fragmented because of conversion into other forms of land 
use, it restricts their mobility between wet- and dry-season grazing reserves. That exposes 
their vulnerability and undermines their entire livelihood system.281 
There is a risk that technocratic policy prescriptions in the name of climate mitigation or adaptation 
(irrigation, satellite-based early-warning systems, as examples) that are not cognisant of customary 
institutions and strategies (such as mobility) will repeat the development mistakes of earlier 
drylands interventions in the 1980s and 1990s (see Chapter 2), such as concentrating people and 
livestock around boreholes. Water development projects – for many years a core element of 
Ethiopia’s sedentarisation programme (Chapter 5) and also central to the CRGE Strategy, which 
targets the “creation of new agricultural land in arid areas through irrigation” (FDRE, 2011b: 138) 
– were highlighted as particularly problematic by several non-state informants.282 This confirms a 
pattern that has been documented extensively in the literature (Behnke et al., 2013; Galaty, 2013; 
Yirgu et al., 2013; Yimer, 2015; Krätli, 2019). In the words of one informant, water provision can 
be: 
…devastating to these lowland areas, particularly when they are putting in water in the wet-
season grazing areas…And of course, they couch it in terms of helping with climate 
change…So you end up having sacrifice zones…because these are areas that normally do 
not hold animals, unless it’s the rainy season’.283 
An international researcher elaborated further:  
Traditional coping strategies have changed. And one of the reasons why they have changed 
is because government has allowed water to be developed everywhere without reference to 
grazing, they have allowed towns to be built anywhere without reference to grazing, the core 
production system. They’ve allowed people to privatise some of the best bits….284 
Reflecting on the role of pastoralism in the ‘green economy’, another researcher observed: 
One of the patterns that we see is that, as central governments and individuals start to 
recognise that there’s an economic value in pastoral areas, whether it’s livestock or whether 
it’s a green-economy-related activity, the chances are that they will try and capture that 
benefit for themselves…285  
While many pastoralists are clearly feeling the negative effects of the kinds of transformation and 
shift to a more commercially orientated economy, as described above, and with traditional support 
systems for poorer households to deal with risks and variability no longer as strong as in the past,286 
others are taking advantage of new opportunities such as the growth in cross-border and 
                                                        
281 Interview with INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018. 
282 Skype interviews with international researcher 1, 18/04/2018; international researcher 2, 11/05/2018; Interviews with: 
INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018; UN agency official 1, 16/05/2018; INGO staff 6, 23/05/2018; INGO staff 7, 26/05/2018; 
Ethiopian PO representative 2, 29/05/2018. 
283 Interview with INGO staff 1, 15/05/2018. 
284 Skype Interview with international researcher 1, 18/04/2018. 
285 Skype interview with International researcher 2, 11/05/2018. 





international livestock markets287 or growing demand for high-value fodder crops. There was a 
view amongst government officials, donors and some researchers that those who were able to grow 
their herds, have access to markets and diversify were better placed to avail of these 
opportunities,288 in line with the kinds of ‘transforming pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and 
green’ discourses I have identified as associated with these actors (Chapter 6). Nonetheless, 
livestock ownership is increasingly “concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of 
people.” This new class of livestock owners “start to appropriate land and water. You get this 
privatisation of rangeland, which makes it more and more difficult for the poor guys to stay in the 
system.”289 These are views consistent with what has been argued elsewhere: that 
commercialisation of the livestock sector is increasingly redistributing livestock from the poor to 
the rich (Krätli, 2019); that there has been a shift towards more individualistic behaviour as 
pastoralists compete for access to and control over productive resources – among the Borana in 
southern Oromia, for example (Tache, 2013), or by an Afar pastoralist elite who have benefited 
from political connections and certain land deals (Rettberg, 2020); and that land appropriation (in 
Somali Region) is co-produced through political claims to territory and capital investment by 
wealthy indigenous (pastoralist, Somali) traders and politicians (Korf et al., 2015).  
The suggestion that many people will opt, or be forced, to move out of pastoralism was reiterated 
by a number of informants.290 For one local researcher: “you see more and more pastoralists 
registering their children in schools because they see it as a way out of the pastoral mode of 
practice.”291 Several INGO staff and international researchers emphasised the challenge of finding 
‘alternative livelihoods’292 for the: “huge proportions of people who are unlikely to return to 
pastoralism.”293 For another informant, a key question was: “how do you invest in alternatives in a 
way that doesn’t pull the carpet from under the pastoralists?”294  
In sum, although wealth disparity is not a new phenomenon among pastoralists (Catley et al., 2013; 
Krätli, 2019), it is evident that there are growing social inequities, with some groups emerging as 
‘winners’ from the transformation of Ethiopia’s predominantly pastoral lowlands, and others 
‘losing’ out in the process. The winners include the state itself – in terms of a rapidly growing 
national economy and increased agricultural export earnings (see Chapters 2 and 4), as well as its 
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claim to have achieved greater national energy and food security (USAID, 2018). Other ‘winners’ 
are investors who have moved into the fertile riparian areas of the lowlands to take advantage of 
changes in land use (the Ethiopian Sugar Corperation is just one example),295 as well as a new 
commercial class of wealthier pastoralists who – as described above – have profited from a 
lucrative regional296 and international market for livestock, and/or who can afford to diversify their 
interests. While government policies and (donor-supported) programmes and investments designed 
to strengthen resilience in the face of climate change are – according to a cross-section of 
informants – providing some degree of social protection for certain poorer and/or drought-affected 
pastoralists that was not there before – determining how many, and who exactly is benefiting, is 
beyond the scope of this research. While Ethiopia has undoubtedly made impressive advances in 
terms of economic development and food security, reduced aid dependency and falling levels of 
poverty297 over the last 15 years (USAID, 2018: World Bank, 2020a, 2020c), the extent to which 
that growth has been translated into redistribution of resources, improved services delivery and 
enhanced adaptive capacity in pastoral lowlands remains unclear and requires further research.  
Poorer pastoralists, meanwhile, who make up the majority of pastoralists in Ethiopia (Krätli, 2019; 
World Bank, 2020d), and whose mobility and access to critical seasonal rangeland resources is 
increasingly restricted by changes in land use and infrastructure development, are clearly the 
‘losers’ from the kinds of changes underway. It is these groups who have found it hard to rebuild 
their herds after successive droughts, many falling into destitution as a result (Gebremeskal et al., 
2019). The extension of large-scale social-protection programmes to pastoral areas of Ethiopia is 
symptomatic of this trend (Tsegay, 2017). Others have opted to migrate in search of livelihood 
options (Catley, 2017). Although beyond the scope of this research, pastoralist women are likely to 
face additional disadvantages because of gender inequality (Balehey et al., 2018; Krätli, 2019). 
Also facing particular challenges, as we saw above, are minority indigenous agropastoralist ethnic 
groups, such as those inhabiting the Lower Omo Valley, who have been displaced from their 
traditional lands to make way for industrial sugarcane cultivation, as well as pastoralist 
communities along the interface between Somali Regional State and Oromia displaced by growing 
ethnic and political tensions during 2017/2018.298  
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7.2.3 What future for pastoralism in Ethiopia? 
Policy outcomes also have consequences for the future of pastoralism and thus deserve 
consideration. While pastoralists are not the homogeneous group as they are sometimes depicted, 
the extent to which pastoral systems in Ethiopia, and elsewhere in the HoA, will remain ‘viable’ in 
the future has exercised the minds of scholars and policymakers for some time (Little 2013; Abera 
and Abdullahi, 2015; Catley, 2017; Lind et al., 2016; Krätli, 2019; Gebremeskal et al., 2019). 
Alternative visions of the future are central to these debates (Lind et al., 2020). Pessimists 
(reflective of both the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourses identified 
earlier) will point to the ongoing marginalisation of pastoralism and question the long-term 
viability of a livelihood system in the face of increasing climatic, and other, challenges. Optimists, 
in contrast – in line with the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse – point to new understandings 
of rangeland ecology, the growth in pastoralist entrepreneurship, as well as the potential for 
pastoralists to be recognised as having a role in the green economy (Chapter 2).  
The findings outlined in this chapter fall somewhere in the middle ground. Most Ethiopian 
informants felt that pastoralism will continue, but some pastoralists will do better than others.299 
Pastoralism, according to a donor official: 
 …will still provide a livelihood opportunity for a significant number of people…The question 
is: will it support the same number of people, or even more people? The answer is no. It’s 
mostly the better-off pastoralists who will survive in the system… (others) will continue to 
drop out and need support to diversify.300  
Ultimately, “there will be ‘fewer people practising mobile pastoralism”.301 In contrast – reflective 
more of the kind of ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse identified earlier – one local researcher 
argued that “mobility will still be key, even in the modern kind of pastoralism…and you’ll find a lot 
of migration, moving out of the pastoral areas, positively and negatively.”302 The argument was 
made that there are still vast areas of land in Ethiopia where alternative land-use options were just 
not viable or appropriate.303 For one international researcher: “Even if it is the case that all the 
higher-quality productive areas are taken out of the system. I think there will still be people who 
can somehow manage to survive on the rest”.304  
What emerges from these findings (and the Kenya findings that follow) is that there is a need for 
improved, and more inclusive, governance of pastoral rangelands – in line with the kinds of ‘pure 
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pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses identified in earlier chapters. At the core 
of such governance is land-tenure305 security: the need to facilitate, rather than impede, mobility 
(including, critically, movement across borders), pastoralists’ key strategic means of managing 
variability, as well as to safeguard pastoralist lands and other resources from the kinds of 
appropriation outlined above. Davies et al. (2016) remind us, nonetheless, that ‘good governance’ 
in pastoral rangelands must be set within an overarching commitment to respect pastoralist human 
rights – clearly lacking in the cases of enforced villagisation and displacement in areas such as 
South Omo, described earlier. In Chapter 8, I bring my key findings together to elaborate further on 
what a more inclusive form of pastoral area governance would entail.  
While Chapters 5 and 6 reveal that discourse in Ethiopia has tentatively shifted towards supporting 
improved governance, there is still a notable disconnect between formal policy that recognises 
pastoral production and the realities on the ground. Article 40 of the 1995 Constitution broadly 
recognises the right of pastoralists to have grazing land (FDRE, 1995), and several Regional State 
Proclamations (for example, Afar, Somali) “guarantee the land-use rights of pastoralists” (IGAD, 
2016: 23). Nonetheless, as we have seen, weak land governance has enabled greater private 
acquisition and individualisation of rangeland and water by wealthier herders and non-pastoralist 
interests (including the state itself), generally to the detriment of poorer pastoralists’ welfare and 
adaptive capacity. At the time of writing (2020), it appears that there are some signs for optimism. 
The MoA, with the support of USAID, is reported to be developing a comprehensive national Land 
Use Policy: ‘The aim is to provide more clarity around land use in pastoral areas, which will then 
prove helpful for the Regional governments to interpret to meet their particular needs….’306 Local 
land-use plans would, in turn, offer: 
A type of protection against further fragmentation, and beyond that, by improving this 
rangeland, by reseeding or removing invasive species, etc… you are showing that you’re 
using the land productively and you’re investing in rangelands. That’s also a form of 
security.307 
It is beyond the scope of this research to examine the extent to which the rhetoric of land-use policy 
reform has been translated into beneficial livelihood outcomes at the local level. Nonetheless, 
several donor and other informants, cited the USAID-supported LAND308 project in Borana 
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(Oromia) as an example of where a customary land-tenure system with traditional grazing area 
units (dheeda) has been formally recognised, and which offers potential to be replicated 
elsewhere.309 This is one example of where discourses of ‘modern, mobile and green’ and even 
‘pure pastoralism’ – both of which place value on strategic mobility as a means of managing the 
variability of dryland ecologies and climate and which highlight the role of customary institutions – 
have begun to inform local government decision-making and planning.  
The extent to which pastoralist representatives and pastoralist civil society in Ethiopia will play a 
role in asserting pastoralist identity, and bring a stronger ‘voice’ to policymaking processes in the 
future, would appear to be weak. As Chapter 6 reveals, pastoralist political representation and 
advocacy on behalf of pastoralism remain far behind the levels found in Kenya. CSOs have been 
constrained until now from questioning state-led interventions or from resisting projects that are 
deemed ‘in the national interest’ (Roberts, 2019; Mosley and Watson, 2016). There are signs that a 
new ‘policy space’ is beginning to open up, in light of political reforms initiated by PM Abiy 
Ahmed in 2018 – although not without a cost. New freedom of political expression has energised 
power struggles over territory between dominant ethnic groups who stand to benefit or lose from 
the reform process in Ethiopia (MRI, 2019).  
While the challenges facing pastoralists in Ethiopia are considerable, the pathways they follow will 
remain diverse, with some taking advantage of new opportunities, and others forced, or choosing, 
to transition out of pastoralism altogether. Clearly there is a need for more inclusive and 
accountable forms of pastoral area governance: that protect mobility and safeguard pastoralists’ 
access to key resources, their strategic means of managing variability, and that enable pastoralists 
to have greater agency in decision-making that affects them. Unless state interests genuinely match 
the rhetoric of the new Pastoral Development Policy (see Chapter 6) and work at the same time 
towards introducing a national Land Use Policy that makes provision for communal land-tenure 
and pastoralist concerns (as in the case of the Community Land Act in Kenya, discussed below), 
such broader forms of governance seem unlikely. 
7.3 The consequences of policy narratives for pastoralism in Kenya 
For Kenya, the findings reveal that climate-change and drylands-focused policies cannot be 
separated from the broader context of political devolution and rapid economic transformation 
underway in ASAL counties. Such policies and programming that have been devolved to the 
county level are generally perceived by key informants (across all actor groups) as beginning to 
bring some benefits, especially in term of pastoralists’ preparedness and recovery in the face of 
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drought and greater community input into decision-making processes.310 New economic 
opportunities are also being created as towns and populations expand along with a corresponding 
growth in demand for livestock products.311 Yet, as in Ethiopia, such benefits are hardly widely felt 
enough to offset what, for many – as we shall discover below – are the negative consequences of 
the kinds of rapid demographic, social and economic transformation that are underway in ASAL 
counties, as Kenya strives to achieve its ambitious Vision 2030 and ‘Big Four’ development 
targets. These developments create space, as we shall see, for ‘elite capture’ among newly elected 
officials, wealthier pastoralists and dominant ethnic groups. Meanwhile, other (poorer, less 
politically connected and/or minority ethnic) pastoralists find their autonomous adaptive capacity 
increasingly undermined as access to and control over critical resources are diminished. The 
perceptions of informants in this research are consistent with a growing body of research that 
focuses on the outcomes associated with Kenya’s ambitions to achieve middle-income status 
through low-carbon strategies and new infrastructure investments in dryland areas (Maina et al., 
2013; Symons, 2014; King-Okumu, 2015; Letai and Tiampati, 2015; Otto-Naess et al., 2015; 
Mosley and Watson, 2016; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Johnson and Ogeya, 2018). What this 
research adds – and what I found surprising – is the extent to which indigenous capital – including 
local pastoralist elites – and local political interests play such a prominent role in driving economic 
and social transformation in formerly peripheral ASAL counties, reconfiguring pastoralist 
livelihoods in the process.  
7.3.1 Strategies, plans and programmes: Kenya 
The establishment of the MDNKOAL in 2008 (see Chapters 2 & 6), the ‘ASAL Policy’ (2012), 
along with the second Medium Term Plan (MTP) of Vision 2030, Kenya’s overarching national 
development framework, have been welcomed by commentators (see Chapter 2) and a cross-
section of informants (Chapter 6) as constituting a notable shift in discourse on Kenya’s drylands: 
away from their being seen as ‘problem areas’ that need to be treated separately to, instead, a 
perspective that regarded them as an integral part of the national economy (Elmi and Birch, 2013; 
Odhiambo, 2014). As the analysis of policy documents in Chapter 5 confirms, there is an 
underlying narrative within the second MTP and associated sector-specific strategies (water, energy 
and agriculture especially) that views what were once considered as peripheral areas to offer 
instead a ‘new frontier’ for capital accumulation, resource extraction and infrastructure 
development, as well as a site for ‘green growth’. More recently, this narrative has been extended 
through the current government’s ‘Big Four’ agenda – a four-point strategy launched by President 
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Kenyatta in 2018. Meanwhile, the process of political devolution has become the primary means by 
which the state is seeking to extend its intentions to economically transform ASAL counties, as 
well as deliver various climate-change policies and strategies (see 7.3.2) – in effect, affording a 
great deal of new power and legitimacy to county officials (Abdi and Lind, 2018; Manzano, 2018; 
World Bank, 2020d). Despite growing acceptance (and endorsement) of pastoralism as a legitimate 
land-use system amongst Kenyan policymakers (at least among those interviewed – see Chapter 6), 
the extent to which there is still space for pastoralist mobility within what is essentially a modernist 
and market-led vision of economic and social transformation of ASAL counties, and who are the 
‘winners and losers’ from the kinds of policy prescriptions that flow from policy narratives, 
depends on whose perspectives and voices are being heard. Invariably, those who have greater 
access to resources and capital in its various forms are able to use these to secure further benefits 
(King-Okumu, 2015; Symons, 2014), as we discover below.  
7.3.2 ‘Winners and losers’ from Kenyan policy narratives 
Devolution is the main context in which a great deal of political and economic change in Kenya is 
taking place. All policies must now be channelled through devolution. These include climate-
change adaptation policies, as set out in the National Adaptation Plan (NAP), the National Climate 
Change Action Plan (NCCAP) and associated Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) initiatives (see 
Chapter 5). The Climate Change Act of 2016 requires county governments to integrate and 
mainstream climate actions into County Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs). ASAL counties 
are in the process of developing their own county-level Climate Adaptation Plans and disaster-risk-
reduction strategies.312 Several counties are piloting a devolved County Climate Change Funding 
(CCCF) mechanism – deemed by a cross-section of informants as an effective process that allows 
for decision-making at the county and community (ward) level.313 CCCFs must be aligned with 
national priorities, as set out in the NAP, but county governments have jurisdiction over sectors 
such as climate information services, agriculture and natural resource governance (Murphy and 
Orindi, 2017).314 Many adaptation investments under this fund target the livestock sector and – 
notably – focus on strengthening customary rangeland institutions,315 reflective of the growing 
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influence of the ‘modern, mobile and green’ and even the ‘pure pastoralism’ discourses identified 
earlier.316 For one PO representative involved in this process: 
We had a very good pilot of climate adaptation plans with Isiolo County. The communities 
decided what they wanted to do, the communities were given the capacity to procure 
services, were trained and given capacity to supervise the implementation of all these 
activities…In Isiolo today, conflicts over resources, over grazing lands, over water points, 
have drastically reduced.317  
In line with the various EDE Strategies (Chapter 5), where the discursive emphasis is on ‘building 
resilience’ to a wider set of shocks and stresses, not just climate risk, there has been an attempt, 
according to one INGO informant, “to move from emergencies to resilience thinking…With the 
NDMA now, the focus is on disaster risk management and there are some positives. Especially if 
they follow it up, and use it at the County level…”318 One government official asserted that, while 
“droughts are more devastating”, now with devolution: “there is more support for pastoralists. At 
least I can say for Wajir...the early-warning system works much better than it used to. The 
institutional structures are now there, so the response is better.”319  
According to several interviewees,320 pastoralists in ASAL counties are now benefitting from the 
roll out of the Kenya Livestock Insurance programme (KLIP), so cushioning the worst effects of 
livestock losses during severe droughts and floods. From its inception in 2014 up until 2018, KLIP 
reportedly paid out KSh700m, benefitting 32,000 pastoralists.321 
Nonetheless, devolution has brought its own challenges. For some informants, county resources are 
frequently channelled into providing ‘showpiece’ infrastructure, such as boreholes, livestock 
markets and slaughterhouses322 with: “little joined-up thinking…they want to show something 
concrete so that people could see that this government had brought us an abattoir.”323 As more 
money makes its way to the counties, corruption and the ‘elite capture’ of benefits are a 
consequence.324 Informants mentioned that minority pastoralist ethnic groups were fearful of being 
disadvantaged in counties where a majority pastoralist ethnic group dominate political and 
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economic power325 – corroborating claims made in the literature (Greiner, 2016: Scott-Villiers, 
2017; Manzano, 2018; Mkutu, 2019).326 Several different informants asserted that local political 
elites often have a vested interest in maintaining ethnic divisions, as they seek to consolidate 
political power and personal gain.327 The situation is made more complex by inter-county boundary 
disputes over pasture and water (Mkutu, 2019, World Bank, 2020d). According to a local NGO 
interviewee, such “politicisation of ethnicity is not helpful in terms of moving forward, or 
protecting communal resources as a whole.”328 For one local researcher: 
Pastoralists are very homogeneous when you pit them against others. But when they 
are amongst themselves they are extremely heterogeneous…with devolution, that 
heterogenuity is playing itself out. In so much as devolution is a huge opportunity, it is now 
being undermined by inter- and intra-community tensions.329  
As earlier chapters reveal, such contestations over power and resources are rarely mentioned within 
the kinds of dominant (and largely de-politicised) policy narratives and representations that tend to 
frame ‘pastoralist vulnerability’ in terms of climate change or ‘resource scarcity’. It is worth 
reiterating here that the term ‘pastoral elite’ is frequently used in discussions on pastoralism in 
Kenya, as it was by interviewees in this research. This refers to a growing class of wealthy, and 
usually politically well-connected, herd owners (often absentee, some of whom may now be MPs 
or members of county assemblies) or former pastoralists, who have made money accumulating 
livestock from enclosing land (such as the ‘Group Ranches’ in the southern Kenyan rangelands) 
and /or from investments in other businesses. It also includes those who have taken advantage of 
rent-seeking opportunities resulting from policy change or political appointment (Catley et al., 
2013; Catley 2017; Manzano, 2018; World Bank, 2020d). The perception that all pastoralists are 
‘poor’ or ‘powerless’ is clearly not accurate.  
Predominantly pastoralist counties in Northern Kenya are, as we have seen, undergoing rapid 
transformation, as population grows and the development of infrastructure and energy projects, 
new roads, pipelines and irrigation schemes continues apace. The GoK is set on developing the 
LAPSSET Corridor project, linking oil production in Turkana with a new port and refinery at 
Lamu, and encouraging multiple investments along its route, including plans to construct a large 
dam on the Ewaso-Ng’iro River (LCDA, 2016). LAPSSET has been framed within GoK policy as 
“essential for growth and investment” (LCDA 2016:16). While LAPSSET remains, for now, “more 
on paper than on the ground” (Scoones, 2018: 2), the prospect of further discoveries of oil, gas and 
mineral reserves in the region is likely to add to its momentum. Various studies (Enns, 2017, Letai 
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and Tiampati, 2015; Loduk et al., 2016; Schilling et al., 2016; Kochore, 2016; Greiner, 2020) have 
highlighted that, while such ‘mega-infrastructure projects’ may bring employment and business 
opportunities for some, they place restrictions on mobility of others, fuel resentment and frequently 
aggravate conflicts over land and other resources where different ethnic groups meet. Patterns of 
economic differentiation, furthermore, are likely to disrupt the kinds of traditional social networks 
and reciprocal arrangements that characterise pastoral systems and that play a critical role in their 
ability to respond to climate change (see Chapter 2). 
As Elliot (2016), Greiner (2016) and Mosley and Watson (2016) have all argued, the enclosure of 
land in northern counties is connected to new forms of territoralisation, driven by powerful 
individuals and local elites, as much as it is by external investors or the state. The prospect of new 
investments, such as those described above, and accompanying rise in land prices has given rise to 
an ‘economy of anticipation’ (Mosley and Watson, 2016: 453), as much as it raises fear of 
dispossession. For one INGO interviewee, new investments such as oil are largely benefitting “the 
elite” in northern counties “while the community members who are not educated, who are actually 
the land-users, may not be feeling the benefits directly.”330 The same informant added: 
Communities we interact with (in Turkana East) have been asking us to help them to 
intervene. They feel the effects of oil and gas will be the same as the effects of the 
geothermal at Olkaria…the investors just came in, have their discussions with the national 
government and they will be given their license …the communities feel that they’re not 
involved. Yet it’s taking part of their livelihoods…331  
Another trend has been the rapid growth of unplanned settlements around towns and waterpoints 
and along new roads. A single borehole or fixed waterpoint can, according to one researcher, 
quickly become: “the epicenter of a rangeland degradation nightmare.’332 
Just like Ethiopia, Kenya clearly has a strong growth-orientated vision of a ‘green economy’ – as 
set out in NDC mitigation targets and the 2015 Green Economy Strategy Implementation Plan 
(GESIP). Keen to leverage funds newly available through the Green Climate Fund (GCF), 
REDD+333 and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), investment in sectors such as 
renewable energy and ‘climate-smart agriculture’ are seen as paths to development and job creation 
(Death, 2016; GoK-MENR, 2015b; Maina et al., 2013). Rangelands are increasingly being targeted 
for the potential to generate solar, geothermal and wind energy projects. The 3rd MTP envisages a 
four-fold expansion of geothermal energy output alone (GoK, 2018). Displacement of local Maasai 
communities and loss of grazing land to make way for the Olkaria geothermal scheme and 
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associated infrastructure development in Kenya’s Rift Valley334 was mentioned by several non-
state actors interviewed,335 endorsing what has been reported elsewhere (Sena, 2015; Johnson and 
Ogeya, 2018; Renkens, 2019).336 For a PO representative, the focus of investment to date has been 
on “large energy projects rather than on decentralised smaller-scale energy projects…that could 
bring real benefit to local communities.”337 For these, and other, non-state actors, the case of Lake 
Turkana Wind Power (LTWP) is another example of where contestations between Kenya’s green-
economy ambitions and the customary rights and aspirations of local pastoralist communities are 
being played out. Sited in 150,000 acres of rangeland on the border of Samburu and Marsabit 
counties, and inhabited by a mix of interacting Samburu, Turkana, and minority El Molo and 
Rendille pastoralist groups (Voller et al., 2016; Drew, 2020), LTWP is currently the largest wind-
power project in Africa, and one of a number of ‘flagship’ infrastructure investments designed to 
‘transform’ northern ASAL counties (another is LAPSSET). As such, the government were very 
keen to involve private investors and donors from the start.338 The development of LTWP has been 
accompanied by accusations of ‘land grabbing’, and concerns over infringements of customary 
land rights of local pastoralists, resulting in a legal case brought by some members of local 
indigenous community groups against LTWP and the county government (Mutiga, 2015: Voller et 
al., 2016). Cormack and Kurewa (2018: 89) suggest that LTWP has produced “a variety of 
contradictory effects”, as local communities seek to gain access to information, and benefits such 
as employment or compensation, while simultaneously experiencing “new forms of exclusion”. 
Vulnerable minority groups like the El Molo are particularly affected by the decrease of negotiated 
use and access to land (Renkens, 2019).  Tensions between - and within - communities close to 
LTWP have also been used and inflamed by incumbant politicians in the newly devolved county 
governments, or by aspiring politicians for political gain (Drew, 2020: 76). Informants in this 
research shared similar concerns about the poor community consultation process, the inadequate 
compensation for land taken from community members and the fact that LTWP has encroached 
into an important dry-season grazing reserve.339 For several informants, the issue of whether the 
development of renewable energy would bring benefits or not was closely tied to the question of 
land rights:  
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There are pastoralists around Lake Turkana who’ve been fighting because their land has 
been taken away to put up a wind farm. If they had secure tenure, they would be daft not to 
put up a wind farm there, because they could make a killing on it. It’s having the rights to 
lease a little bit of your land to generate energy and then I think pastoralists have got a huge 
opportunity.340  
This underlines the need, as stated in the case of Ethiopia above, for more inclusive forms of land 
governance in pastoral areas that offer security of tenure for user groups of communal rangelands.  
Another domain where the prescriptions that flow from climate policy narratives have implications 
for pastoralist livelihoods is ‘climate-smart agriculture’ (CSA). Following on from its CSA 
Framework programme launched in 2015 (analysed in Chapter 5), the GoK has subsequently 
developed a Kenya CSA Strategy 2017–2026, in line with its climate-change commitments. 
Various donors, meanwhile, are providing substantive funding to programmes in Kenya that 
include a CSA component.341 For its proponents, CSA offers ‘a triple win’ in the face of climate 
change: “enhancing resilience and food security, and where possible, trying to mitigate climate 
change.”342 As with narratives of ‘climate resilience’ and the ‘green economy’, the global 
momentum around CSA proves an attractive ‘fit’ for the Kenyan (and Ethiopian) states’ ambitions 
to tackle the twin challenge of climate change and food security without constraining economic 
growth. Emphasis on technological and market-based solutions adds further impetus to the push for 
CSA, as revealed by the discourse analysis in Chapter 5. CSA can be seen as another example 
where powerful actors – in this case, the Kenyan state, the World Bank and UN bodies (such as the 
FAO), along with private-sector interests (agri-businesses) – are adopting and promoting a global 
green narrative around what is essentially a long-standing idea – the modernisation of agriculture 
(Bergius and Buseth, 2019). Arguably, just as with agri-modernisation endeavours in the past, CSA 
policies and strategies will sideline the kinds of socio-political processes – such as displacement 
from critical resources or ‘elite capture’ of newly devolved funding – that continue to marginalise 
those pastoralists with the least assets or connections to political power at county level. A cross-
section of non-state actors expressed reservations about what CSA has to offer.343 One local 
researcher commented: 
First of all, it’s agriculture. They don’t think about pastoralism. They are thinking about 
converting Turkana into something else. They are thinking about irrigation. They look at a 
green dry-season grazing areas and see it as having potential for doing agriculture.344 
Nonetheless, for an international livestock researcher: 
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Climate-smart agriculture policies do prioritise adaptation and they talk about pastoral 
production systems...but a lot of these narratives are just about productivity…for example, 
one of the biggest CSA projects…funded by the World Bank…It does highlight livestock, yet 
it’s not terribly sophisticated in its understanding of the dynamics of pastoralism.345 
The predominant national food security narrative, which, as we have seen, frequently uses climate 
change as a reason to justify the expansion of irrigated cropping, and which places little value on 
pastoral production – was also highlighted by interviewees as a cause for concern. For one CSO 
informant: “The belief that ‘in order for you to be food secure, then you must grow crops’ is still 
there.”346 Lands traditionally used as pastoralist dry-season reserves are being targeted for 
irrigation schemes, effectively undermining pastoralists’ ability to respond to climatic and other 
uncertainties.347 Once these resources are “removed from the system”, pastoralists are forced to “go 
elsewhere when there is a drought.”348 As a consequence: “you will see more and more invasions 
of national parks, the forests, privatised land…”.349 Sizable new ‘land banks’ as a means to ensure 
future food security are also being proposed in ASAL counties, where land is still considered 
plentiful.350 Several interviewees351 gave the example of the (one million acre) Galanna Kulalu 
irrigation and food security scheme in Tana River County, which has dispossessed lands previously 
used by minority agropastoralists (such as the Orma) and which has largely proved to be an 
expensive failure according to media reports.352 In a similar vein, PO informants felt that the recent 
expansion of community wildlife conservancies in northern Kenya (see Chapter 6) – which are 
backed by international donors and the Kenyan political elite alike (Bersaglio and Cleaver, 2018) – 
represents another form of expropriation of critical dry-season resources, bringing benefits to some 
(such as new sources of income), but disadvantaging others.353 While conservancies usually allow a 
certain amount of grazing rights, Mosley and Watson (2016) write that those who are not 
considered to be ‘members of the community’ (pastoralist groups from elsewhere who make 
seasonal use of pasture, for example) are likely to be excluded.  
In sum, there are clearly ‘winners and losers’ from Kenyan policy processes and the prescriptions 
that flow from policy narratives. The ‘winners’ are those pastoralists in ASAL counties with closer 
proximity to administrative centres who are in a position to take advantage of improved services 
(health and education and, for those who qualify, new social-protection measures such as the 
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Kenyan Livestock Insurance Programme), infrastructure (the building of roads and abattoirs), 
alongside newly devolved drought-preparedness strategies and county climate adaptation. Other 
‘winners’ are those pastoralists (generally wealthier and/or with larger herds in the first place) 
profiting from the growing urban demand for meat and dairy, or who have been able to use their 
political allegiances to capture the benefits of devolved power and resources to the county level. 
The ‘losers’ in this scenario are those groups with the least assets (smaller herds, for example, 
which makes it harder to recover after a drought), or who are not well connected politically and 
economically, and whose traditional livestock routes, mobility and access to critical seasonal 
resources have been restricted by the growing privatisation of formerly communally managed 
rangelands. In tandem are those who have been displaced as pastoral resources are converted to 
other types of land use – irrigated cropping (Galanna Kulalu, for example), renewable energy 
schemes (the expansion of geothermal and wind power, described above), oil extraction (Turkana) 
or wildlife tourism. Ultimately, the livelihoods and adaptive capacity of these groups are being 
compromised.  
7.3.3 What future for pastoralism in Kenya? 
In light of the challenges described thus far, the future of pastoralism in Kenya – just as in Ethiopia 
– is uncertain. The ability to which pastoralists, as households and as communities, can respond to 
climatic and other ‘shocks and stresses’, and can adapt to and anticipate change – in other words, to 
be ‘resilient’ – depends on multiple factors, not least their ability to maintain mobility. Facing 
increasing restrictions in access to key resources, and at the same time showing a desire to access 
education, or with new livelihood opportunities opening up, the trend of some ‘moving out’ (Lind 
et al., 2016) of pastoralism is likely to continue.354 A cross-section of informants stressed, 
nonetheless, that pastoralists have always adapted to change, and will continue to innovate355 – 
reflective of the ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse identified in earlier chapters. According to a 
private-sector consultant: “You have a more educated, more aware, more connected with the 
outside world, group, so they can actually enhance livestock development, using modern 
methods…which tells us that some people will do ok.”356 Similarly, one international researcher 
reflected that: 
A lot of pastoralist communities are trying to develop, trying to modernise, trying to engage 
more in markets, make use of technologies…do some things differently, while still being 
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pastoralists. And in some cases, still maintaining some aspect of the extensive nature of 
livestock keeping’.357  
Several INGO informants maintained that pastoralists in some areas who had previously ‘exited’ 
pastoralism were now returning, as the market for livestock products continues to grow.358 Echoing 
sentiments expressed by their Ethiopian counterparts, a cross-section of informants asserted that 
pastoralism is likely to remain the best land-use option in the most arid areas, despite climate 
change.359 There was a belief that some pastoralists will do better than others. According to one 
informant: 
The big players will take advantage of county resources, of the county infrastructure that is 
developing, to fatten their animals for the market. They might buy from the poorer livestock 
keepers, who might get some trickle down. But mostly the key players will be the bigger 
commercial interests.360  
Unsurprisingly perhaps – as their interest is to mobilise support for pastoralist concerns (see 
Chapter 6) – PO representatives generally held a pessimistic outlook. Typically:  
If we keep going the way we’re going now, there’ll be some serious change. Unless our 
government understands pastoralism, and protects pastoralism…Even in that climate-smart 
policy, there’s nothing about pastoralism. In that ‘Big 4’ agenda, there’s nothing about 
pastoralism...361 
For another:  
With all of these things combined, we’re almost heading towards the extinction of 
pastoralism in Kenya, if we’re not careful…In spite of there being rhetoric about 
recognising pastoralism.362  
As in Ethiopia, climate adaptation and pastoralist development policies and interventions in Kenya 
need to be considered within the context of pastoral land governance. Without security of tenure 
and agreements around land use, these policy interventions – however well intentioned – are likely 
to result in failure, or will be insufficient to mitigate against the negative consequences of the kinds 
of inappropriate developments described above. For one researcher, ensuring the longer-term 
sustainability of pastoral areas was less about “technical solutions…It is getting governance sorted 
first. It includes agreements about who can go where, and when.”363  
Given that customary forms of pastoral governance have usually worked best when they are far 
from state control (Behnke, 2018), the challenge remains as to how to maintain these systems in 
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light of the new forms of devolved political governance in Kenya (Manzano, 2018) – where, as we 
have seen, ‘elite capture’ is a real possibility. Isiolo County Government’s attempt to revive and 
protect ‘customary institutions’, as emphasised in their County Livestock Strategy and Plan (2016) 
(see Chapter 5), would appear to be one effort to overcome such as challenge. The risk, however, is 
that a ‘hybrid’ form of governance in pastoral areas emerges, diluting effectiveness (World Bank, 
2020d). Nonetheless, in light of the centrality of mobility to pastoralist systems the case for more 
flexible property relations has become stronger. As we have seen, ideal patterns of common 
property mangagement rarely exist in the increasingly fragmented pastoral drylands (see Chapter 
2).  Drawing on the work of Moritz (2016), Scoones (2020: 26) suggests that the emergence of 
‘open property regimes’ – hybrid constructions of private, communal and open-access – in pastoral 
areas emphasises how production, accumulation and longer term sustainability can be achieved 
outside a standardised, regulated tenure form. Policy makers in Kenya could also learn from the 
experience of the LAND project in Borana, Ethiopia, described earlier (7.2.3), where attempts have 
been made to reconcile traditional customary instutions with formal government administrative 
systems as well as promote participatory rangeland management type planning. 
Several informants volunteered suggestions on ways in which the governance of pastoral lands and 
secure access to resources could be strengthened. According to an INGO interviewee: “if we help 
communities to have security of tenure for the land that they are traditionally practising grazing 
on, then they would be able to make decisions on other forms of investment…”364 For one 
researcher, in areas where land use is increasingly contested, legally demarcated ‘livestock 
corridors’ will reduce conflict and can prove beneficial to wildlife.365 As in Ethiopia, there were 
calls for a clear national land-use policy and local land-use plans that recognise pastoralism as a 
land-use system and protect pastoral land from further encroachment.366 It was observed, 
nonetheless, that ‘vested interests’ often work against well-intentioned local community resource 
management agreements – so undermining the kinds of collective risk management arrangements 
that are fundamental to dealing with climate and ecosystem variability. Wealthy livestock owners, 
from a pastoralist background, but who don’t “necessarily live a pastoralist life themselves 
anymore…who now live in Nairobi or a county capital”,367 can afford to hire other herders, and 
have the ability, connections and resources to move large numbers of animals to where pasture is 
good, and so have little interest in seeing local communities impose their own by-laws restricting 
grazing.368  
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Legislation alone does not solve the problem of weak pastoral tenure but it does provide the legal 
basis for action (Hannam, 2018: 1). The Community Land Act (CLA) 2016 (see Chapter 6) – an 
outcome of the Kenyan Constitutional reform process and legislation and conceivably influenced 
by the ‘pure pastoralism’ and ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourses that recognise the importance 
of pastoralism to drylands – has been welcomed by many in Kenya as providing a legal tool for 
securing community land (Manzano, 2018; Mokku and Alden-Wily, 2017) – a view endorsed by 
almost all interviewees in this study. Nonetheless, concerns about the CLA consistent with those 
found in the literature (Alden-Wily, 2018; Manzano, 2018) remain. These include the lack of 
institutional capacity and political will to see it implemented, and whether loopholes in the CLA 
will be used by pastoral elites to ‘grab land’ and dispossess communities, as happened with former 
‘Trust Lands’ in the post-independence period.369 A number of informants shared the view that 
those groups with greater assets and information, and with closer links to decision-making 
processes are, likely to benefit more than others from the current land-reform process unless 
safeguards are put in place and greater awareness raised.370 While gaps between policy-making and 
policy implementation are apparent in the case of the CLA, undoubtedly the more open policy 
space that has been generated in Kenya (compared to what we have seen in Ethiopia) – including 
efforts to integrate national climate adaptation actions into County Integrated Development Plans 
(CIDPs), as well as ensure coherence between climate adaptation, DRR and other county level 
programmmes - described earlier (7.3.2), is a potentially positive indication for implementation 
effectiveness.  
7.4 Conclusion 
Drawing on the findings of interviews with a cross-section of relevant policy actors in Ethiopia and 
Kenya, this chapter has examined how climate-change and broader national policy narratives are 
manifesting themselves through development planning and programming in the drylands of the 
HoA and, in turn, the consequences of policy ‘solutions’ for pastoralist livelihoods and for future 
pastoralist pathways. In doing so (and addressing the fourth element of my analytical framework), 
the insights of this chapter go some way towards uncovering the political economy of winners and 
losers from policy processes, that might otherwise be obscured within the kinds of depoliticised 
policy narratives that are so prevalent in many of the policies reviewed (Chapter 5). 
The findings of this research provide further evidence to support what a number of scholars have 
argued elsewhere: that the kinds of economic, social and political transformations that are 
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underway in the pastoral drylands of Ethiopia and Kenya, while benefiting some, are resulting in 
negative processes for others. Notable are: the appropriation of pastoral resources (see for example: 
Galaty, 2013; Mulatu and Bekere, 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016; Regassa 
et al., 2019); involuntary sedentarisation (Yimer, 2015; Hodbod et al., 2018; Regassa et al., 2018); 
the replacement of pastoralism with irrigated agriculture (Behnke and Kerven, 2013; Lavers, 2016); 
the exacerbation of local resource conflicts and ethnic divisions (Schilling et al., 2016; Mkutu, 
2019; Manzano, 2018); alongside growing social inequity within pastoral areas (Greiner, 2016, 
2017; Catley, 2017; Kochore, 2016; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Krätli, 2019). What this research 
adds – and what is only beginning to be explored elsewhere (Regassa et al., 2019; Lind et al., 
2020) – is an insight into the extent to which local capital – including local pastoralist elites and 
local political interests – play a prominent role in driving those transformations. In other words, it 
shows where the interests of the state, external private investors and local capital have merged to 
gain control of, and profit from, formerly communally managed lands and resources – 
reconfiguring pastoralist livelihoods in the process. This is another example of where 
governmentality in the Foucauldian sense (Chapter 4) is playing out in the pastoral drylands, 
whereby certain local actors (political elites and pastoralist entrepreneurs, for example) have come 
to internalise the responsibilities, norms and discourses (in this case, a ‘transforming pastoralism’ 
discourse) of the state, often at the expense of the wider community.  
In Ethiopia, it is argued, the kinds of policy prescriptions and planning that flow from dominant 
narratives surrounding climate change, the ‘green economy’ and the development of pastoral areas 
more generally primarily serve the interests of those who have most to gain from greater 
commercialisation, changes in land use and the privatisation of formerly customarily managed 
resources. These include the state itself (in terms of a rapidly growing national economy and 
increased agricultural export earnings – the benefits of which, according to government officials, 
are beginning to be reinvested in pastoral area development) but also external investors (state and 
private agri-businesses, investors in infrastructure and extractives) as well as a growing commercial 
class within pastoralism. Poorer pastoralists, meanwhile, whose mobility and access to critical 
seasonal rangeland resources is increasingly restricted by changes in land use and infrastructure 
development, are undoubtedly the ‘losers’ from the kinds of changes underway. Facing particular 
challenges are minority agropastoralist ethnic groups, such as those inhabiting the Lower Omo 
Valley – dispossessed of their traditional lands to make way for industrial sugarcane cultivation 
and facing enforced villagisation as a consequence. The findings further reveal that technocratic 
solutions – programmes of sedentarisation, fixed waterpoints and conversion of dry-season pastoral 
reserves to crop cultivation – are still being prioritised by policymakers, despite a long history of 
similar ill-conceived interventions (Dyer et al., 2008; Lavers, 2012; Catley et al., 2013; Regassa et 





Similarly, narratives of ‘green growth’, ‘food security’ and ‘climate resilience’ are, as we saw in 
Chapters 5 and 6, being evoked by policymakers in Kenya as a means of legitimising new 
infrastructure projects and private investments. As the interviews reveal, infrastructure 
development, the rapid growth in towns in northern counties, investments in extractives, ‘green’ 
energy, irrigated cropping – even wildlife conservancies – are evidently bringing employment and 
business opportunities for some. Notably they are those with greater resources of land, livestock, 
education, social and political capital – or who belong to a dominant ethnic group in a devolved 
county. Yet such developments place restrictions on the mobility of others: poorer, less asset-rich 
and/or minority pastoralist groups, who may have been displaced and marginalised historically,371 
and who now face new forms of exclusion in the name of ‘green growth’ or conservation, or as 
political boundaries are redrawn. With the loss of access to key resources, local conflicts over land 
and resources are accentuated. Without sufficient assets or political capital to be able to stake their 
own claims or resist the power of the state and private capital, these poorer groups risk increasing 
marginalisation and are less equipped to deal with climatic and other ‘shocks’ as a consequence. 
This ultimately pushes many into destitution and food-aid dependency.  
More specifically, the consequences of climate-change policies for pastoralists are mixed. 
Although levels of implementation are arguably at a more advanced stage in Kenya, some dryland 
communities in both countries are – according to a cross-section of informants – beginning to see 
the benefits of various climate-adaptation and disaster-risk-reduction policies and (donor-
supported) resilience programmes in terms of greater preparedness in the face of drought and other 
hazards, along with improved provision of state services and the extension of social-protection 
measures to formerly peripheral pastoral areas. The effects of severe regional drought in the period 
2015–17, for example, are perceived (in both cases) as being less devastating for dryland 
communities than the drought of 2011/12 was. Nonetheless, the interviews also reveal that national 
climate policies that drive large-scale transformative change - the development of hydropower, for 
example, or the conversion of pastoral lowlands into other forms of land use - are effectively giving 
rise to complex and unpredictable effects at the local level. This ultimately undermines pastoralists’ 
primary means of responding to climatic and resource variability – mobility. 
There are some important differences between the two countries, nonetheless. In the case of Kenya, 
the findings reveal that there is a stronger effort amongst government ministries to integrate and 
ensure coherence between various climate-adaptation and drought-management strategies. Under 
the 2016 Climate Change Act, all such policies and plans must be channelled and mainstreamed 
through devolved government. Public participation is a social and political right of all citizens of 
Kenya, protected by the Constitution. This opens up more space for community engagement in 
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decision-making. In Ethiopia, in contrast, as Chapter 6 reveals, different powerful ministries are 
more likely to work separately on different policies, with some competition for resources and donor 
support. At the time of writing (2020), there is a risk that policies for developing pastoral areas as 
set out in a new draft Pastoral Development Policy and Strategy may be given less attention, as the 
government endeavours to contain emergent power struggles between dominant ethnic groups who 
stand to benefit or lose from the current political reform process (MRI, 2019). In Kenya, while 
many pastoralists face disadvantages, or suffer the consequences of increasing rangeland 
fragmentation, they are not subject to enforced sedentarisation (as in Ethiopia), nor would they 
tolerate it, given their greater political power.372 In Kenya, local communities have the space to 
resist unwelcome forms of development, in a way that has not been permitted in Ethiopia until very 
recently. In Kenya, the Community Land Act is generally perceived as offering a progressive means 
by which communal land holdings can be legally recognised and pastoralist tenure protected. No 
such comparable legislation exists in Ethiopia. These findings thus add further weight to the 
growing call by various institutions for strengthened land rights and governance in pastoral areas, 
and for the need to bring pastoralists into the centre of policy debates (Haddis et al., 2017; FAO, 
2018; Gebremeskel et al., 2019).  
In sum, this chapter argues that, while some important differences exist between the two countries, 
actions to address climate change or build ‘climate resilience’ and ‘green growth’ in pastoral areas 
are creating new social disparities and differentiated patterns of vulnerability, as well as 
consolidating existing ones, in both cases. Different actors and interests (the state, private investors, 
wealthier herders / ‘pastoralist elites’) are seeking to take advantage of the kinds of investment 
opportunities and political / policy spaces that are opening up, particularly as they relate to critical 
issues of access to, and control over, land and other resources. Invariably, those groups that have 
greater access to resources and capital in its various forms are able to use these to secure further 
benefits. In Chapter 8, I provide concluding arguments in support of my thesis that more responsive 
and inclusive forms of governance in pastoral areas are necessary, as well as identifying openings 
for further research.  
                                                        
372 Pastoralist MPs form a sizable caucus in the Kenyan Parliament, and Kenyan CSOs operate with far greater freedom 















































Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, it was revealed that – while there is a growing body of 
knowledge on how climatic and other forms of dynamic change are impacting on pastoralism in the 
HoA – less is known about how recent policy responses and development interventions in the name 
of climate change or drylands development are shaped by certain discourses and narratives and by 
political interests, and what the consequences of these narratives are. This study sets out to address 
that gap. Drawing on a systematic content and discourse analysis of national policies across 
multiple government institutions and across a distinct period of time (2007–2017), as well as from 
an analysis of interview data from 68 key informants in the two case-study countries, this study 
argues that – while concerns around climate change and calls for strengthening resilience of 
dryland communities have given a new impetus to pastoral development in the HoA – old 
narratives that depict pastoral systems and pastoral areas as unproductive and in need of 
modernisation remain embedded in policymaking. Combined with climate-change arguments, these 
narratives are opening up space for the state and other actors – private investors, local elites, 
conservation organisations – to extend control over natural resources previously managed under 
customary institutions. Climate policy ‘solutions’ and dryland investments are, in turn, leading to 
new patterns of social differentiation and vulnerability among pastoralists. Meanwhile, local 
pastoralist elites and local political interests are playing an increasingly prominent role in driving 
economic and social change in formerly peripheral pastoral drylands of Kenya and Ethiopia. It 
follows that predominantly apolitical and technocratic climate-adaptation and resilience-building 
interventions on their own – while providing some degree of climate-risk preparedness – are 
insufficient to meet the needs of pastoralist communities. The extent and nature of dynamic change 
in the drylands of the HoA calls for political responses that address social inequities and power 
imbalances, that safeguard pastoralists’ resource rights and that allow for more inclusive forms of 
governance.  
The first part of this chapter synthesises the results of this research and outlines my central 
arguments in support of my thesis. The second part offers practical contributions with regard to 
what improved governance in pastoral areas might entail. The third part highlights the contribution 
of this study to the existing body of research. In the final part, I identify some possible openings for 





8.2 Beyond climate change: The politics of pastoralist transformations 
The first argument of this thesis – and the answer to my first research question – is that, despite a 
growing body of research and evidence pointing to the ecological, economic and social value of 
pastoral systems, a ‘transforming pastoralism and pastoral areas’ discourse remains at the heart 
of both Ethiopian and Kenyan policy. As has been discussed, the governments of Ethiopia and 
Kenya have – with donor support – ambitions to integrate formerly peripheral dryland areas into 
the national economy and to design development strategies and policies that ostensibly seek to 
strengthen the ‘resilience’ of pastoralists to climate change. What is evident, nonetheless – from 
both the policy document analysis and the interview data – is that, within this vision, pastoralists 
are still frequently perceived as ill-adapted to ‘modern’ contingencies and ‘in need of 
transformation’. If not always explicit, old narratives of fragile and conflict-ridden drylands and of 
pastoral systems as ‘unproductive’ remain deeply embedded within policy discourse. By defining 
pastoralists as ‘vulnerable’ social groups whose ‘resilience’ needs to be enhanced, as many national 
policies clearly do, pastoralists’ own agency and knowledge in how they respond to climatic and 
other change is denied. 
The depth and persistence of such narratives is, in part, both a cause and consequence of these 
narratives’ power to influence policy and planning processes (Robbins, 2012), ultimately 
contributing, as we have seen, to limiting the power and resource rights of local people – in this 
case, poorer pastoralists. Just as narratives of ‘overgrazing’, ‘desertification’ and ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ shaped drylands planning in the past (Chapter 2), so the threat of climate change – 
combined with the drive for modernisation and ‘green growth’ – provides justification for powerful 
actors today (state institutions, rent-seeking government officials, private investors, conservation 
organisations) to claim stewardship over communal rangelands and convert them to other forms of 
land use. In Ethiopia, the desire to build ‘climate resilience’, combined with the push for rapid 
economic growth, are clearly guiding narratives for the drive to sedentarise pastoralist communities 
and for transforming pastoral production systems towards a more commercialised orientation. In 
Kenya, while counternarratives built around the ideas of ‘pastoralist resilience’ and ‘pastoralist 
rights’ are influencing the ways in which pastoralists are understood and portrayed by policy actors 
– and are more prominent within certain policies373 – long-standing crises narratives of ‘pastoralist 
vulnerability’, ‘conflict over resources’ and ‘food insecurity’ still persist. Narratives, furthermore, 
not only convey storylines of cause and effect; they usually have embedded the advocacy of 
particular policy ‘solutions’. In Ethiopia and Kenya, it is no different. Technocratic policy 
prescriptions – ‘rangeland management’, ‘disaster-risk reduction’, ‘early warning systems’, 
‘commercialisation of the livestock sector’, ‘index-based livestock insurance’, ‘water development’ 
– are, for the most part, privileged over measures that would strengthen pastoralist land rights – or, 
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critically, protect mobility, pastoralists’ key strategy for managing climatic and ecological 
variability.  
The second core argument of this study – and the answer to my second research question – is that 
the transformation of pastoral production towards a more commercial and diversified orientation 
remains the primary interest of policymakers (the state and donors) in both cases, despite 
differences in their political landscapes.  
In Ethiopia, the state (key ministries such as the MoFPDA, the MoEFCC and the MoA especially) 
is clearly the dominant actor driving national policy narratives on pastoralism and climate change. 
Nonetheless, the influence of certain donors (the World Bank and USAID), UN agencies and – to a 
lesser extent – a select group of INGOs and respected individual researchers and research institutes 
on shaping the current narratives, and bringing certain elements of the ‘modern, mobile and green’ 
discourse to debates on the future of pastoralism, is also evident (see Chapter 6). Ethiopian state 
actors have in turn clearly adopted many of the metaphors and narratives associated with a 
‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse on pastoralism, as they seek to mobilise resources around 
common goals of climate resilience, food security and economic growth. Yet the extent to which 
new understandings of pastoralism are manifested in development planning in pastoral areas, or 
existing structures of power are challenged, remains open to question.  
In Kenya, in contrast, the findings are less clearcut – while a ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse 
is, as we saw, dominant in most policy documents analysed (Chapter 5), the findings of interviews 
reveal that interaction between state and non-state actors have had a deeper and more lasting 
impression. Local and international researchers, CSOs and even certain individuals within key 
government ministries (notably the former MDNKOAL) and institutions (the NDMA, in particular) 
– along with ‘pro-pastoralist’ local county government officials and members of the Pastoralist 
Parliamentary Group (PPG) – form a ‘discursive coalition’ of like-minded actors, who have 
evidently brought about a more substantive shift in thinking around pastoralism. This shift is 
discernable in the perspectives and assumptions of those Kenyan government officials interviewed 
for this research (see Table 6.1) – if not necessarily in all areas of written policy (as Chapter 5 
reveals) or in all areas of policy implementation (Chapter 7).  
POs, meanwhile, although an important contributor to new understandings of pastoralism, remain 
(in both cases) at the margins in terms of their influence over policy processes and outcomes and 
find themselves increasingly restricted by the challenge of securing long-term financial support 
(Ethiopia and Kenya), as well as by what they can, or cannot, say on certain matters deemed in the 





My third argument, and the answer to my third research question, is that, while some differences 
exist between the two cases, actions to address climate change or build ‘climate resilience’ and 
‘green growth’ in pastoral areas are leading to new social inequities and differentiated patterns of 
vulnerability, as well as accentuating existing ones. In Ethiopia, the findings point to the fact that 
the kinds of policy prescriptions and planning that flow from dominant narratives surrounding 
climate change, the ‘green economy’ and the development of pastoral areas more generally 
primarily serve the interests of those who have most to gain from greater commercialisation, 
changes in land use and the privatisation of formerly communally managed resources, especially in 
the fertile riverine areas of Ethiopia’s lowlands. This includes the state itself, in terms of higher 
economic growth (the benefits of which are arguably being reinvested in rural development and 
improved services) but also private investors and a growing commercial, and politically well 
connected, class within pastoralism itself. Meanwhile, technocratic solutions and control-orientated 
measures – programmes of sedentarisation, fixed waterpoints and conversion of dry-season 
pastoral reserves to crop cultivation – continue to be prioritised by the state, despite a long history 
of similarly ill-fated interventions in pastoral rangelands. As Chapter 7 reveals, these programmes 
have led to undesirable consequences for poorer pastoralist households, who find themselves 
displaced from critical resources. As a result, communities along the Awash River (Afar) or 
minority indigenous agropastoralist groups, such as in the Lower Omo Valley, whose traditional 
lands have been converted to industrial sugarcane cultivation, face enforced villagisation and 
subsequently find themselves more vulnerable or even destitute.  
Similarly, narratives of ‘green growth’, ‘food security’ and ‘climate resilience’ are being evoked by 
policymakers in Kenya as a means of legitimising new infrastructure projects and private 
investments in ASAL counties. While infrastructure development corridors (such as LAPSSET), 
the rapid growth in towns, investments in extractives, ‘green’-energy projects, irrigated cropping – 
even wildlife conservancies – bring gains for some, others ‘lose out’ as a consequence. As in 
Ethiopia, an emergent local elite in pastoral areas (including wealthy livestock owners and ex-
pastoralists) has been able to use their political connections (at both national and county level) to 
capture the benefits of devolved power and resources, or has managed to profit from compensatory 
payments for infrastructure development and changes in land tenure. At risk of falling into 
destitution are those less asset-rich households (with smaller herds) and/or minority pastoralist 
groups that face new forms of displacement in the name of green economic growth or conservation, 
or as political boundaries are redrawn along ethnic lines. Such groups are less equipped to deal 
with climatic and other ‘shocks’ when they do occur.  
There are, nonetheless, some important differences between the two cases. For Kenya, the findings 
reveal that there is a stronger coherence between various climate-adaptation and drought-





channelled and mainstreamed through devolved government, so – in theory – opening up more 
space for community engagement in decision-making. In Ethiopia, in contrast, as Chapter 6 
reveals, different ministries are more likely to work separately on different policies, with some 
element of competition for resources and donor support. In Kenya, while many pastoralists 
undoubtedly suffer the consequences of rangeland fragmentation and inappropriate development, 
they are not subject to any official programmme of sedentarisation (as in Ethiopia) – nor would 
they accept such an imposition, given their stronger political power. In Kenya, local communities 
and POs have shown they have the power to resist unwelcome forms of development, in a way that 
has not been permitted in Ethiopia until very recently. In Kenya, the 2016 Community Land Act 
(CLA) is generally perceived as offering a progressive means by which communal land holding can 
be legally recognised and pastoralist tenure protected. No such comparable legislation exists in 
Ethiopia.  
8.3 Policy lessons and ways forward  
The findings of this research demonstrate that policies and interventions for climate-change 
adaptation and pastoralist development need to be considered within the context of political 
interests and governance in pastoral areas. Climate-adaptation and resilience-building types of 
policies and programming on their own, whether well-intentioned or – as we have seen (Chapters 6 
and 7) – designed with other interests and priorities in mind, are clearly insufficient to address the 
nature of dynamic change underway and the multiple challenges faced by pastoralists in the HoA. 
‘Governance’ opens up a broader political agenda that addresses the multiple political processes 
and relationships through which state and non-state actors interact, allowing policymaking in the 
HoA to move beyond the kinds of depoliticised ‘environmental-crises’ narratives that are a feature 
of so much of the ‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse described thus far. 
It is evident that clearer overarching national land-use policies that integrate principles of ‘pastoral 
governance’ (see Chapter 3), and that put measures in place to prevent the loss of further key 
pastoral resources would make a difference in terms of enhancing pastoralists’ rights and 
livelihoods. At the heart of such governance is the need to facilitate, rather than impede, mobility – 
nomadic pastoralists’ key means of managing the variability of drylands, including movement 
across borders (national and inter-county or regional-state), where forms of governance are often at 
their weakest (Sempleci and Nori, 2020). As reiterated throughout this thesis, there is a need, 
furthermore, to safeguard strategic resources (for example, dry-season grazing reserves) from the 
kinds of inappropriate investments and forms of capital accumulation described in earlier chapters 
– investments frequently driven by the very policies that purport to transform pastoral areas in the 





systems, in that they provide a critical ‘fallback’ in times of need, such as during a drought, 
livestock disease outbreak or armed conflict.   
The extent to which poorer pastoralists especially will be able to adapt to environmental, economic 
and political change, and take advantage of policy initiatives and economic opportunities – in a 
manner that is both equitable and sustainable – depends on how willing the state is (with or without 
the support of ‘development partners’), at both national and local government levels, to create an 
enabling space for responsive and inclusive governance in pastoral rangelands. Such intentions are 
certainly reflected in the 2012 ASAL Policy in Kenya (see Chapter 5) –which, as we saw, emerged 
at a particular time when a (discursive) coalition of state and non-state actors, including progressive 
minds within the MDNKOAL, came together to push for recognition of pastoralism as a legitimate 
land-use system and for the development of ASAL counties. The MDNKOAL has since been 
disbanded and its successor institutions are perceived as lacking the same political will to see the 
ASAL Policy implemented (Chapter 6) – at a time when the Kenyan Government’s ‘Big Four’ 
agenda dominates national development interests (GoK, 2018). In turn, there is general agreement 
that the process of devolution and growing pastoralist political representation at both national and 
county levels, have created a significant political space for pastoralism in Kenya. But this is not 
without the accompanying challenges of elite capture, growing social differentiation and new forms 
of territoralisation along ethnic lines, as Chapter 7 reveals. The extent to which the new Pastoral 
Development Policy (Chapter 6) has opened up a similar policy space for pastoralist engagement in 
Ethiopia remains to be seen, and ultimately depends on the outcomes of the broader political 
reform process initiated under PM Abiy Ahmed.  
Rather than invest solely in top-down and technical ‘solutions’ to climate change and rangeland 
management – as is the case in a great many of the policies analysed – there is a need to invest 
instead in pastoralists’ capacity to claim their rights to the strategic resources on which they depend 
and to empower them to participate in relevant decision-making processes, as they are entitled to 
do under both countries’ respective constitutions (Chapter 2). Clearly, fairer and more inclusive 
power structures – at all levels – are required to ensure that institutions, both formal and customary, 
are transparent and accountable to those pastoralist communities they purport to govern. There is a 
need, furthermore - as we heard from a cross-section of interviewees (Chapter 6) - for the state and 
donors to ensure long-term support to those CSOs and other non-state actors who are providing 
pastoralist communities with essential information regarding legislation, policies and investments 
that have implications for them – the 2016 Community Land Act (CLA) or County Spatial Plans 
(see below) in Kenya, for example. Such support remains uncertain at present (Chapter 6). 
As has also been highlighted in this study, greater emphasis needs to be put on local pastoralists’ 
knowledge, innovation and adaptation as entry points for climate-change and livestock-related 





change in the drylands, as well as awareness of the current constraints to innovation – notably 
restrictions on mobility and growing inequities in asset ownership and levels of power (Chapters 6 
and 7). While existing adaptation policies and measures may reduce risk in the short term, they do 
not necessarily address the development needs and rights of pastoralists that enable them to adapt 
to climatic and other forms of change in the longer term. Mainstream climate policy discourse, as 
was evident from the policy analysis (Chapter 5), is rarely shaped by indigenous understandings 
and practices, and is contingent instead on the inputs of institutionalised science and so-called 
‘experts’ – another form of power in the Foucauldian sense (Chapter 4). Following a constructivist 
perspective that informs this research, ‘inclusive’ or participatory governance necessarily implies 
opening up pastoral area governance to alternative and ‘non-expert’ framings of problems and 
solutions (Hajer, 1995), particularly in relation to complex challenges that have social implications, 
such as climate change. Although not a focus of this study, the active role of women in pastoralist 
systems also needs to be more widely recognised and supported through enabling policy 
frameworks. Resource loss, climate shocks, conflicts, and adverse policies affect all pastoralists, 
but their impact is felt more severely by pastoralist women who have been historically 
marginalised.  
Challenges remain nonetheless, especially in terms of how ‘communities’ are to be defined and 
delineated and at what scale communal territories are to be recognised in land-tenure legislation 
(Sande et al., 2020). Formal land-certification frameworks (such as in Ethiopia) have generally 
been developed with small-scale farmers in mind and offer no guidance on how large communal 
rangeland territories should be (Sande et al., 2020). The USAID-supported LAND project in 
Borana Ethiopia (see Chapter 7) offers an example, nonetheless, of where attempts have been made 
to harmonise flexible and traditional customary governance institutions (the Gada and dheeda) 
with formal government administration, and where a ‘participatory rangeland management’ (Roba 
and Davies, 2018) type of planning has worked to overcome these challenges. There is potential for 
such good practice to be replicated and scaled-up elsewhere in Ethiopia. In the Kenyan case, 
meanwhile, wealthy and/or absentee livestock owners – who have the ability, connections and 
resources to move large numbers of animals to where pasture is good – will often work in pursuit 
of their own interests, undermining community-based resource-management agreements (see 
Chapter 7). The weakening of customary institutions and the kinds of misguided development 
interventions described thus far have not helped, especially in a pastoral land-tenure context where 
– to borrow the words of Behnke – “everything is now up for grabs” (2018: 716).  
At a regional level, 2020 has seen moves towards adoption of an important protocol on cross-
border transhumance amongst IGAD member states374 – a key tool in realising the AU Policy 
Framework for Pastoralism (see Chapters 2 and 5). This transhumance agreement has been 






influenced by two important documents: the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(FAO, 2012) and the VGGT Technical Guide on improving governance in pastoral lands (Davies 
et al., 2016), both of which offer valuable pointers for governance reform. In Kenya, work is being 
done by the Kenyan National Land Commission to develop County Spatial Planning Guidelines, 
designed to assist counties in mapping and managing pastoral lands (GoK-MLPP, 2018). 
Significantly, the 2016 Community Land Act in Kenya offers, as we have seen, a potentially 
progressive legal tool for securing community land, although concerns have been raised around 
whether the institutional capacity and political will is there to see it implemented, and whether 
loopholes will be used by local pastoral elites to ‘grab land’ and dispossess communities (Chapter 
7). Allowing communities to themselves lease lands to investors or to national and local 
governments – as suggested by several interviewees (Chapter 7) – may ensure that communities are 
properly compensated from new investments, such as a wind farm or a mining concession. At the 
same time, there is a need to confront vested interests and political power in such contexts, where 
there is a high risk that benefits will accrue to some groups more so than others (Chapter 7). ‘Good 
governance’ calls for equitable benefit-sharing agreements between investors and other 
stakeholders, as well as within communities. Pastoralist communities are entitled to be protected by 
the UN principle of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ which pertains to indigenous peoples, so 
allowing them to give or withhold consent from a project that affects them or their territories 
(Davies et al., 2016) – a principle evidently not observed in the case of Lake Turkana Wind Power 
(LTWP) (Chapter 7). Davies et al. (2016) observes that ‘good governance’ in pastoral rangelands 
must be set within an overarching commitment to respect pastoralist human rights – clearly also 
lacking in the enforced villagisation and displacement of pastoralists in certain regions of Ethiopia 
described earlier.  
Ultimately, the challenge for initiatives such as the LAND project (Ethiopia) or the CLA and 
County Spatial Plans (Kenya) lies in their implementation – and the extent to which CSOs, 
including local pastoralist groups and organisations, are given a real ‘voice’ in policy- and 
decision-making processes that affect them. This would ensure that alternative discourse and 
narratives countering common misconceptions around pastoralism and climate change are heard. 
Nonetheless, as Godfrey-Wood and Otto-Naess (2016: 56) remind us: “ensuring that vulnerable 
people have a ‘voice’ cannot necessarily be equated with transformative outcomes, and may have 
little effect unless they are accompanied by changes in structures for representation and power.” To 
date, this would seem to have been realised to a far greater extent in Kenya than in Ethiopia, where 





8.3 Contribution to the literature 
This thesis makes a contribution to the pastoralist studies literature in a number of ways. These are 
as follows: 
Firstly, as we saw in Chapters 1 and 2, several scholars have suggested that, while the language 
may have evolved, some of the narratives driving current climate-change and pastoralist-
development policies in Ethiopia and Kenya are not necessarily ‘new’, but are instead rooted in 
‘old’ (historical) discourses around ‘unproductive’ drylands, the poor as agents and victims of 
environmental degradation, and the need for modernisation. Eriksen and Marin (2015), for 
example, argue that seemingly apolitical narratives of environmental change found in Ethiopian 
climate-change policies are likely to serve the interests of certain constituencies or obscure policy 
impacts at the local level. Elsewhere, Krätli (2019) asserts that the Ethiopian state is using climate-
change arguments, combined with the drive for modernisation, to validate the re-emergence or 
continuation of past unpopular policies such as sedentarisation or the displacement of pastoralists 
from key resources. In the case of Kenya, Odhiambo (2014) argues that deeply held negative 
narratives depicting the ASAL as degraded and unproductive, and pastoral systems as backward, 
remain remarkably persistent, despite the gains made by ‘new policy frameworks’. Climate change 
has, if anything, “fed these age-old narratives” (ibid.: 17). What this study adds to this literature is a 
systematic analysis of Ethiopian and Kenyan national policies over a specific time period 
(supplemented by interviews with key informants), the results of which clearly verify the claims 
above – allowing for some nuances and differences between the two cases. The CA and DA of 
national policy documents (Chapter 5), which identified a ‘transforming pastoralism and pastoral 
areas’ discourse to be to the fore in both cases, provides strong empirical evidence to support the 
argument that climate change and future food-security imperatives are being evoked by powerful 
actors as a means to legitimise appropriation of pastoral resources, just as narratives of 
‘overgrazing’, ‘desertification’ and ‘tragedy of the commons’ were used to do so in the past 
(Chapter 2). Similarly, the interviews with policy actors reveal that state officials in Ethiopia are 
inclined to frame commercialisation of the livestock sector, livelihood diversification and even 
sedentarisation as necessary precursors for ‘climate-resilient livelihoods’ (Chapter 6).  
Secondly, this research adds further empirical evidence to support what has been observed 
elsewhere: that narratives shift to suit the needs of actors as new opportunities and contexts arise 
(Maina et al., 2014; Otto-Naess et al., 2015; Whitfield, 2016) – the process of devolution and the 
accelerated economic development of northern Kenya’s ASAL counties or the promotion of a 
‘green economy’ in Ethiopia being cases in point. And that ‘dominant narratives’ have the ability 
to absorb the language and concepts of ‘counternarratives’ (Toulmin and Brock, 2016) – where a 
discourse of ‘modern, mobile and green pastoralism’ has now become more central to how 





‘climate-resilient’ and ‘modern’. What this study reveals, which has perhaps been underexplored to 
date, is the extent to which interactions between state and non-state actors have had a deeper and 
more lasting impression on how pastoralism is understood within certain policymaking circles in 
Kenya compared to Ethiopia. Local and international researchers, CSOs, even individuals within 
key government ministries (notably the former MDNKOAL) and institutions (the NDMA) – along 
with ‘pro-pastoralist’ local county government officials and members of the Pastoralist 
Parliamentary Group (PPG) – form a ‘discursive coalition’ of like-minded actors, who have 
evidently brought about a more substantive shift in thinking around pastoralism than has been the 
case (until very recently) in Ethiopia. This shift is discernable at least in the perspectives and 
assumptions of those Kenyan government officials interviewed for this research (see Table 6.1) – if 
not necessarily manifested in all areas of written policy or in all areas of policy implementation. 
This is an anomaly explained by the fact that there is likely to be greater support for pastoralism 
within certain government Ministries and state institutions – those responsible for livestock 
development, pastoralist affairs and/or drought management, for example – than there is among 
their colleagues responsible for national economic planning, renewable energy or irrigation – all 
domains where important policy decisions are made that have implications for the livelihoods of 
pastoralists. 
Thirdly, this research builds on what a number of scholars have highlighted elsewhere – that the 
kinds of economic, social and political transformations and processes that are underway in the 
pastoral drylands of Ethiopia and Kenya, while benefiting some, are resulting in negative outcomes 
for others. Such processes include: the appropriation of pastoral resources (see for example: Galaty, 
2013; Mulatu and Bekere, 2013; Abbink et al., 2014; Mosley and Watson, 2016); involuntary 
sedentarisation (Yimer, 2015; Hodbod et al., 2018; Regassa et al., 2019); the replacement of 
pastoralism with irrigated agriculture (Behnke and Kerven, 2013; Lavers, 2016); the exacerbation 
of local resource conflicts and ethnic divisions (Schilling et al., 2016; Mkutu, 2019; Manzano, 
2018); alongside growing social inequity within pastoral areas (Greiner, 2016; Catley, 2017; 
Kochore, 2016; Cormack and Kurewa, 2018; Krätli, 2019). What this research adds – and what is 
only beginning to be explored elsewhere (Regassa et al, 2019; Lind et al., 2020) – is a clear exposé 
of the extent to which local capital in both Kenya and Ethiopia – including local pastoralist elites 
and political interests – are playing a prominent role in driving that transformation (see Chapters 6 
and 7). The findings reveal that capital accumulation and resource appropriation in the pastoral 
areas cannot be understood simply as a case of ‘the state and/or global capital versus local 
communities’ – as might suit a populist narrative – but rather is a multidimensional process 
whereby the interests of the state, external investors and local capital frequently converge with 
similar intentions in mind: gaining control of, and profiting from, formerly communally managed 
lands and resources - reconfiguring pastoralist livelihoods in the process. Local capital and local 





former communally held rangeland into irrigated crop cultivation, oil extraction or wildlife 
tourism, is just one such case. In some instances, this could be a matter of local pastoralists 
‘enclosing’ formerly communal lands, before they are taken by others, with a view to profiting 
from future land value (Chapters 6 and 7). This trend is another example of where governmentality, 
in the Foucauldian sense (see Chapter 4), is playing out in the pastoral drylands – whereby certain 
local actors have come to internalise the responsibilities, norms and discourses (in this case, a 
‘transforming pastoralism’ discourse) of the state, often at the expense of the wider community.  
There is a need, nonetheless, to move beyond a simple dichotomy of ‘winners and losers’. The 
challenge for policy makers is to enable pathways the allow the development imperatives of the 
state – such as food security, resilience in the face of climate change, and sustainable economic 
growth – to be met in a way that does not undermine the rights of pastoralists to land and other 
resources. And which, as argued above, affords more agency and voice to pastoralists in 
policymaking processes that affect them. In others words, an inclusive and ‘rights-based’ form of 
governance of pastoral drylands as this chapter has called for.  ‘Climate resilience’ discourse does 
not have to be ‘modernisation in disguise’, confined to kind of top-down technocratic programmes 
and ‘mega’ infrastructure projects that are such a strong feature of much contemporary green 
development in Ethiopa and Kenya’s drylands – large scale hydro-power or the replacement of 
mobile livestock production with irrigated agriculture, for example. The consequences of which are 
leading to new forms of vulnerability for many.   Such discourse needs to be steered instead 
towards emphasising the adaptive capacity and agency of pastoralists towards progressive ends.  
As those whose standpoint is closer to a ‘modern, mobile and green’ discourse have argued 
(Chapter 3), climate change offers an opportunity for the state and their development partners to 
move beyond simply recognising the role of extensive livestock systems in drylands management 
and food security and to translate that new understanding into climate change mitigation and 
adaptation strategies that are appropriate to local and diverse contexts. And that do not lead to 
maladaptive outcomes. The need for a ‘greener’ form of development also offers space for 
pastoralists capitalise on the growth in new ‘niche markets’ for high-value livestock products, and 
to be compensated for the environmental services they provide.  This thesis support such a view, 
with the premise that such a green development paradigm recognises the broader context of 
vulnerability in pastoral drylands, which prevents the interests of some groups being promoted at 
the expense of others, and which allows room for multiple perspectives and forms of knowledge in 
policy-making processes.  
8.4 Limitations, and avenues of further research  
This thesis has systematically examined the ways in which discourse and narratives around 





change and drylands development in Ethiopia and Kenya, the agency and interests of different 
actors shaping these policies, and the consequences of these policy narratives for pastoralist 
livelihoods. The findings reveal that climate-change narratives – combined with the drive for 
modernisation – are being used by the state and other actors as tools in contestations over land and 
other resources in the drylands of Ethiopia and Kenya, the outcomes of which are creating new 
social inequities and patterns of vulnerability among pastoralists, as well as accentuating existing 
ones. Finally, it has argued for more inclusive forms of governance in pastoral lands: that protect 
and safeguard pastoralists’ rights to the resources necessary for sustaining mobile livestock 
production, and that afford more agency and voice to pastoralists in policymaking processes. 
A limitation of this research is the fact that no local case studies of contested forms of climate 
adaptation or mitigation – while frequently cited (LTWP in Kenya for example) – are examined in 
depth. Nor is space given to the voices and perspectives of local pastoralist community members 
(for reasons given in Chapter 4), despite pastoralism being at the heart of this study. The fact that 
womens voices or perspectives are not explicitly considered in this study is acknowledged as a 
further limitation. It is quite possible that different perspectives would have emerged should 
womens’ voices have been more the fore. 
Evidently, more local, case-specific, research is needed – typically focusing on, for example, cases 
where interventions in the name of climate adaptation, the ‘green economy’ (such as a renewable-
energy or carbon-sequestration project), ‘climate-smart agriculture’ or ‘climate resilience’ are 
being implemented in predominantly pastoral areas of Ethiopia or Kenya. The kinds of questions 
that need to be asked here include: What climate-change arguments and other narratives are driving 
these interventions and what and whose knowledge is being taken into account? What are the 
political and structural drivers that produce vulnerability in these local contexts? Are such projects 
‘building resilience’, as their proponents claim, or are they instead exacerbating existing, or 
creating new, inequities and differentiated exposure to climate change and other uncertainties? In 
light of growing social differentiation within pastoral areas, as have seen above, there is clearly 
also a need also to interrogate the concept of a ‘pastoralist community’ more closely in any such 
localised case-specific research. 
Such research necessitates critical, politicised and context-specific analysis of both the nature of 
local vulnerabilities and multiple stressors, as well as kinds of solutions being proposed. By placing 
local and regional environmental problems in a broader historical, and political economy, context, 
and by examining the distribution of costs and benefits from environmental change (a change in 
land use from pastoralism to irrigated cropping or from pastoralism to a wildlife conservancy, as 
examples), this research could benefit from the insights of political ecology, which seeks to 
understand the ways in which social relations, institutions and power produce particular types of 





studies by (among others): Kronenburg-Garcia (2018) on forms of governmentality and pastoralism 
in Kenya’s southern drylands; Pas Schrijver (2019) on shifting roles of access and control of 
grazing resources in northern Kenya; Greiner (2020) on the consequences of geothermal 
investments in Baringo county, Kenya; Cormack and Kurewa (2018) and Drew (2020) on the 
politics of inclusion in the case of LTWP; Rettburg (2020) on the politics of state-driven 
investments in the Awash Valley, Ethiopia. More research on the consequences of devolution for 
pastoralism in Kenya would also be of value, building on the work of Scott-Villiers (2017), Abdi 
and Lind (2018) and Manzano (2018), who have pointed to the ‘territorial nature’ of devolution in 
pastoral areas as posing a significant challenge for minority ethnic groups where a majority group 
dominates – a trend reported by informants in this study (Chapter 7). A question for further 
research is how pastoralist mobility, in the context of climatic and other forms of change in the 
dryland, constitutes a challenge to such territorialisation as a form of governmentality in the 
Foucauldian sense (see Chapter 4).  
At the same time, there is a need for climate-change research that engages critically and reflexively 
with local pastoralist communities, and action-research that aligns with the ways pastoralists talk 
about their own dynamics of vulnerability / resilience – in other words, that engages with 
pastoralists’ own perspectives, knowledge and worldviews. Pastoralist communities, after all, have 
been living with a fluctuating climate and other forms of change for millennia. They continue to 
adapt and innovate, and create new forms of mobility, despite the many challenges. For ‘solutions’ 
we need to look more to the local level rather than rely on the kinds of top-down technocratic fixes 
and knowledge of experts that, for the main part, form the mainstay of the kinds of policies 
analysed in this study. This calls, perhaps, for collaborative forms of research, using ethnographic 
approaches over a longer period of time, logistically not possible for this study. 
8.5 Conclusion 
From the findings of this research, a clearer picture has emerged of how seemingly apolitical 
narratives of climate change and pastoralist vulnerability are likely to serve the political and 
economic interests of certain constituencies, as well as mask the impacts of national policy and 
politics at the local level, including politicised claims to land and other resources. In tandem, 
actions to address climate change or build ‘climate resilience’ in pastoral areas are consolidating, as 
well as creating new, inequities and patterns of differentiated exposure to climate risk. Clearly, 
climate-adaptation and resilience-building interventions on their own are insufficient to meet the 
needs of pastoralist communities. The extent and nature of change in the drylands of the HoA call 
for political responses that address social inequities and power imbalances, that safeguard 
pastoralists’ resource rights, and that allow for more inclusive forms of governance. Through the 





– this research has made an empirical contribution to the growing literature on the pastoralist–
climate change nexus and related discourses and narratives. This research is important in its own 
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Appendix C: Letter of information and Informed Consent Form 
  
1. Tom Campbell, DCU, PhD Research – Letter of Information 
Date: 
Dear colleague 
(Working Title): ‘Climate Change Policies and Pastoralist Livelihoods in the Horn of Africa: 
Insights from Ethiopia and Kenya’ 
I am writing to invite you to participate in a study of climate policy and pastoralism , which I am 
conducting as part of my PhD research with the School of Law and Government, Dublin City 
University, Ireland (http://www.dcu.ie/law_and_government/index.shtml). The aim of this research 
is to investigate contemporary climate change and green economy policies in Ethiopia and Kenya 
and to determine what the implications of these policies are for pastoralist livelihoods. 
This research is for purposes of completing a PhD thesis, but the findings may also be used in the 
writing of subsequent publications such as academic journal articles, conference papers, and similar 
publications. While your involvement in this research will bring no direct benefits to you or your 
organisation, you may find the findings and conclusions useful and interesting in terms of 
informing the work you do. 
My preferred approach is to conduct an audio-recorded interview, the content of which will then be 
transcribed. If you are happy be interviewed and for me to record the discussion, I will ensure that 
anything that might identify you as an individual is removed from the ensuing transcript. 
Participation in the research poses no material risk and you may withdraw from the study at any 
point. Full transcripts of interviews will be stored in confidential electronic files on a personal 
password protected Google drive until such time as the research is completed, or not longer than 4 
years after the interview is conducted (which ever is soonest) with confidentiality of information 
provided subject to legal limitations. After this period these transcripts will be disposed of. When 
the research is completed I will send you a link to the final PhD research thesis, as well as to any 
academic papers published that make use of the data collected. The thesis will also be available 
through the Dublin City University library. The interview is expected to take approximately one 
hour long and can be held at a time and location that is convenient for you. 
Please complete and sign the attached consent form if you are happy to take part in the study and 
would like the findings disseminated to you. 
 
With many thanks 
 
Thomas Campbell, PhD Student, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University (DCU) 
Thomas.campbell4@mail.dcu.ie 
If you have any concerns about this study and wish to contact an independent person, please 
contact: The Secretary, Dublin City University Research Ethics Committee, c/o Research and 





Informed Consent Form 
 
Research working title: Climate Change Policies and Pastoralist Livelihoods in the Horn of Africa: 
Insights from Ethiopia and Kenya 
Researcher: Thomas Campbell, PhD Student, School of Law and Government, Dublin City 
University (DCU) – Thomas.campbell4@mail.dcu.ie 
 
Name of Interviewee:  
___________________________________________________________________ 




 I have read and understood the letter of information about this research on climate change 
policy and pastoralism in Ethiopia and Kenya.  
 
 I have had the purpose of this research explained to me and have had an opportunity to ask 
questions about the study. 
 
 I understand I may withdraw from this process at any time, or ask for the recording device 
to be switched off. 
 
 I agree that my interview can be audio-recorded and transcribed, provided I cannot be 
identified from the written transcripts.  
 
 I am aware that the information I provide to the researcher can be only be protected within 
the limitations of the law, i.e. it is possible for the data to subject to subpoena, freedom of 
information request or mandatory reporting by some professions. 
 
 I understand that the transcript of this interview will be retained for a period of up to 4 
years, to be used solely for the purposes of supporting information for the PhD thesis 






 I understand I will not benefit directly from this research. 
 
 I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
 
 Accordingly, I freely and voluntarily consent to take part in this research project 
 
Participants Signature:         
Name in Block Capitals:         
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Appendix D: Interview Schedules 
 
Questions for Ethiopian interviewees: 
Policy Context 
1. What do you think have been the main challenges and issues facing the pastoralist / 
lowland areas of Ethiopia in recent years? 
 
Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q1 above): 
1.1. How significant is climate change for the future of pastoralist areas and pastoralist 
livelihoods in Ethiopia, and the HoA more generally? 
 
Policy responses and their effectiveness 
2. How are these challenges currently being addressed through national policies, 
including climate change policy? 
3. What in your view, does an‘effective policy’ look like? Is that what current policies 
are? If not, why not? 
 
Actors and institutions, and their motivations and interests. 
4. Who are the principle actors and institutions involved in policymaking in this area?  
Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q4 above): 
4.1 Are these the same actors who are also involved in shaping agricultural / livestock 
policy, or developing policies around ending drought emergencies in dryland areas?  
4.2. Are there other non-state actors involved in, or concerned with, this policymaking 
process? 
4.3. How are these policies negotiated if there are multiple actors or stakeholders 
involved and perhaps competing agendas? 
5. Does your organisation / ministry have any role in climate change, green economy or 
dryland / pastoralist development policies – at the formulation or the implementation 
stage? If so, what is the nature of this involvement and what does your organisation hope 
to achieve? 





5.1. If you or your organisation is not directly involved in policymaking do you align 
yourself with any particular policy position? Why? Why not? 
 
Sources of legitimacy and power 
6. Do some actors have more influence than others, when it comes to formulating policy, 
and if so, why? (from where do they draw their strength?) 
Supplementary questions  
6.1. Does the availability of new sources of climate finance have any influence in 
determining what policies are prioritised over others? 
6.2. Do the international community – donors or the UN for example – have any say over 
what policy options and types of interventions are privileged over others? 
 
6.3 Do international consultants, used to design and write policy – around climate change 
and the green economy for example – have any influence on the way certain policies are 
designed and communicated?  
 
7. Do any fora, or platforms, exist for pastoralist MPs, pastoralist representative 
organisations, or other civil society organisations, to input to these policymaking 
processes? 
Supplementary questions  
7.1. Are these platforms effective in your view? (Why? Why not?) 
7.2. (Ethiopia only) It has been argued that space for civil society engagement in 
policymaking processes has shrunk as a result of the 2009 Civil Society Proclamation – 
that restricts local NGOs from using foreign sources of funding for rights advocacy work. 
Has this any bearing on how pastoralist organisations, for example, might have engaged 
in recent climate or CRGE policy dialogues? 
 
7.3. (Ethiopia only) Does a Pastoralist Affairs Standing Committee (PASC) still exist in 
the Ethiopian parliament and if so does it have a role in policymaking? 
 
 
 Climate policy prescriptions and pastoralist outcomes  
8. Would you describe the policy options currently being promoted for pastoralist areas 
as largely ‘incremental’ in nature, or are they calling for more fundamentally 





8.1 Do the kinds of approaches and policy solutions favoured by policymakers today 
differ from dryland policies and programmes in the past? 
 
9. What, in your view are the consequences for pastoralists – both positive, and negative 
– of the policies we have been discussing so far?  
Supplementary questions (if not answered under Q9 above): 
9.1. Are these interventions and solutions likely to benefit pastoralists…. in terms of 
offering new opportunities for pastoral development, or strengthening their capacity to 
deal with climatic and other uncertainties? 
 
9.2. Do policies take sufficient account of the social and political (non-climatic) factors 
contributing to pastoralists’ vulnerability?  
9.4. Are there any cases where donor or government-led ‘climate resilience’ programmes 
in pastoral areas may in fact be undesirable, or unachievable, for some pastoralist 
households?  
 
10. What role, if any, do pastoralists have in the transition to a ‘green economy’?  
 
Supplementary questions, (if not answered under Q10 above): 
10.1. What are the implications for pastoralist communities in areas where renewable 
energy infrastructure development – hydro-electric power, geothermal or wind power – is 
being rolled out? 
10.3. Do you know of any REDD+ or other such carbon sequestration schemes in dryland 
/ pastoralist areas, and if so: what are the consequences of these for local pastoralist 
communities? 
 
11. Does ‘climate smart agriculture’ have anything to offer to the drylands, or to 
pastoralist livestock production more specifically? 
 
What future for pastoralism ? 
12. How do you see the longer-term future for pastoralism and pastoralists in Ethiopia? 







13. How can rangelands be made more secure for local users such as pastoralists?  
 
Supplementary questions (if not addressed in the answer to Q13 above). 
13.1. Are there any vested political interests that may seek to derail – or delay – climate 
adaptation, drylands development, and other policies that seek to improve governance for 
pastoralist areas? 
13.2. How can the ‘voice’ of pastoral communities in climate change and other policy 
















Questions for Kenyan interviewees: 
 
Policy Context 
1. What do you think have been the main challenges and issues facing the pastoralist / 
dryland areas of Kenya in recent years? 
 
Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q1 above): 
1.1. How significant is climate change for the future of pastoralist areas and pastoralist 
livelihoods in Kenya, and the HoA more generally? 
 
Policy responses and their effectiveness 
2. How are these challenges currently being addressed through national policies, 
including climate change policy? 
3. What in your view does an‘effective policy’ look like? Is that what current policies are? 
If not, why not? 
 
Key actors and institutions, and their motivations and interests. 
4. Who are the principle actors and institutions involved in policymaking in this area?  
Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q4 above): 
4.1 Are these the same actors who are also involved in shaping agricultural / livestock 
policy, or developing policies around ending drought emergencies in dryland areas?  
4.2. Are there other non-state actors – CSOs for example, INGOs, donors, or even the 
private sector – involved in, or concerned with, this policymaking process? 
4.3. How are these policies negotiated if there are multiple actors or stakeholders 
involved? – and perhaps competing agendas? 
5. Does your organisation / ministry have any role in climate change, green economy or 
ASAL / pastoralist development policies – at the formulation or the implementation 
stage? If so, what is the nature of this involvement and what does your organisation hope 
to achieve? 
5.1. If you or your organisation is not directly involved in policymaking do you align 
yourself with any particular policy position? Why? Why not? 
 





6. Do some actors have more influence than others, when it comes to formulating policy, 
and if so, why? (from where do they draw their strength?) 
Supplementary questions (if not mentioned in the answers to Q6 above): 
6.1. Does the availability of new sources of climate finance have any influence in 
determining what policies are prioritised over others? 
6.2. Do the international community – donors or the UN for example – have any say over 
what policy options and types of interventions are privileged over others? 
 
6.3 Do international consultants, used to design and write policy – around climate change 
and the green economy for example – have any influence on the way certain policies are 
designed and communicated?  
 
7. Do any fora, or platforms, exist for pastoralist MPs, pastoralist representative 
organisations or other civil society organisations to input to these policymaking 
processes? 
Supplementary questions  
7.1. Are these platforms effective in your view? (Why? Why not?) 
7.2. (Kenya only) The creation of the MDNKOAL in 2009, the subsequent ‘ASAL 
policy’ from 2012, and the process around the new Constitution in 2010, were all seen as 
opening up significant ‘policy space’ for pastoralists in Kenya engage in policy 
processes. Now that the MDNKOAL has been disbanded does that space still exist? 
 
7.3. (Kenya only). What are some of the specific governance challenges faced by ASAL 
County governments in addressing climate change? 
 
7.4. (Kenya only). To what extent do you think the current devolution or decentralisation 
process (including the formulation of County Integrated Development Plans and the 
Equalisation Fund) impedes, or facilitates, policy implementation that is favourable to 
pastoralists? 
 
 Climate policy prescriptions and pastoralist outcomes  
8. Would you describe the policy options currently being promoted for pastoralist areas 
as largely ‘incremental’ in nature, or are they calling for more fundamentally 
‘transformative’ change to take place?  





8.1 Do the kinds of approaches and policy solutions favoured by policymakers today 
differ from dryland policies and programmes in the past? 
9. What, in your view are the consequences for pastoralists – both positive, and negative 
– of the policies we have been discussing so far?  
Supplementary questions (if not answered under Q9 above): 
9.1. Are these interventions and solutions likely to benefit pastoralists…. in terms of 
offering new opportunities for pastoral development, or strengthening their capacity to 
deal with climatic and other uncertainties? 
 
9.2. Do policies take sufficient account of the social and political (non-climatic) factors 
contributing to pastoralists’ vulnerability?  
9.3. Are there any cases where donor or government-led ‘climate resilience’ programmes 
in pastoral areas may in fact be undesirable, or unachievable, for some pastoralist 
households?  
 
10. What role, if any, do pastoralists have in the transition to a ‘green economy’?  
 
10.1. What are the implications for pastoralist communities in areas where renewable 
energy infrastructure development – hydro-electric power, geothermal, or wind power – 
is being rolled out? 
10.2. Do you know of any REDD or other such carbon sequestration schemes in dryland / 
pastoralist areas, and if so: what are the consequences of these for local pastoralist 
communities? 
11. Does ‘climate smart agriculture’ have anything to offer to the drylands, or to 
pastoralist livestock production more specifically? 
 
What future for pastoralism ? 
12. How do you see the longer-term future for pastoralism and pastoralists in Kenya? 
 
13. How can rangelands be made more secure for local users such as pastoralists?  
 





13.1. Are there any vested political interests that may seek to derail – or delay – climate 
adaptation, drylands development, and other policies that seek to improve governance for 
pastoralist areas? 
13.2. How can the ‘voice’ of pastoral communities in climate change and other policy 
formulation be strengthened in the future? 
 
13.3. (Kenya only): Do you think the new Community Land Act (2016) will be beneficial 







Appendix E: Interview findings Axial codes (Nvivo) 
 
Kenya Interview findings  
Nodes\\Phase 2 – Axial Codes 
Name Description Files References 
Actors and Actor Networks  0 0 
Actor networks and discourse coalitions  32 96 
Actors’ motivations and interests  34 156 
Vested interests  25 52 
Actors’ sources of power and legitimacy  25 42 
Contingent nature of policy processes  33 129 
Climate policy framework and institutions  12 13 
Climate-finance mechanisms  19 25 
Devolution, pastoralism and climate change  33 107 
Policy coordination and effectiveness  30 79 
Policy discourses  0 0 
Climate policy prescriptions  28 58 
Technical / Apolitical solutions  15 26 
Conflicting, competing narratives and Inter-
discursivity 
 12 16 
Environmental and climate crisis narratives  35 88 
Inappropriate policies and investment  32 80 
'Food security without pastoralism'  24 37 
‘Beyond marginalisation’  23 32 
Land tenure  29 49 
Restrictions on mobility and access to critical 
resources 
 24 38 
Understandings and misunderstandings of 
pastoralism 
 25 55 
‘Modern, mobile and green’  21 70 
Narrative archetypes  3 4 
‘Pure pastoralism’  18 65 
‘Transforming pastoralism and drylands’  26 34 
ASALs as the new frontier  10 11 





Name Description Files References 
‘Too many people, too many livestock'  12 20 
Policy outcomes and consequences  0 0 
Adaptive capacity  17 31 
Future of pastoralism  31 45 
Pastoralist governance and rights  24 52 
Rhetoric or reality?  32 100 










Ethiopia interview findings  
Nodes\\Phase 2 – Axial Codes 
Name Description Files References 
Actors  0 0 
Actors’ motivations and interests  27 116 
Participation in policy processes  25 81 
Policy coherence and effectiveness  25 76 
Contingent nature of policy processes  13 18 
Sources of power and legitimacy  28 116 
Historical context  12 17 
New policy spaces  22 46 
Technologies of rule  5 6 
Discourses and narratives   0 0 
Conflicting narratives  15 27 
Consensus-building metaphors and narratives  9 18 
Dominant discourses  22 46 
‘Doomed by climate change’  28 59 
Climate resilience  28 67 
Coping vs adaptive strategies  18 25 
‘Drylands as the new frontier’   13 22 
‘Modern, mobile and green’  22 65 
‘Pure pastoralism’  19 80 
'A failure of policy'  29 158 
Countervailing power  14 22 
Loss of critical resources  20 63 
Political and governance solutions  10 14 
‘Transforming pastoralism and drylands’  28 49 
'Too many people, too many animals'  21 47 
Technical solutions  9 14 
Misunderstanding pastoralism  23 60 
Narratives with archetypes  4 10 
Policy consequences  0 0 
Adaptive capacity  22 37 
Future of pastoralism  28 62 
Pastoral governance  21 46 
Livelihoods  16 18 
Rhetoric vs realities  26 71 




















Appendix G: Indicative list of current or recent donor-funded pastoralist-resilience 





Programme Duration  Funding  Institutional 
Partners 







(PCDP) – Phase 
III 

















programmes, in 113 
pastoral and 
agropastoral 
woredas of the Afar, 
Somali, Oromiya, 












































PRIME focuses on 
selected districts of 
Ethiopia’s Afar, 






















Pastoralist area land 
rights and 
governance in 






30 NGOs, FAO EU-funded project 
designed to 
                                                        
375 This list is by no means exhaustive but does include the some prominent donor-funded pastoralist-area-resilience 











Programme Duration  Funding  Institutional 
Partners 
Areas of focus  








































services, DRR, in 

















US$122m  Objectives include 
‘enhance livelihood 





















Programme Duration  Funding  Institutional 
Partners 
Areas of focus  























Growth384 initiative  
USAID Resilience and 
Economic 










































Water supply and 
NR governance 










in Kenya Plus’ 
(StARCK+) 387  
2013–
2019 




and funding to 
CSA initiatives, 
and to the County 
Climate Funds 
(CCF)  





£14 million  “improve the 
coping strategies 
for over 500,000 of 
the poorest people 
in Northern Kenya 
(to help them to 





Horn of Africa 
2013– E40 million  GoK, FAO, 
DANIDA  
Drought resilience, 
food and nutrition 
                                                        
383 https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2018/05/08/boosting-prosperity-improving-equity-in-north-and-north-
eastern-kenya 











Programme Duration  Funding  Institutional 
Partners 





security, and DRR 
in ASAL 
counties389 












                                                        
389 https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/kenya-supporting-horn-africa-resilience-kenya-share%E2%80%93kenya_en 
